In a series of experiments, the developmental psychologists Paul Harris, Kathleen Corriveau and Melissa Koenig have shown that young children are more confident about the existence of unobservable scientific entities than they are about the existence of unobservable (semi-)religious entities. 5-year-olds in the Boston area, for example, were more sure about the existence of germs and oxygen than they were about the existence of God and Santa Claus. The experimenters were surprised by this finding, and replicated in several settings, including children from religious households in Spain who were sent to religious (Catholic) schools, and children from a Mayan community in Mexico (Santa was replaced by local spirits that people widely express belief in). As I will show below the fold, a plausible explanation for why children are less confident about religious entities is that the testimony to religious entities differs from that of most scientific entities. It that’s true, we need to rethink how to spread and promote the acceptance of “controversial” scientific ideas like climate change, the safety of vaccines, and evolutionary theory. For, as I will argue, some well-meant efforts to promote such ideas may actually backfire and fuel skepticism. 


In a recent unpublished paper that will appear in an edited volume on testimony and children (Einav & Robinson, Children's trust in testimony), Harris and Corriveau suggest an intriguing hypothesis for why children are so confident oxygen exist but have doubts about God. Young children do not see an intrinsic difference between scientific and religious unobservables. Rather, they are very good at detecting consensus and doubts in testimony. When there is a lack of consensus, this raises a red flag, and makes children vigilant. Doubts, even implicitly raised, also increase epistemic vigilance.

Harris provides a nice illustration of a schoolteacher who led her class in prayer in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 “We thank you that we can trust in you that you have this situation under control, even though it seems to us that things are not under control…” – by this prayer, the teacher signals and recognizes doubts “it seems to us that things are not under control…” Importantly, this teacher was teaching in a fundamentalist school, which may contribute to less confidence about God's existence than about the existence of oxygen even in such milieus. Similarly, children hear their parents and others frequently say “I believe in God”, but not “I believe in oxygen”. Even implicit signals of controversy, such as professing that one believes p is true, make children less willing to accept that p is true, or more doubtful about its truth.

If these findings can be generalized, then well-meant efforts to promote scientific literacy might actually backfire. For instance, I recently read an article of someone who said she felt forced to “come out” as a pro-vaccine person (this is also very unfortunate way of phrasing things!) Anyway, when I had my oldest daughter vaccinated – this was years before that debate had become so public – I had no doubt in my mind this was the best thing to do for her. The idea of not having her vaccinated against horrible diseases, one of which my mother nearly died from as a child, was not even a live option. Now for my son, I also chose vaccination, but I felt more self-conscious about it, and found myself thinking when I was present at his vaccinations “vaccines are perfectly safe”. Of course they are! How could I even doubt it?

This generalizes to other forms of pro-science campaigning, including websites like talkorigins.org. These are well-meant efforts, but by explicitly highlighting that there is a controversy (where there shouldn’t be one, but de facto there is), they raise doubts in people’s minds and may paradoxically end up undermining trust. If whole campaign now started saying “Oxygen exists. Oxygen: the facts etc. with lots of links to papers demonstrating its existence, e.g., “Although we can’t directly see oxygen molecules, there is lots of indirect evidence for their existence”, this may raise doubts about their existence.

One might argue that oxygen and things like vaccines, evolution and climate change are different because people already raised doubts about the latter kinds of scientific entities. In the light of this, websites like talkorigins may be a good idea after all. But even so, we should rethink how such campaigns and websites are presented. Perhaps it is better to place more emphasis on the factuality of the claims, not on the controversy (a website like “Why evolution is true”, for instance, implicitly signals by its name alone that some people at least believe it is false). Consensus should also be highlighted, but not in an explicit way, e.g., "while religious fundamentalists believe evolution is false, here’s a long list of scientists who endorse evolution" is probably not very helpful in convincing doubters (who are typically of backgrounds that don’t give them the skills or literacy to understand why the testimony of scientists is so valuable). 

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4 responses to “How well-meant efforts can fuel skepticism about climate change, evolution and vaccines”

  1. Curtis Avatar

    I tackled a similar topic but from a different angle. How does science do itself a disservice when it seeks answers to questions it can’t answer? Specifically, predicting hurricane seasons: http://curtisknowsnothing.blogspot.com/2013/10/why-hurricane-season-predictions-are.html

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  2. Miles Rind Avatar

    It seems to me that people doubt or deny scientific conclusions because of some combination of natural cognitive biases and social reinforcement of contrary beliefs (e.g., by religious traditions), not because someone has publicly explained the considerations that support those conclusions. The doubts don’t originate with explanations of reasons for the conclusions (as your analogy with belief in oxygen seems to require); rather, the explanations are given in response to the doubts.
    Of course, answering doubts gives the doubts a kind of legitimacy, however restricted, that they would not have if they received no public acknowledgment at all. But I don’t see how disregarding anti-scientific attitudes can reduce their influence. It would be vain to try to deny or ignore the fact that there is controversy over, say, the theory of evolution. The question is not whether there is controversy but what the nature and extent of the controversy are. Those who try to spread doubt or disbelief toward well-established scientific conclusions always try to make it seem that there is a scientific controversy over those conclusions when there is none.

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  3. Helen De Cruz Avatar

    Hi Mike: Since evolution, climate and other “controversial” scientific topics are de facto controversial, I agree that it would be vain to ignore the controversy. But I think the way bloggers, science writers and the like respond to the controversy is suboptimal. The explanations, as you point out, are given in response to doubts. However, there is a significant amount of scholarship that indicates that the “ordinary folk”, i.e., the average person with perhaps a bit of college education or no college education, or education long ago, does not evaluate the epistemic standing of scientific claims by a careful weighing of the evidence. Harris et al in the unpublished paper I mention (which I think Harris can send you if you ask for it) describe an experiment where children and adults were asked about whether things like angels, germs etc. exist, and then asked how confident they were. The justifications for their confidence were very rarely (I think only 14%, but I don’t have the original paper here) in terms of assessing the evidence, but often in terms of deference (e.g., that they have this from a reliable testimonial source or common consent). So I appreciate the efforts of websites like talkorigins, but my point is that they should emphasize the unproblematic factuality of their claims, rather than reminding their readers that there is “controversy” over these claims. Just a change in emphasis might be a good idea.

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  4. Curtis Avatar

    Hi Helen,
    When it comes to climate change, I think a shift in perspective from what models can predict to what models can explain is important. Models of sea level rise by 2075 (or something) aren’t as much good as models that explain why sea level is higher in 2013 than it was in 1913, for example. I think this is a corollary to your point about framing the “headline” so to speak (“Why evolution is true”).

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