This is my first foray into newAPPS waters– and I thank the newAPPS coterie for the invitation!– so I thought I’d start by tossing out a fairly straightforward philosophical claim:  Tolerance is not a virtue.

When I say that tolerance is not a virtue, to be clear, I don’t mean to imply that tolerance is a vice. No reasonable moral agent, certainly no moral philosopher worth his or her salt, would concede that.  Rather, I only want to point out that “being tolerant” requires at most little if not nothing more than refraining from being vicious.  Not only is it the case that we don’t define any other virtue in this explicitly negative way, but we also don't generally ascribe any particular kind of moral credit to persons who are merely refraining from being vicious.



There are, of course, many good moral reasons to encourage our fellow citizens and agents to be tolerant, not the least of which is that ignorance and prejudice, to which we are all susceptible, incline even the best of us toward vicious behavior.  In the unfortunate cases where ignorance and prejudice cannot be corrected or eliminated, we ought to try at least to de-fang them, ameliorate their effects and soften the severity of their blows.  I take the value of "tolerance" training to be that kind of propaedeutic, a disarmament strategy, an effort to achieve the least-worst state of affairs, or something like a sort of intro-level philosophy course in being a moral agent. 

So we have Lesson One for this intro course: if you want to be virtuous, you first have to stop acting like an a-hole.

Now, on to Lesson Two: you don't get any moral credit for not being an a-hole.

This particular issue– what I call the "hyperinflation" of the value of tolerance– has been brought to the fore over the course of the last couple of years for a number of reasons, almost all of which are in one way or another connected to our collective cultural valorization of the category of persons we call “allies.”  The generic frame for understanding “allies” as such, especially with regard to LGBT issues but also in re other underrepresented, marginalized or oppressed groups, frames aliies as those for whom perpetuating the underrepresentation, marginalization or oppression of Group X-to-which-they-are-allied is conscientiously disavowed. The regrettable consequence of that sort of framing is, unfortunately, the proliferation of a category of attitudes/behaviors by self-identified allies who subtly (and probably unintentionally) vacate the meaning of the word "ally" of any real positive or progressive moral/political sense at all.

For what it’s worth, I don't want to pick on allies any more than I want to pick on tolerant people.  That's not because I think allies (exemplars of tolerance, in many ways) exhibit some virtue that is beyond reproach, but rather because I think allies (some of them, not all of them, but more and more of them) don't exhibit any kind of positive "virtue" in their alliance at all. 

I’ll concede that these merely-tolerant allies don't deserve moral opprobrium for their tolerance, but neither do they deserve any significant moral praise.  They're not being vicious, thankfully, but they're not exactly being virtuous, either.  Increasingly, what it means to be an ally is to have taken on a moral disposition that is fundamentally (and much too proudly) neutral. There was a time when "ally" was the antonym of "opponent" and the synonym of "advocate”—and it is still the case that some allies are really advocates—but  more and more it appears that being an ally requires little more than a disavowal of the advocate/opponent dichotomy.  If anything is required of today’s allies at all, it is only a sort of "fine by me" indifference. 

Last month, on "National Coming Out Day," a group of students and faculty at my home institution (mostly "allies") wore t-shirts that read "LGBT? fine by me."  (For what it's worth, the "fine by me" catchphrase is not the creation our local LGBT ally group; it's a trademark logo created by the Atticus Circle, which actually is an "advocacy" group.) At the time I was unconvinced, and for the most part remain unconvinced, that "LGBT? fine by me"says anything substantively more distinct than "Diversity? whatevs.”  It’s difficult for most decent moral agents to disavow the basic sentiment “fine by me,” I’m guessing, but that’s mostly because we’ve been lulled into a kind of moral/political sleep by the enchanting "tolerance is a virtue" lullaby.  When forced to stop and really think about whether or not "fine by me" is something worthy of being declared on a tshirt, on one’s body, as a person, a citizen or moral agent—whether or not it’s even a declaration of virtue at all—I suspect the writing is on the wall.  When weighed in the moral balance, allies are found wanting.

If tolerance is all that is required of allies, if "fine by me" is the most substantive declarative statement that allies can make about themselves, then we ought to stop congratulating them on the deployment of their moral agency.  Be an advocate or an opponent, we should insist instead.  Or, if not one or the other, then concede that the matters on which you do not or cannot take a position don’t matter enough to warrant praise or blame.  Even Bartleby, who at least refused, did more.

To bring it all back home to professional philosophy, it may be worth asking how much the current debate about the underrepresentation of women and people of color in tenured or TT Philosophy positions is framed the same way, that is, framed by (and for the benefit of) those who naïvely believe that declaring themselves as tolerant of difference is tantamount to declaring oneself an  advocate for difference.  To wit, when it comes to a certain category of “allies,” it’s no wonder that underrepresented groups collectively sigh: with friends like these…

(More on this topic here!)

