It is not very difficult to give undergraduates advice about where they might pursue graduate study without egregiously insulting large numbers of your professional colleagues. 

But then how to explain the ubiquity things like this not unrepresentative post by Spiros?*

In the context of a very nice post about an exceptional department, Professor Leiter claims: "The term 'pluralism'** has, alas, been debased to the point that everyone now knows it is usually a code word for 'crappy philosophy is welcome here'."

That's accurate, but a little too generous! For one thing, it understates the self-congratulation with which the term is deployed, and well as the ways in which it is wielded in order to deceive those most vulnerable in our profession.

I realize that many of our judgments of concerning philosophical work are somewhere between full-bore cognitive judgments and Kantian judgments of taste rather than judgments of things you happen to find agreeable. I mean, my distaste for a philosophical view or text is not the same as my distaste for bitter vegetables. And that's fine!


But, again, it's just not very difficult construe one's beliefs about philosophical value as full bore cognitive while at the same time being humble about those very beliefs. But why do so many of us find this difficult?

In general, we should as much as possible follow the following three defeasible assumptions: 

  1. If you are a professor, professors at other universities and are your colleagues, members of the same guild, 
  2. If you are a graduate student, the same holds of graduate students at other universities,
  3. People we disagree with (in or out of our department) about philosophical positions, texts, or paradigms are in general both informed and of good will. It is extraordinarily important that our behavior reflect this awareness.

Like Jaded Philosopher (e.g. here) it seems obvious to me that lack of humility with respect to your own philosophical paradigm and figures very easily translates into intolerance and bullying.

Moreover, I don't think that it is possible to sympathetically read the beautiful concluding chapter of Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy without agreeing with Jaded Philosopher on this. For people who haven't read the Russell, note that he takes two of the main virtues of philosophy to be that it inculcates the epistemic virtue of being radically open to new possibilities and also that it engenders a kind of humility that is in fact a general moral virtue. If you find Russell compelling then it's all the more of a drag when you see people using philosophy like male rams use their horns.

But what about the children, whom it is our duty to save from cognitive depravity? Well, first please just consider how much egregiously horrible social policy comes out of a desire to "protect the children." With respect to anyone who might take seriously Spiros' cranky quote above, just note that if in your desire to protect new graduate students you end up by example teaching them that a big part of philosophy is mocking people whom you disagree with, then you are the problem.***

Again, just check out Russell. The relevant discussion is on-line here.****

[Note:

*Who would enjoy the video to right, but would have liked this one better. Sorry man, we'll always have the final track on evillive with Glenn and Henry jointly affirming their numerical identity.

**Full disclosure. I am happy to describe my own department as pluralist with no use of scare quotes, and I'm also happy to be here. If you want to take what I write with a grain of salt as a result, that's fine. As Rollins notes above, "I still feel alright."

***Who are in their twenties, but issues involving heteronomy and autonomy with respect to faculty responsibilities to graduate students is a topic for another set of posts.

****Any time I post on anything relating to the vituperativeness of the analytic-continental divide, I get lots of e-mails from people all over the map, some of them are quite angry. Let me say a few things: (1) I am not speaking for anyone else at Newapps; yes, we are all individuals, and (2) I'm a terrible, terrible e-mail correspondent. Please, if the above prompts you to write me, just say it here instead, as non-vituperatively as possible. If you have tenure, say it here with your own name. If you're tenure track without tenure, then use a consistent handle. If you're not tenure track, then feel free to be anonymous or use different handles. Or don't say anything. It's all copecetic. Or rather it should be.]

Posted in , , ,

114 responses to “But What about the Children?”

