I have been thinking about Québec separatism for a long time now—the PQ won its first election a few months after I arrived here. I abhor the very idea of separation except in conditions where the separating entity is actively being oppressed. On the other hand if a jurisdiction votes to separate, it should be allowed to do so without undue fuss. (The Québec situation is the paradigm case of undue fuss, though, prolonged as it has been for forty or more years, with the attendant destabilization of the Canadian polity and economy. Vote yes and then goodbye, or vote no and hold your peace forever.)

This said, I am puzzled by the stand of all three national UK parties regarding the pound. Their position, and that of the Governor of the Bank of England, is that an independent Scotland cannot have the pound. I don't understand.


Presumably, Scotland is a part of the UK, and the pound is the UK currency. George Osborne, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, said in an Edinburgh speech: "If Scotland walks away from the UK, it walks away from the UK pound," and "“There is no legal reason why the rest of the UK would need to share its currency with Scotland.” Osborn's second statement shows what is wrong with his first: the pound does not belong to "the rest of the UK"—it belongs to the UK. And the UK would, as such, cease to exist if Scotland were to walk away from it.

“The pound isn’t an asset to be divided up between two countries after a break up as if it were a CD collection,” said Osborne. But isn't that exactly what it is?

Oh . . . and the same goes for the Canadian dollar, I think.

Posted in

43 responses to “Scotland and the Pound”

  1. Tomatisblog.wordpress.com Avatar

    A point of information: the Scots can’t be stopped from using the pound if they want to. Ecuador uses the dollar and it didn’t need Washington’s permission. What they can’t have without the agreement of the rest of the remains of the UK is a currency union with it.
    And why do they want a currency union or to keep the pound even if they are so keen on independence?
    Also, it’s not clear how keeping the pound fits with staying in the EU, as new members are supposed to commit to using the Euro.

    Like

  2. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Wouldn’t the “rest of the UK” be obliged to negotiate joint control of the pound? After all ROUK would be one of two successors to the state that now owns it.
    As for the euro and Europe, I am again not sure why Scotland more than ROUK would have this problem. ROUK would be a new member of the EU if Scotland is.

    Like

  3. Tomatisblog.wordpress.com Avatar

    The ROUK, as far as I have heard, would not have to re-apply to join the EU. It would count as the same state, with a change to its size and borders, nothing more. The whole point of what the Scots want in having a currency union, as far as I can see, is not to have a jump in interest rates if they have their own currency. So while your logic is correct the all powerful markets regard sterling as belonging to London.

    Like

  4. Nathan Avatar
    Nathan

    Just as the EU remains the EU if member states join or leave the UK remains the UK regardless of whether one of its constituent parts elects to leave. The UK would be no more obliged to form a currency union with an independent Scotland than it is with the euro zone. Scotland could continue to use the pound as currency but that would not constitute a currency union any more than the fact I can use euros in many major retail outlets. You are treating the UK in a ‘metaphysically ontological’ rather than ‘socially ontological’ manner and a ahistorically, as if it were a perfectly organised federal entity equally constituted by all. The very fact of devolution, the variation of devolved powers in NI (most), Scotland (some), Wales (least) and England (none) and the phrase ‘the Westminster government’ show this is not the case. Alex Salmond has chosen no to go for ‘Devo max’ but independence, these are the implications. It is not like he was unaware of them, pretending it is a matter of natural justice rather than politics seems a little, well, obtuse.

    Like

  5. Eric Winsberg Avatar
    Eric Winsberg

    The pound is a fiat currency. Its value is only what the issuer says it is, and its value flows from the trust that its users have in the issuer. Osborne is just saying, we will not put our trust behind your currency if you walk away from the UK. Of course, the converse is true too. If osborne kicks Scotland out of the Pound, that Scotland’s trust will not stand behind the UK’s pound. So, the situation is perfectly symmetrical, its only that one half of the symmetry is being taken for granted.

    Like

  6. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    I hate to say it, but I honestly don’t understand most of what you say. (And I really mean “don’t understand.” I am not acquainted with constitutional law.)
    First: The EU has a different ontological status than the UK, doesn’t it? It’s an association of states, and each state can drop out at will. That’s not the same as a single state, which the UK is (I take it, or am I wrong?) I can’t see what devolution has to do with it. That’s just an internal constitutional issue.
    Second: I understand that Scotland can use any currency it likes, down to and including the Indian rupee. But would it have a claim on ownership to any currency other than the pound? Presumably not. (No more so than you do when you use the euro in various retail outlets.) Would it have claim on partial ownership of the pound? I can’t see why not.
    Third, I understand Tomatisblog’s comment that the markets would accept whatever currency was controlled by London. So if the pound was discontinued and the Bank of England decided to start a new currency homonymously called the ‘pound sterling,’ the markets would accept that as the natural successor of the pound sterling I. That’s fine. But that doesn’t make it the case that £ the elder = £ the younger. (Is market acceptance vs identity the same as “social ontological” vs “metaphysical ontological”?)
    Fourth, why is Alex Salmond’s rhetoric any more relevant to this issue than George Osborne’s? (Or were you just venting? . . . I tend to do that a lot when I think of Québec.)