 

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8 responses to “Tolerance is not a virtue”

  1. Anonymous Grad Student Avatar
    Anonymous Grad Student

    Thanks for this post! While I agree with and appreciate lesson two, I am not so sure that tolerance is never a virtue. On certain views of certain virtues, merely refraining from having inappropriate feelings or mental states, and/or refraining from doing the wrong thing–that is, refraining from being vicious–may be virtuous. Take temperance, for example. Sometimes, at least, being temperate seems to require nothing more than simply failing to have and/or act on inordinate desires for inappropriate pleasures. I am not claiming that tolerance is like temperance in this regard, though it is not obvious to me that it isn’t; I would need to think more about it.
    It may also be worth noting that consequentialist views on which virtues are psychological states that leave the world better off (enough) may deem intuitively neutral states, and tolerance in particular, virtuous. If as seems plausible the world would be much worse were it not for tolerance, tolerance may be a consequentialist virtue (which is not of course to say that actively pursuing the goods one is merely tolerant of would not be more virtuous by consequentialist lights).

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  2. Neil Sinhababu Avatar

    Hi Leigh! Welcome to the blog.
    Would you say that honesty isn’t a virtue either, because it’s just the absence of the vice of dishonesty? I was thinking that there might be other cases of things often regarded as virtues that really are just the absence of vices. Maybe one can be virtuous by lacking a common vice.

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  3. Neil Sinhababu Avatar

    Darn you, Anonymous Grad Student! How did you type that fast? 🙂

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  4. Becko Copenhaver Avatar
    Becko Copenhaver

    I hope that tolerance is a virtue. I understand that the term has been multiply deployed by various folks to serve purposes that undermine the very virtue it is supposed to represent (I hope). I also understand that the meaning of the term has been and continues to be incredibly fluid.
    On one far end it denotes a kind of acceptance, if not friendship, to views that one regards as unacceptable in the barest sense that one, oneself, cannot and does not accept the view. Nevertheless, the view is valuable on any number of dimensions: it is instructive; it is significant in the lives of those one values; it is a way of looking at the world that one cannot accept but one recognizes as a viable way of looking at the world. In short, it is a view for which one would not blame another in terms of a basic epistemic norms (where the bar there is reasonably low).
    That strikes me as a virtue.
    On the other far end, it denotes allowing a view to have a space at all. In other words, on the other far end, tolerance means allowing a view that one does not hold to have some measure of consideration, but only on one’s own terms. That view must always know at whose pleasure it serves. Here there is no thought of basic epistemic norms – that would be a category mistake as it would take the view too seriously. One simply allows a view that one does not hold to have its “due consideration” out of considerations of an appearance of fairness.
    Obviously that is not a virtue.
    But let’s not condemn tolerance. Tolerance in its best sense involves humility, and humility involves a willingness to live with a view you positively cannot accept, with the full knowledge that living with it – really living with it – might change you.

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  5. Undergrad Sailor Avatar
    Undergrad Sailor

    Thanks for the post, Leigh. My comment is focused towards an area not covered in your post, so I apologize. I find your claim that tolerance is not a virtue to be compelling. Indeed, one of my favorite essays is Marcuse’s “Repressive Tolerance.” It seems to me that your point is dead on, especially in the context to which I’m most familiar: the U.S. military. I’ve been in the service since 2005, and a lot has happened since then. When the military lifted its restrictions on homosexuality in the military, we had to go through extensive “training”, basically, tolerance training. The most frequent comment I’ve heard in the last few years: “we only have to tolerate them, not respect (or like) them.”
    Tolerance in this case is certainly no virtue.

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  6. Leigh M. Johnson Avatar

    Thanks for the comments, all.
    @AnonymousGradStudent and @Neil: I see your point, I’m just disinclined to grant that “refraining from vice” is the same as “virtue.” Or, if it is, we ought to concede that we’ve vacated “virtue” of any morally significant meaning.
    Though I’d grant that many tolerant people are quite often virtuous in other ways, I’m not sure that the sorts of virtuous behaviors Becko describes are characteristic of “tolerance” per se. (Those behaviors seem to be indicative of other sorts of virtues– generosity, magnanimity, friendliness, charity, etc– and although they are certainly consistent with tolerance, they aren’t necessary for it.) To wit, when we say that someone is “tolerating x” I don’t think that we generally assume that said agent is doing anything other than not acting toward x in a way that we might find intolerant, vicious, or morally objectionable. As I said in the post, I agree that tolerance may be the first step toward developing an attitudinal disposition or acting toward x in way that is worthy of praise– and I suppose I’d also grant that, in certain situations, not-being-vicious may itself be worthy of some basic utilitarian praise– but we should make a distinction between acting-virtuously and not-acting-viciously. Otherwise, we back ourselves into ridiculous sorts of moral judgments (“Look how virtuous I am while I sleep!”) and using the term “virtue” in rather vacuous ways.

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  7. M. Anderson Avatar
    M. Anderson

    According to Nietzsche (BGE 262), “every aristocratic morality is intolerant…they consider intolerance itself a virtue, calling it ‘justice.’”

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  8. Brad Cokelet Avatar
    Brad Cokelet

    You might well know of these other works, but I think you should consider being even more suspicious of tolerance…have you had occasion to come across Marcuse’s “Repressive Tolerance” or Wendy Brown’s recent book “Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire”? I would be interested to hear if and how you get of Brown’s “anti-tolerance” boat!

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