  1. anonymous phenomenologist Avatar
    anonymous phenomenologist

    I wasn’t claiming that philosophy should consist all and only of arguments. I think that that’s wrong. I also wasn’t claiming that there aren’t many different ways of arguing. I think that there are many different ways of arguing. My claim is that there are many philosophers writing in the Continental tradition who either do not give any arguments or give very few arguments, and instead give summaries of whatever text they’re discussing. I constantly see sentences with the following sort of construction: “Merleau-Ponty urges us to think…,” which is then followed by a long quotation from Phenomenology of Perception (or whatever). But I want to know why Merleau-Ponty urges us to think this. What is the alternative position? Is it still of contemporary relevance? etc. Honestly, I can’t believe these sorts of points need to be brought up.
    If anyone wants to read a particularly atrocious example, here is a short article that argues that Merleau-Ponty does not have a theory of perception because perception just means representational theory of perception. Does this even count as serious philosophy? http://books.google.com/books?id=d56Yf1K46EYC&lpg=PA3&dq=merleau-ponty%20%22theory%20of%20perception&pg=PA83#v=onepage&q=merleau-ponty%20%22theory%20of%20perception&f=false

    Like

  2. Charles R Avatar
    Charles R

    What did Spiros mean by those “most vulnerable in our profession?”
    I mean, in light of what Patrick cites about Rescher’s thinking, I find the phrasing of “everyone knows” or “we all know” used to say-without-saying that goes on in these discussions fascinating but alienating. If I didn’t know what’s meant, like how everyone knows what pluralism means these days, then what is being said about my ignorance of it?
    On a different note, as much as I do think we have to consider the morality of how faculty treat students, I’m curious if it’s completely irrelevant to also take these opportunities for reflection on how we act and think of one another to also consider the morality of how we treat the administrative and physical plant staff of our departments, those other one-anothers. Bullies don’t just bully students, do they?

    Like

  3. Jon Cogburn Avatar

    anonymous phenomenologist,
    Please, the vast majority of readers here are in no place to assess claims about what counts as good Merleau-Ponty scholarship.
    I haven’t read any Toadvine or Madison and don’t have time in the near future given my responsibilities. I did go to a fantastic paper by Eugene Kleist on Merleau-Ponty’s late lectures and Schelling,* and Toadvine was discussed with respect. It’s fine you don’t like his book and the reasons you give are interesting, but you’re giving evidence that your interlocutors can’t respond to, because we’re not Ponty scholars and all are overworked with respect to our own projects.
    Also, as I tried to argue in the OP, I just don’t find denigrations of our colleagues as not being engaged in “serious philosophy” to be helpful. So I feel very conflicted about responding, but here goes. Yes, if it’s in a book edited by Shaun Gallagher it counts as serious philosophy.
    Please continue to discuss general things, but I’m begging you not to make it about individual people’s work. Not only were they not in the OP, but the kind of discussion at this point is in danger of replicating that which I thought you were against.**
    [*Which argued quite brilliantly against the Simondon/Deleuze/Speculative Realist interpretation of late Merleau Ponty as moving away from phenomenology. Kleist is a paradigm example of the kind of philosopher who can disagree respectfully about fundamental issues. We were not members of different tribes but rather colleagues in the same guild.
    **Cf. Nietzsche on fighting monsters, staring into the void, etc.]

    Like

  4. anonymous phenomenologist Avatar
    anonymous phenomenologist

    Jon Cogburn: Fair enough about not discussing specific philosophers. If you want to delete those posts that’s fine with me. My frustration is not with a vague group of SPEP philosophers, it’s with specific examples of (what I take to be) very bad philosophy. Many of those examples have been written by SPEP philosophers, but any discussion about good and bad philosophy seems to me to only gain traction in discussion of specifics. My other frustration is with the general idea that continental philosophers feel like the only thing keeping them out of the top departments is analytic prejudice. I do not deny that there is plenty of analytic prejudice, but that’s not the only reason. I would suggest that it’s not even the main reason.

    Like

  5. Jon Cogburn Avatar

    It’s no big deal. I enjoy reading what you have to say.