    Like

  7. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Eric, I think your point is the same as Tomatisblog’s @ 3. I agree with him/her and you that the markets will put their faith in London rather than Edinburgh. (I certainly would, so why not Soros?)
    But can London “kick Scotland out of “THE” pound”? Would “the” pound persist and endure after said kicking-out? Don’t say: the markets would take it to be same entity. Perhaps they would, but this isn’t my question.

    Like

  8. tveb Avatar
    tveb

    As a couple of others have pointed out above, if Scotland insists on having monetary policy autonomy, it can call the currency anything it likes (including “pound”). But if it wants to maintain the (financial) status quo–and I can see why they would want to avoid major disruptions or at least short-term volatility, because for one, it would not be really clear how major investors/traders would react–the others are not obligated to assist them. So yes, Osborne misspoke (and Scotland indeed can claim part- ownership of the name), but what he’s really doing is sort of blackmailing them.

    Like

  9. Eric Winsberg Avatar
    Eric Winsberg

    Yes, strictly speaking, there would cease to be an entity that was identical to the present day pound. There would be a new UK pound, and a new scottish pound. But the UK would be able to convince all market participants to treat their new pound as if it were the same as the old pound. The exchange rate between the old pound and the euro would be unaffected with the new pound, etc. So even though you told me not to, I’m going to say: “the markets would take it to be same entity.” and there is no other interesting criterion of identity for currencies.

    Like

  10. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Aside from the extreme charity of calling blackmail “misspeaking,” this seems right.
    But I’d like to put Realpolitik aside. What would happen if Scotland separated, and then demanded a share of ownership in the Bank of England? They could appeal to the House of Lords, and the Law Lords would surely give them a fair hearing. No?
    So suppose they demanded as minority shareholders that they should have representation on the Monetary Policy Committee? Wouldn’t they have a right?
    It’s interesting though that as far as I can tell there is not a single Scot on that committee now. Everybody there has only London, Ottawa, Munich, or New York experience! Maybe the Scots would benefit from part ownership!
    By the way, it’s super-interesting that the Governing Council of the Bank of Canada has only one Quebecker and only one woman (who happen to be the same). No women on BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee. (However, seven of nine advisors to the BoC’s are women: two francophones.)

    Like

  11. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Ha! Strictly speaking, yes, but it’s not interesting! Some philosopher, you are.

    Like

  12. Neil Levy Avatar
    Neil Levy

    I don’t know whether it is true, but the stated reason is that the Euro crisis shows that monetary union without effective coordination of fiscal policy is inherently destabilizing. Of course, coordination of fiscal policy could be negotiated, but it is hard to see how that would differ from the status quo, in which many powers have been devolved to the constituent parts of the UK.

    Like

  13. Eric Winsberg Avatar
    Eric Winsberg

    but what he’s really doing is sort of blackmailing them.
    Perhaps blackmail is part of the story. But surely the present situation with the Euro has made people rightly nervous about currency unions in the absence of sovereign power.

    Like

  14. Eric Winsberg Avatar
    Eric Winsberg

    Neil and I crossposted the same point.

    Like

  15. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    I am not sure that monetary policy has devolved in any way at all. As I mentioned in comment 10, there is nobody from Scotland on BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee.
    And yes, I agree that people are nervous of monetary union without sovereignty. But I would point out that Scotland (or rather the SNP) has not been nervous about making people nervous. All of this kerfuffle is a good indication of how successful they have been.

    Like

  16. Neil Avatar
    Neil

    That monetary policy has not devolved isn’t an objection to my point: it is my point!

    Like

  17. David Wallace Avatar
    David Wallace

    A few points about UK governance:
    (1) Pedantry: the UK stands for “The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland”. The “United” bit doesn’t refer to the England/Scotland union, but to the Britain/Ireland union. “Britain”, historically, is the union of (England+Wales) and Scotland.
    (2) Scotland is proposing to secede from the UK, not cause the UK to break up. But that isn’t particularly crucial, because
    (3) The formal mechanism for independence is that the UK parliament will pass a bill that declares Scotland to no longer be part of the UK. That bill will set all the rules for (e.g.) what happens to the Bank of England. That bill, once passed and signed by the Queen, will be immune to any appeal to the Supreme Court (formally the Law Lords) because
    (4) under the UK constitution, Parliament is sovereign. There is no equivalent of the US Supreme Court, and no written constitution. Parliament could, if it saw fit, pass a law mandating the slaughter of the firstborn.
    (5) It’s in any case irrelevant who formally owns the Bank of England. What ultimately grounds the financial status of “fiat” money like the Pound is that the UK government will accept it in payment of debts (notably tax). A Scottish-controlled central bank might issue money, might call it “pounds”, but as long as the UK government doesn’t recognise it, the fact that it’s called that doesn’t matter.

    Like

  18. Eric Winsberg Avatar
    Eric Winsberg

    David:
    I mostly agree with your (5), and that’s more or less what I was saying in my #9, but I was wondering about the following fact: surely the Bank of England has some reserves in the form of foreign currencies and bonds, and some gold. Now, as a fiat currency, this amount is probably rather nominal, but it must exist. And so whoever owns the bank of england owns these reserves, no?

