Aside from the nauseating mythological reminiscences of the Kennedy presidency, news today is dominated by discussion of the US Senate's decision to eliminate the possibility of filibuster for certain nomination votes.  All manner of dire consequence has been suggested on both sides of this procedural issue.  (Has there ever been a more hyperbolic characterization of anything than calling this change in voting procedures a "nuclear option"?) It seems to me that there is a deeper issue here that points to a rather depressingly misguided focus of intellectual thought on collective rationality, one that cuts across a wide variety of disciplines.  


There is, of course, an enormous literature – in philosophy, economics, political science, decision theory, etc. – on the rationality of voting procedures. And while focus on procedural matters is not universal in any of these disciplines, it is surely fair to say that such considerations dominate the intellectual discourse.  But such a focus requires ignoring one very simple, uncontroversial, and devastating fact: No voting procedure, nor any other definable procedure for arriving at a group decision is guaranteed to be rational.  To see this, one need not look at fancy cases. Indeed, let's take a case which is as straightforward as it can be. Say we have an election for department chair in a department of 100 people.  There are two candidates neither of which are voting.  99 of the department members favor A and 1 favors B.  So obviously the department should vote for A, right?  Well, maybe not. Suppose that each of the 99 are nearly indifferent. They think both A and B would do a great job, but have a tiny preference for A.  The one dissenter, however, is deeply opposed to A being chair, believing her election to be a disaster, one that will be crushing and probably fatal for that voter's continued participation in the department. (Add in, if you like that the dissenter is the only member of some minority group in the department.)  

In this case, I take it, a rational department will discuss the matter and decide to elect B.

And what can we say about this rationally required move? Well, that reasonable people will accept it, and that a well functioning department will have the sort of discussion that leads to that decision.  And that a department that fails in this is going to devolve into infighting, dissention, etc. One could add lots more details, in terms of how we appropriately ought to treat one another, what sorts of "social affect" are best encouraged in a functional department, ways of "actively listening," etc. But there is little prospect of such epistemological suggestions becoming determinate procedures.

But could voting procedures be amended to guarantee the right result? I think not. One can certainly move to a consensus model in which one person has the ability to "block" a case.  The Senate until yesterday had a modified version of this – 1/3 of the Senators could block.  But as the last 6 years show, this is no solution. If members of the body do not respect one another, do not instatiate virtue, do not show respect, collective rationality, know how to listen and compromise, etc. then the block will simply be used to prevent meaningful action.  

The fundamental point here is that these things are not to be fixed by obsessing on procedures. Procedures are merely tools, and in the hands of vicious craftsmen – to steal a phrase from Ani Difranco – every tool is a weapon if you hold it right. If philosophers and others want to contribute to more rational deliberative bodies, they need to stop obsessing with problems that can be formalized, and turn to messier issues of moral education, the socialization of habits of rationality, even, dare I say it, the cultivation of care and perhaps a beloved community (to steal from another social visionary.)  Again, I am aware that there is literature in this area, but I don't think anyone will claim that the cultivation of Aristotelian civic virtue is a dominant thread in the academic discussion of collective rationality.

For those who are interested, I wrote a paper on this idea a few years back. It is written not in academic style or primarily for academics – though it applies as much to academic communities as any other – but rather directed at disputes internal to activist movements.  

It is called "Fetishizing Process".

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4 responses to “filibusters and the fetishizing of procedures”

  1. Eric Avatar

    I do not have anything to add regarding some of the broader points you raise, but I would like to point out that there are voting procedures that have the property you describe. Specifically, I am thinking of a procedure discussed in a recent book by M. Balinski and P. Laraki called majority
    judgement. The idea is that the voters
    share a common grading language and
    assign grades to each candidate. Then, the
    candidate with the largest median grade is
    declared the winner. Balinski and Laraki
    came up with an interesting tie-breaking
    rule to deal with situations in which the, but
    that is not really relevant to my general
    point. To see an example of the election
    that the feature you desire: Suppose there are two candidates C1 and C2 and the grading language is A, B, C, D, and F (where A is the highest grade, B second highest,…, and F the lowest grade. For simplicity I’m just using the grading system that is common in America, but any set that is linearly ordered would work). Also, suppose that there are 5 voters assigning their grades as follows:
    voter 1: C1: A, C2: B
    voter 2: C1: A, C2: B
    voter 3: C1: C, C2: D
    voter 4: C1: C, C2: A
    voter 5: C1: C, C2: D
    Note that 4 out of the 5 voters rank C1 above C2 (in the sense that they assign a higher grade to C1 than to C2). So, if you simply ask everyone “who do you prefer?” or “who do you voter for?”, then candidate C1 would win in a landslide. But if you use Majority Judgement and ask voters to “grade” the candidates, then the median grade for C1 is C and the median grade for C2 is B. Since C2 has the higher median grade, C2 is elected. Examples similar to this have been used to show that there is something “wrong” with Majority Judgement, but I have never been convinced that this is really a flaw (mostly for the reason you mention above).
    Of course, one can find other flaws with Majority Judgement, and this is a bit of a digression from the overall point of your post, but I thought it was worth pointing to this somewhat non-standard approach to voting (I can recommend Balinski and Laraki’s book if you are interested in this approach to voting: it has a very nice discussion about voting theory, whether one can always find a common grading language, and some experiments where they tested their voting method during actual French elections).

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  2. Mark Lance Avatar

    Eric:
    I agree that you can design a procedure that blocks any particular problem. Moving to consensus, as I mentioned in the OP will also solve the one in question. But there will be other ways for irrationalities to result from your system. I mean if everyone decides that their preferences are really really important, and just gives As and Fs, we are back to standard voting. The point is that there is no way to procedurally define or formally enforce rational group interaction.

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  3. Howard Frant Avatar

    Two problems:
    1. I agree that there is no procedure that will always be collectively rational. But there are election procedures that are more likely to produce a legislature where negotiation is possible, if you think that’s a good thing. How about if we do that while we’re waiting for moral education to kick in?
    2. What’s the evidence that we actually know how to do moral education?

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  4. Mark Lance Avatar

    Howard:
    I’m not sure what election procedures you have in mind. Eliminating gerrymandering? But how do you do that without changing political culture?
    But more broadly, I’m not saying that procedures aren’t useful, or that in any given context some aren’t more useful than others. On the contrary, as I said in the OP, they are tools.
    On 2, well, this is a much bigger issue, but I think the implicit cynicism is unjustified. I think we know quite a lot about how to do moral education – which is deeply tied up here with rational education. We could know more – my claim is precisely that the pursuit of this, the development of theories of how to do it, needs to be seen as a pressing issue in philosophy. But there is no reason to think that improving the rational character of people is somehow a fundamentally impossible project.

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