    Like

  6. Anonymous Continental Philosopher Avatar
    Anonymous Continental Philosopher

    @AP
    Doesn’t synopsis require interpretation, and isn’t interpretation itself a form of argumentation? One could argue that certain philosopers have failed to adequately justify their interpretations of Merleau-Ponty (or whoever), but if interpretation is itself a form of argument, this amounts to saying that their arguments are bad–not that they aren’t making arguments.
    In my experience, a lot of analytic-inflected history of philosophy runs afoul a similar problem: that of faling to provide sufficient historical context for the ideas, theories, arguments, etc. being discussed. As a result, I often feel as though ideas, theories, arguments etc. from the past are being reconstructed in a way that makes them more interest or relevant or whatever to contemporary discussions. Whatever this is, it isn’t good history of philosophy. Creative anachronism, perhaps?
    In any case, the take-away seems to be that philosophers (both analytic and Continental) occasionally make bad arguments, and I have seen enough howlers in both traditions that I see no reason to single out one over the other on this score.

    Like

  7. ACP Avatar
    ACP

    “My other frustration is with the general idea that continental philosophers feel like the only thing keeping them out of the top departments is analytic prejudice. I do not deny that there is plenty of analytic prejudice, but that’s not the only reason. I would suggest that it’s not even the main reason.”
    So what is?

    Like

  8. anonymous phenomenologist Avatar
    anonymous phenomenologist

    ACP: One can summarize a text without interpreting it by regurgitating an author’s claims without bothering to explain the hard passages or how different parts of a text relate to each other. Typically summaries precede in the order of the text being summarized and rarely make substantive claims about how the parts of a text might relate to an overall argument or how the same topic might be broached in different places. Summaries also typically use a lot of quotations, and instead of trying to understand the quotations by explaining them to the reader, the quotations just sort of stand. Summaries try to interpret as little as possible.
    Well, I would say that there are two main reasons that keep continental philosophy out of the top departments: first, my impression (and of course this is all just my impression) is that most continental philosophy written in America is not very good in the specific sense that even if an analytic philosopher were very very open minded and interested in continental philosophy, they would not be remotely convinced of the value of continental philosophy. A lot of continental philosophers would say that that is merely because of the biases of analytic philosophers. I don’t know what makes someone an analytic philosopher, but I don’t find much of the American continental philosophy very good, and I can safely say that I’m not philosophically biased. And, of course, there are quite a few philosophers who publish on continental philosophy in the top departments, they just didn’t attend the ‘usual’ continental schools. But who cares? I have yet to see a compelling reason for why they aren’t just as much continental philosophers as philosophers who attended Oregon, etc. Second, most continental philosophy in America doesn’t engage with non-continental philosophy in America, which is unfortunate. There are many overlapping issues that would help both sides.
    I should say: I’ve been speaking of Analytic and Continental philosophy, but day to day, I don’t differentiate between the two at all.

    Like

  9. ACP Avatar
    ACP

    It appears we’ve come full circle in this discussion, which is to say, we have gone absolutely nowhere. You’re really just rehearsing the Brian Leiter’s tired claims–you’re just doing it (mostly) without being a douche. I’ve had enough of this nonsense for one week. I’m going to go back to doing what I do best–i.e., crappy, not-very-good philosophy.

    Like

  10. anonymous phenomenologist Avatar
    anonymous phenomenologist

    I’m glad I’m (mostly) not being a douche. As I said before, I find that without concrete examples of articles or books to work with, there really is no way to have a real discussion. With concrete examples I have the (probably totally naive) hope that I could at least show you what I’m talking about. Without concrete examples, i’m left to talk in vague generalities that i can easily imagine sounding insulting. For what it’s worth, I hope it’s obvious that I’m motivated by my appreciation for continental philosophy and not by disdain.