    Like

  19. Randy McDonald Avatar

    Jane Jacobs made the argument in her 1980 The Question of Separatism that independence motivated for economic reasons is pointless of the seceding entity doesn’t have control over its currency and its economic policy. Writing about the particular case of Quebec and sovereignty-association, Jacobs wondered why an independent Quebec would go to great lengths to achieve independence but then to try to revive the old union in a form that would undermine the whole project.
    Scottish separatism seems to be at least as driven by economic concerns as by cultural ones; Gaelic and even Scots aren’t nearly as widely spoken as French in Quebec or Catalan in Catalonia, say. SNP people have been talking about Scotland becoming a social-democratic state while the rUK goes off and does whatever right-wing aristocratic capital thing it wants to do. If that’s the case, why would Scotland keep a currency geared towards the dominant British ideology instead of an independent currency suiting its needs?
    There’s even good reason for the rUK to not favour a currency union with Scotland. Given the much smaller size of the Scottish economy, the rUK would be the dominant player and the only state capable of bailing out the entire union. Yet in the case of a currency crisis, the rUK would have only nine-tenths of the economy that it once had. This would increase the costs to the rUK significantly, especially if Scotland adopts different economic policies that would put the currency union under strain.

    Like

  20. Jonathan Birch Avatar

    There is a precedent, of course, which is the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922. They did initially use British currency. After a few years they introduced an Irish pound, which was kept at a 1:1 exchange rate with sterling until the 1970s.
    The formal name of the UK was changed from the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’ to the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’. I suppose that, with Scotland gone as well, we might become the ‘United Kingdom of Southern Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ or something equally awkward.
    So if one accepts that the country currently known as ‘the UK’ would cease to exist if Scotland were to leave, then that country has only existed in the first place since 1922. Remember that the next time someone tells you that the UK is older than the USA! But then again, perhaps the country currently known as ‘the USA’ only came into existence in 1959…

    Like

  21. Incandenza Avatar
    Incandenza

    It’s always a bit embarrassing for me when philosophers talk about economics (subject to a number of important exceptions). I think it might be helpful for many of the participants here to bear the following facts in mind:
    1. As others have noted, Salmond does not simply want Scotland to “use” the UK pound, in the sense of using it to buy bread at Scottish supermarkets. There is, of course, no way that the UK can stop Scotland “using” the pound in this very weak sense, any more than the USA can stop Ecuadorians from using the US dollar at Ecuadorian supermarkets.
    2. Rather, when Salmond states that Scotland ought to be permitted to use the pound, he is really making two claims:
    (i) Scotland should be permitted to play some role in the appointment of senior members of the Bank of England, thereby continuing to exert a nontrivial influence on UK monetary policy (that means things like interest rates, money supply, quantitative easing, etc.)
    (ii) The Bank of England should continue to act as the lender of last resort for Scottish banks, e.g. RBS.
    That is the true meaning of a “currency union”.
    3. When these elementary points are made clear, it is readily apparent that a currency union between rUK and Scotland is not an “asset” in any interesting sense. It is perverse to describe the right to determine the monetary policy of the UK as an “asset” to which Scotland is entitled post-independence. Certainly I have never seen such an asset on any balance sheet I am aware of! If the right to determine the monetary policy of the UK is an “asset” to which Scotland is entitled post-independence, then presumably the right to vote on legislation in the UK Parliament is also an “asset” to which Scotland is entitled post-independence!

    Like

  22. Incandenza Avatar
    Incandenza

    Also, the suggestion that Scotland is somehow a shareholder of the Bank of England is frankly bizarre. The Bank of England is a corporation formed by Royal Charter, not a company formed under the Companies Acts. It doesn’t have shareholders or anything equivalent to shareholders.
    It makes about as much sense to suggest that the UK Parliament is a company or quasi-company with shareholders or quasi-shareholders. Should Scotland assert a right to appoint Members of Parliament post-independence on the basis that it is a minority shareholder of the UK Parliament?!

    Like

  23. Alan Weir Avatar

    It’s good to see some informed discussion of this by philosophers, I’m afraid the public discussion by some English philosophers on this in the UK has so far been of very poor quality (I write as a Scottish philosopher who is in the SNP (Scottish National Party)). Here’s a few points I’d make.
    a) The SNP are not in favour of ‘separatism’ as Mohan called it, a scare-word used by our British Nationalist opponents. The goal is for the Scottish parliament and government to have the same status as those of e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and not, as currently, a parliament subordinate to, and created by, a parliament whose electorate is 84% English (how many Danish people want to see their parliament reduced to the status of a German Land? Is there much opinion in Canada in favour of Canada becoming a US state?) whilst maintaining open borders, free trade, cooperation without subordination as happens in the EU and the Nordic Union. Scandinavia in fact is very much a model for the SNP.
    b) On the currency, the Scottish government’s fiscal commission group (which included two Nobel (as it is informally called) prize winning economists, Stiglitz and Mirrlees), recommended a number of options among which they favoured a formal currency union, as per the 70 year long one between Belgium and Luxembourg, (though I think this was a rather strange dual exchange one), noting the very high degree of convergence of the Scottish and rUK (rest of the UK) economies, in contrast with the Euro zone, though with the possibility of asymmetric shocks due to Scotland’s oil wealth. Its other options included an informal currency union, as per the Irish Free State, initially, or Panama, but that has the problem of no lender of last resort; or floating our new currency, as the new states which broke away from the Soviet Union did; or a dual currency.
    c) Our own currency is the favoured choice of a number of groups in the Yes campaign, but not the SNP, though I think many of the latter view the sterling currency union as a ‘walk before you run’ matter (some economists think this wouldn’t work because there would be capital flight given the likely temporary nature of the union). Our own currency would of course give us a greater degree of independence more akin to Norway’s than the Netherlands or Austria (but it is silly to say these aren’t independent countries, as the unionist parties insist on saying). But it would have downsides, notably transaction costs and the need to insure in default swaps against uncertainty.
    d) A great deal of the rationale for the SNP’s favouring a currency union is ease of transition: the main tactic of the British Nationalist parties- Labour, Tory and the LibDems- is to play up as far as possible the uncertainty of change and undermine as much as possible the growing self-confidence of Scottish people, particularly the younger generation, in themselves as a nation equal to, not inferior to, its neighbours. So it is as much a psychological policy, by the SNP, as an economic one.
    e) The Scottish Government claim that the unionist parties combined rejection of a formal currency union is a bluff because there is a self-interested reason for rUK to enter one: lower transaction costs together with the fact there is no real risk in providing those lender of last resort facilities which are needed: liquidity support, which the Bank of England (which is in fact the UK’s central bank, but the name tells you everything you need to know about the nature of the UK) and the Federal Reserve provide outside their own domains anyway, and deposit insurance, which the Scottish govt could guarantee to indemnify. I think they are probably right: and if it is not a bluff, it is a threat of a form of economic sabotage.
    f) If a formal currency union is indeed rejected by rUK, Scotland could continue to use sterling as before and also, as the fiscal commission noted, launch its own currency (providing lender of last resort facilities, probably pretty limited initially) initially as a online currency (as the Euro was initially). It also has the means of retaliation if there is any economic sabotage. (I have to say I think this is unlikely, you just need to look at the way the UK behaved when the Irish Free State declared itself a Republic to see how unlikely this idea that the English will want to punish the Scots for seeking equality with the other small European nations is). In particular England/UK’s nuclear deterrent is completey based in Scotland. Although it would take a long time safely to remove the missiles from their bunkers, the submarines could be expelled on day one of independence (as many Scots wish anyway), leaving England overnight as a non-nuclear power, probably for a considerable time, and placing its UN Security permanent seat in great jeopardy
    g) Finally: woops I’ve gone on quite a long time you can see I’m a bit obsessed about this- the EU. That’s a complicated one too. You would think, as Mohan said, that since the UK is in unionist ideology a multi-national state formed by two unions (though the second: GB with Ireland was a bit of a sham) on dissolution both parts have the same status, e.g. both remain in the EU or both are out. But the view of the UK’s lawyers, and I haven’t seen this contradicted, is the GB in 1707 is just a continuation of England (that’s how the English certainly have always seen it); UK in 1801 of GB and rUK in 2016 or 2026 or whenever, of UK so that it will take on all the treaty responsibilities, and of course all the debt. The UK government recently confirmed this is what would happen, another interesting economic aspect. A lot more to say on the latter of course and on Europe: the German precedent, although a converse case: fusion of a state outside with one in, rather than fission, is the most important precedent it seems to me.
    Oh correction re David’s comment, the doctrine that the UK parliament is sovereign holds only in English law, not Scottish law, (we still have a separate legal system based on distinctive Romano-Dutch principles). This was highlighted in a famous judgement of the Scottish Law Lords when the right of the Queen of the UK (btw virtually no one in England, bar her, seems to realise there is no more a Queen of England than a King of France!) to call herself Queen Elizabeth II (there never was a monarch called ‘Elizabeth’ in Scotland before her) was challenged. The Lord President declared ‘the principle of unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively English principle and has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law”. The Scottish Law Lords nevertheless said she can call herself what she likes but also affirmed that parliament is not sovereign in Scotland, which could have interesting implications if there is, as seems alas likely, a no vote but Scotland gains enhanced devolution and a right of secession.

    Like

  24. David Wallace Avatar
    David Wallace

    Eric: I’m sure you’re right about reserves.
    Having said which, I think that would get subsumed in the question of who owns the (vastly larger) debt obligations of the BoE. My tentative impression is that in the event of Scottish independence without currency union, the rest of the UK would inherit that debt, and presumably also those reserves.

    Like

  25. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Alan @ 23, thank you for this informative and thoughtful response. Some questions and comments on your lettered points:
    a. I am not sure what ‘separatism’ means in Scotland; in Canada, the term tends to be shunned by the PQ (who call themselves sovereignists). I think it is natural to use it of a movement to carve out a sovereign state from a larger unit now sovereign. Let’s not quibble about terminology though, and just call the SNP sovereignists. (Or ‘sovereigntists,’ which is more like English—in Canada, the term is taken from French usage.) Re parliaments, I would have thought that the current status of the Scottish parliament is akin to that of a Canadian province. Ontario’s parliament is not subordinate to Canada’s, but it legislates independently over a distinct set of topics. At the same time, Ontario is a part of Canada.
    b. I would have thought that post-sovereignty, there would be one (unsatisfactory) situation, with negotiations open (or complete) regarding a resolution. The point that I have been making is that in the absence of any treaty, the immediate post-sovereignty situation is that there would be one currency with no exclusive ownership. (David Wallace’s point about “the” UK government accepting the pound in payment of debts is irrelevant: there would be no automatic continuity immediately post sovereignty. Eric Winsberg’s “fiat” is also beside the point, because similarly it isn’t clear whose fiat is operative.)
    f. Correct me if I am wrong, but I think this comment reveals that you are not thinking about the UK being partly Scotland pre-sovereignty. You say “it wold take a long time to remove the missiles from their bunkers, the submarines could be expelled on day one”. In my way of thinking, Scotland has part ownership of all UK assets immediately post-sovereignty, from the submarines in Scottish bases to Westminster Palace itself. These assets have to be divided in some rational way (like a CD collection post-divorce). It may be natural and intuitive for Westminster to go to the English and Holyrood to the Scots. But this doesn’t gainsay that before the assets are actually divided, they are joint property.
    g. This is perhaps the most interesting thing to me, because completely new. Are you saying that according to the UK’s lawyers, the UK is just a continuation of England in the way that current Germany is a continuation of the Federal Republic? If that is correct, then all bets are off on everything I have said! Please clarify.