    Like

  11. sk Avatar
    sk

    anon phenom: “Second, most continental philosophy in America doesn’t engage with non-continental philosophy in America, which is unfortunate.”
    first, in my experience, this is not true with regard to feminist philosophy and philosophy of race. there’s just not that many folks doing this work, and we read each other. more than that we have been influenced by each other, and by feminist philosophers and critical race philosophers who work outside of philosophy departments – of which there are many, something that should give pause.
    in my experience, also, this depends on what we’re talking about when we’re talking about non-continental philosophy: are we talking about austin? rorty? wittgenstein? quine? brandom? are we talking about metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy, aesthetics? i know continentalists – SPEPers, sorry! hard to keep a handle on these floating signifiers – that work on these folks and in these areas. it’s my instinct that, since continental philosophy now has the imprimatur of legitimacy, in that analytically trained folks work/publish on it, work done from the other side – that is, non-continental work done by SPEPers, is less legitimate. again, this is me following out the logic, not doing survey research. but it makes me wonder, what is pluralism? it seemed to be a good, but then the pluralists’ guide came out, leiter complained about how unfair it was that people used political terms politically, and now it is a cover for “crappy” philosophy – the kind of philosophy that causes unjust harm to the most vulnerable, graduate students? the kind of philosophy that corrupts the youth?
    by this i mean no disrespect to our esteemed hosts, btw. i just am fascinated by the strange recent history of this term, pluralism.

    Like

  12. bzfgt Avatar
    bzfgt

    I couldn’t get all of the pages of that Madison piece, but what I could read was pretty good. I take it the problem you have with it is he never motivates the position he describes M-P as having, but a continentally trained person already knows where to find such motivation ad infinitum (largely in Heidegger in this case) and if he’s telling the truth that the position he decribes M-P as having is not generally recognized as M-P’s (like Jon, I have no idea whether it’s true) then he’s doing something useful. I take the point of whether we’d still use the word “perception” to be secondary–the main point seems to be “Don’t think, as many do, that M-P does X; he actually does Y.” That seems useful to me.
    I only read the first three pages and then skimmed some of the rest though (again, Google books doesn’t give all the pages) so maybe I’m mistaken. It’s written clearly, anyway, which is supposed to be the major differend between good and bad philosophy according to, er, some philosophers…

    Like

  13. bzfgt Avatar
    bzfgt

    I should add to the last sentence of my first paragraph: “That seems useful to me as long as the ‘as many do’ is accurate.” Like Jon says, I am not qualified to say, but I didn’t take your problem with it to be that his “summary” was the usual one.

    Like

  14. Anonymous phenomenologist Avatar
    Anonymous phenomenologist

    I’m sure this thread is basically dead, but I thought I would respond anyways. My problem with Madison’s argument is that he confuses a theory of perception with a kind of theory of perception. It just doesn’t follow from the claim that theories of perception have frequently historically been representational to the claim that by “theory of perception” we mean “representational theory of perception.” Furthermore, if Merleau-Ponty doesn’t have a theory of perception, then why is he so concerned with refuting Descartes, Kant, etc.? If they were genuinely talking about different things, then there is no reason to disagree. If they are talking about the same thing, perception, but trying to give different accounts (or theories) of it, then they have quite a lot to disagree about. Sometimes by “theory” philosophers mean something thicker than an account, but I don’t really think that is at issue here given the quotation from Derrida.
    Sk: good to here that feminists and philosophers of race are reading each other’s stuff. That’s wonderful. I think it’s a shame that pluralism has become a code word. My issues are nominalistic. I’ve become frustrated with the quality of a lot of the American literature on 20th Century Continental philosophers. I’ve noticed that much of this literature is done by people who work at the well-known schools among the SPEP community. Mainly I think it’s a shame. I don’t see why the literature couldn’t be better. I’m not trying to draw broad morals about the philosophers who attend SPEP. I’m noting a correlation that I’ve discovered after reading a lot of the literature. Like I said above, from my perspective this is a debate that only has merit in the specifics.

    Like

Leave a reply to Jon Cogburn Cancel reply