    Like

  26. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    I am terribly sorry to have embarrassed you. My post was interrogatory, not affirmative.
    I am afraid I don’t understand your position that the Bank of England is not an asset “in any interesting sense.” Here is something from the Bank’s website: The Bank of England is the central bank of the United Kingdom. Sometimes known as the “Old Lady” of Threadneedle Street, the Bank was founded in 1694, nationalised on 1 March 1946, and in 1997 gained operational independence to set monetary policy.
    I am not sure what “nationalized” means, if it doesn’t mean that it became the property of the nation. When I said “shareholder” I was analogizing. I don’t believe that the BoE has shares outstanding.
    You say that Scotland wants to continue exerting non-trivial influence on UK monetary policy. First of all, I don’t believe that Scotland now exerts any influence on UK monetary policy as such (any more than a Canadian province exerts influence on Canadian monetary policy). But should Scotland become independent, then the assumption would be that it had a partial right to all UK assets, including the Bank of England.
    It would be nice to be instructed by you on these matters. It would be even nicer if you adopted a more respectful and friendly tone.

    Like

  27. tveb Avatar
    tveb

    Also, Incandenza’s somewhat haughty and superior tone would seem to be a tad unjustified, especially since many people already realize most of the points he/she is making (as I noted in #8, “the the others are not obligated to assist them”).

    Like

  28. Randy McDonald Avatar

    Alan:
    “The SNP are not in favour of ‘separatism’ as Mohan called it, a scare-word used by our British Nationalist opponents. The goal is for the Scottish parliament and government to have the same status as those of e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and not, as currently, a parliament subordinate to, and created by, a parliament whose electorate is 84% English (how many Danish people want to see their parliament reduced to the status of a German Land? Is there much opinion in Canada in favour of Canada becoming a US state?) whilst maintaining open borders, free trade, cooperation without subordination as happens in the EU and the Nordic Union. Scandinavia in fact is very much a model for the SNP.”
    This makes little sense.
    1. Nordic countries may cooperate–though there is no institutional “Nordic Union”, at least not by that name–but Nordic countries are also sovereign nation-states.
    2. You say that the “goal is for the Scottish parliament and government to have the same status as those of e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria”. That is to say, you want Scotland to become an independent state.

    Like

  29. Alan Weir Avatar

    Mohan@25
    The Scottish Parliament is certainly subordinate to Westminster. Although (by contrast with a previous devolution plan) the default is that the Scottish parliament legislates on everything which is not reserved to Westminster, the latter can override any legislation of the Scottish Parliament if it wants, and restrict its powers (though there might be an interesting clash, given that Scots law doesn’t recognise the unlimited sovereignty of any parliament if that was tried).
    I don’t know about Canadian provinces (except that they control much more of their revenue than the Scottish parliament does) but Ontario and its people are surely still subordinate to the federal parliament in this sense: the most important decisions: macroeconomic, war, international relations, get taken by the latter, and could be taken by a party which is a minority in Ontario, yes?
    b. Sterling is an internationally tradeable currency and the banks which operate in Scotland (most of whom are, like ‘Royal Bank of Scotland’- a name which is a bit like ‘Holy Roman Empire’- only very marginally Scottish, in terms of ownership, clients, assets, even when incorporated there) have reserves of sterling. So with no agreement an informal currency union could continue, as long as the Scottish branches of these banks continued to have access to sterling, which there is no reason to say they wouldn’t. Sterling wouldn’t cease to exist on the demise of the UK any more than it ceased to exist in 1921 when the UK of GB and Ireland expired and the UK of GB and N.Ireland replaced it.
    I think, re Incandenza @21, when Alex Salmond, who is a trained economist, talks about sterling as also a Scottish asset, he doesn’t of course mean it can be divided up like a CD collection, as Osborne said (though the BoE’s foreign and gold reserves could) but rather that the strength and reputation of sterling, such as it is, surprisingly high given the debt to GDP ratio, is partly due to Scotland’s contribution e.g to the balance of payments and fiscal situation. That creates a moral liability on the part of rUK (though the liability to compensation for the deception by the UK govt in the 1970s over the likely size of oil revenues is in my view greater). I think that’s what he means, about it being a a Scottish contribution which has to be taken into account in negotiations.
    c. Sorry I wasn’t thinking about Scotland getting 8.4% of the Trident nuclear submarines. But their base is in the Gare Loch with the warheads (not missiles I should have been clearer) stored in the neighbouring Loch Long. There is nowhere really suitable elswhere in the UK, I believe, and anyway to create an operational base elsewhere would take many years (perhaps the fleet could share the US facilities in Georgia, I don’t know). My point is that this is a very strong bargaining card for Scotland: we could “de-nuclearise” rUK (of course many people there would like this, but not the governing elite) straight away.
    g) As I understand it, it’s a matter of dispute, at least among non-German international lawyers, whether Germany is the successor of FRG, and the latter of the Third Reich. Cf.
    von der Dunk, Frans and Kooijmans, Peter H., “The Unification of Germany and International Law” (1991). Michigan Journal of International Law see in particular p. 521-2.
    http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw/7
    Interestingly, it is there and elsewere claimed that though Basic Law 23 of the FRG constitution supports the continuation claim, Basic Law 146 contradicts it. Germans have had real trouble with consistent basic laws right back to Frege!
    Anyway, the more important point I think is that the lawyers seem to agree that political considerations matter more than legal. The need to keep FRG in without interruption is what led to 16 million non-EU citizens being instantly admitted even though their economy nowhere near met the conditions for EU membership. Likewise, I suggest, political considerations, if there was a Yes vote, mean it is unlikely 5 million Scots, who are already EU citizens and whose economy is in complete conformity, would be evicted. (The UK government, moreover, in the Edinburgh agreement with the Scottish goverment, has pledged to act in ways which are in the best interests of both nations, should there be a yes vote).
    On UK = England+. Some Scottish Nationalists have tried to hold unionists to their official line, which is that there is no such identity, and say that, even though in political actuality this is true, the above equation won’t hold in international law. These nationalist argue that Scotland and rUK will be treated as joint successors as per Article 34.1(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States. But the UK (like most states) is not party to this convention. As far as I can see the legal consensus is that rUK would be the continuing state in international law, this is what the experts commissioned by the UK say:
    ‘the passage of such a long period of time would make it difficult for Scotland to assert identity with the pre-1707 Scottish state for legal purposes, and even if it did so that would not affect the status of the rUK as continuing the legal personality of the UK’
    see the UK goverment publication
    https://www.gov.uk/government/news/factual-analysis-promised-as-legal-implications-of-scottish-independence-made-clear
    with its heading ‘An independent Scotland would be regarded as a completely separate state under international law while the continuing UK would retain responsibility for all UK institutions, laws and treaties, according to an expert legal opinion published today’
    The UK has acknowledged it will take on, as rUK, all the UK debts (just as Russia took on all the debts of the Commonwealth of Independent States). True it also argues that an independent Scotland has a moral duty to take on a new debt, its share of the giant UK national debt. I agree this is a liability on Scotland’s side but would argue that rUK has a moral liability to compensate Scotland for its deception on oil revenues: Scotland was sending revenues equivalent to 30-45% of its entire non-oil GDP to London in the early 80s but not through informed consent. Can you imagine if Canadian politicians had turned over an oil resource to the US saying it wasn’t worth much but knowing (as the UK government did, via its economic expert Prof. McCrone, whose report, unlike a recent Treasury mandarins on the currency, was kept confidential for 30 years until a tip-off led to it being released under FOI legislation) that it was worth potentially that amount? Wouldn’t there be a demand for compensation? That compensation- how much greater Scotland’s growth path would probably have been had the 25% of GDP or so fiscal surpluses of the early 80s being invested in capital and infrastructure, as in Norway, is likely vastly to outweigh our share of the UK debt.
    At any rate going back to legalities, the lawyer’s consensus seems to be that the UK is essentially the continuation of England. Politically the important point is arithmetic: UK is 84% England, 8.4% Scotland. There is nothing like this imbalance in federal systems elsewhere. Thus Bavaria, which was independent more recently than Scotland, is about 15% of Germany, the next biggest Land, which is in fact the biggest, Nord-Rhein Westfalen 20%. Although Bavarians joke about the rest of Germany being Prussians, if the German federal state really was 84% Prussia, 8.4% Bavaria, it wouldn’t hold together.
    That raises the question why the referendum isn’t a walk-over for the Yes campaign. I don’t think the reason is economic. Even if the unionists were right that Scotland would probably grow less quickly as an independent state (and I think the evidence is quite strongly against that) that wouldn’t cut much ice for a nation with a strong enough sense of identity: the English would not join a United States of Europe (even thought it wouldn’t be 84% German) if promised £500 a year more or whatever. The astonishing thing, though, is that there is a referendum, that there is a sense of national identity at all, after 300 years. Certainly when I was young most Scots thought of themselves as British first, Scottish second. (Most English at that time, I suggest, thought of themselves English first, Yorkshire, Cockney etc. 2nd).
    The re-emergence of Scottish national identity happened some time before the oil was discovered, as historians have documented and I think can only be explained by the collapse of Empire. The “British Empire (this is one place where the English did not use ‘England’ instead of ‘UK’) disguised the swamping of Scotland by England with its picture of a vast family of British nations, with England as the wise fatherhead, (protestant) Scotland as 2nd in command, and all the childlike and barbarous (as J.S. Mill put it) non-white nations below (and perhaps with the Catholic Irish and Catholic Highland Scots right at the bottom).
    But nowadays only about 11% of Scots view themselves more British than Scottish; 23%, like me, view themselves as not British at all (the most respected pollsters I think are ScotCen Social Research: see their ” Who Supports and Opposes Independence – and why?”). But the people in between are not prepared to put their money where their mouth is at present (as they see it, though I think they are wrong about the economics). I don’t think this is at all surprising: Scotland is a nation kept in a state of low collective self-esteem (for centuries) by its own Scottish ruling elite (as was, before the SNP rise to power)- Scots can do great things, but only under the tutelage of the English is the attitude- and this very deep rooted attitude will take some time to shake off, probably two referendums. That’s my twa bawbees worth (an old Scots coin!) anyway!
    Randy@28. Yes of course I want Scotland to be an independent state like Norway or Sweden, I just think calling the latter ‘separate’ is misleading: for example, they have never had passport controls as far as I’m aware, even though one is in the EU, the other not. At least in the UK, the term is used to suggest some kind of North Korean outcome.There is a formal ‘Nordic Council’ and a ‘Nordic Council of Ministers’- Nordic goes beyond Scandinavia, I should have made clear,

    Like

  30. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Randy, I would agree with the general thrust of your comment. There is a difference between regional and state parliaments and the national parliament. However, it is somewhat misleading to say (as Alan did) that provincial parliaments are subordinate to the national parliament. (I am not sure whether you agree with him on this.)
    Regional parliaments have exclusive authority as far as their powers are concerned; national parliaments in turn have exclusive authority over their powers. However, there are differences among countries regarding matters that are not reserved for one or the other. The constitution of Canada contains provisos like the following on matters of shared jurisdiction: “where such a law of Parliament and a law of a province conflict, the law of Parliament prevails to the extent of the conflict.” In the case of Scotland, it is the opposite: “Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998 lists matters that are reserved to the UK Parliament; if a matter is not mentioned in this section, it is devolved to the Scottish Parliament.”
    So it is not really a question of “status,” but of whether a parliament can legislate on matters having to do with other countries.

    Like

  31. Randy McDonald Avatar

    Alan:
    “Yes of course I want Scotland to be an independent state like Norway or Sweden, I just think calling the latter ‘separate’ is misleading: for example, they have never had passport controls as far as I’m aware, even though one is in the EU, the other not.”
    1. All of the Nordic states are in the Schengen accord, including non-EU Norway and Iceland. (I’m not sure about Greenland, which is largely autonomous but also outside of the EU. I expect Greenlanders have automatic EU entry rights because they’re Danish citizens.) If they weren’t, there would be barriers.
    2. “Separate” is not misleading. The SNP wants Scotland to be a state independent of the United Kingdom, a separate state. Pretending otherwise, or suggesting that Scotland would be able to unilaterally determine the nature of its relationship with the remaining United Kingdom, doesn’t strike me as especially honest.
    “At least in the UK, the term is used to suggest some kind of North Korean outcome.There is a formal ‘Nordic Council’ and a ‘Nordic Council of Ministers’- Nordic goes beyond Scandinavia, I should have made clear[.]”
    I’m well aware of that. The fact remains that there is no organization known as the Nordic Union, nothing statelike in the manner of the actually existing European Union or the Nordek that was torpedoed in the early 1970s by the Soviet Union (Finland joining a Nordic federation didn’t suit Brezhnev’s priorities). There certainly isn’t any currency union.
    Mohan:
    Agreed. Different structures, different countries.

    Like

  32. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Alan, thanks once again for a constructive and informative response.
    A couple of small points.
    First, if the UK parliament can reverse what the Scottish parliament has enacted, then I agree that the latter is subordinate. It would appear though from the legislation that it can’t, at least without repealing the Scotland Act, since the Scottish parliament has devolved powers that the UK parliament has given up. Given that the UK parliament is, or considers itself to be, sovereign, it can actually repeal the Scotland Act. I agree with you that this marks a point of subordination.
    But this is independent of your point that “Ontario and its people are surely still subordinate to the federal parliament in this sense: the most important decisions: macroeconomic, war, international relations, get taken by the latter, and could be taken by a party which is a minority in Ontario, yes?”. Yes, they have no choice but to live with legislation passed by the Conservatives in the Parliament of Canada, but still, I don’t see this as a sign of subordination. The Parliament of Canada has the power to legislate on matters of national interest. Ontario’s provincial parliament has the right to legislate on matters of provincial interest. And that is a division, rather than a subordination, of power.
    Second, I agree with you that the case for Scottish sovereignty is neither weakened nor strengthened by economic considerations. However, I don’t see Scottish identity as decisive either. As you rightly point out, it is relatively recently that Scots started to feel Scottish before British. Early in such an identity consciousness, people tend to think that sovereignty is the best option. But it can happen, by a natural evolution, that people continue to cherish their identity but to see that as compatible with membership in a larger sovereign collectivity. It’s possible that this will happen in Québec. As much as I abhor Québec sovereigntism, I do acknowledge that Quebeckers are right to feel their identity as such more salient than as Canadians. But I think that as Québec’s self-confidence grows, Quebeckers become more, rather than less, likely to think of their identity including being a part of Canada.
    It’s certainly interesting that rUK is so wedded to the idea of being England that they are willing to take on the whole of the UK debt. I know that ROC does not feel the same way.

    Like

  33. Randy McDonald Avatar

    Alan:
    “Likewise, I suggest, political considerations, if there was a Yes vote, mean it is unlikely 5 million Scots, who are already EU citizens and whose economy is in complete conformity, would be evicted”
    These Scots would still be British citizens, so they would have access.
    It does not automatically follow that the polity they lived in would be part of the European Union, especially since the only reason Scotland and Scottish territory were part of the European Union were that Scotland and Scottish territory were part of the United Kingdom. If Scotland leaves the United Kingdom, it would seem to also be leaving the European Union.
    We could imaginably have a situation where Scottish citizens would still be EU citizens because of their continued British citizenship, but Scotland itself would not be.
    I’m sure procedures could be developed to handle this, but it would require cooperation and good will from everyone involved.

    Like

  34. Alan Weir Avatar

    Randy @ 31: ‘2. “Separate” is not misleading. The SNP wants Scotland to be a state independent of the United Kingdom, a separate state. Pretending otherwise, or suggesting that Scotland would be able to unilaterally determine the nature of its relationship with the remaining United Kingdom, doesn’t strike me as especially honest.’
    A terminological dispute about ‘separate’ is not very interesting but I stick to my guns here. It is misleading in the current debate in Scotland. It is used by British nationalists to suggest relationships very different from those in the Nordic countries or the European Union. That’s why they continually raise the spectre of border posts and passport controls. There has never been any such controls between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, for example, not even at the worst points of the N. Ireland Troubles. It was easier to get from Liverpool to Dublin than Belfast to Derry at some points (I know because I taught at Queen’s University Belfast from 1985:2006 and have lived in Belfast for a very long time) Sometimes it would be easier to get from Derry to Donegal than to move around Belfast.
    So sure there is a sense of ‘separate’ in which the Netherlands and Germany are not just independent but separate states, even though you can walk through suburbs of Aachen and not realise you are no longer in it but in the Netherlands. But that relationship between the Dutch and the Germans, which is how Scottish nationalists want the Scottish:English relation to be, is not how British nationalists portray what will happen. They are stuck in a late 17th Century model in which big states swallow up smaller ones, by economic threats and threats of war (as England did to Scotland in 1707- there have been no threats of war this time round right enough!) and try to portray a future of independence as one of frontiers and economic warfare. That, in the actual context of this debate rather than a dispute about lexicography, is how ‘separate’ is being used. I am not pretending that is how the debate is going, I’m in the middle of it in Scotland- I know how it is going.
    Nor does anyone in the Yes campaign (which though mainly run by the SNP includes also the Green Party and others) think that Scotland can unilaterally decide what will emerge from negotiation; the debate has been about whether what is viewed by the Yes side as essentially an English government is engaged at the moment in bluff and attempted bullying which will disappear if there is a yes vote.
    Re your point at 33 regarding the EU and an independent Scotland ‘These Scots would still be British citizens, so they would have access.’ Fair point. At any rate, Scots will have the option of dual citizenship after independence, I don’t think anybody is questioning that. But e.g. the owners and workers of Scottish businesses remaining in Scotland would be treated very differently from West Germans if they were even temporally evicted from the EU. My reading of the legal and political experts who have opined on this (but I concede there is no consensus among them) as opposed to politicians in the UK and Europe is still, though, that a political accommodation will be reached, at least if the Scottish and rUK governments agree on one (there is a key difference here with Spain and Catalonia. The UK recognises a Scottish right of ‘secession’, Spain does not for Catalonia).
    Mohan at 32. I’m wondering whether ‘subordination’ versus ‘division’ of powers is just a terminological difference between us. Perhaps not. The UK, remember, has no written constitution so the powers of the Scottish parliament are not constitutionally entrenched and, as you note, the UK parliament claims the English principle of unlimited sovereignty.
    But suppose (as the LibDems wish) that the UK acquired a written constitution and the Scottish parliament’s powers were entrenched. Ok I can see the point of saying that’s a division of powers. But if you see yourself as a nation, not a province (that’s a big one, unpacking that distinction I admit!) I still think the situation is one of subordination. Weren’t various Indian kingdoms subordinate to the British Empire, (indeed the British East India Company prior to 1858) even though there was a great deal of local autonomy? After all, if the executive of a particular overarching legislative authority can require you to fight and die for a war it has engaged in, even if a majority in your region/province/nation reject the war, isn’t that a pretty subordinate situation to be in? And at present, and even in the imagined LibDem scenario, a Westminster government can do that to the Scots. Not to mention the fact that it situates its nuclear arsenal not 30 miles from London, but rather 30 miles from Scotland’s largest (and best, of course) city. Has the US ever sited ICBM launch sites in the Toronto region? I’d be surprised to hear if it does or has. Wouldn’t a Canadian politician who suggested it (well maybe ICBMs are a bit outdated) in order to curry favour with Washington be viewed as a bit of a US poodle?
    Also Mohan: ‘As you rightly point out, it is relatively recently that Scots started to feel Scottish before British.’ I would emphasise that this identity has re-emerged it’s not a recent thing. Of course the historians argue about how close the idea of ‘nation’ in the 11th Century, when the kingdoms of Strathclyde, Lothian, and the Scottish-Pictish kingdom were combined under the rule, so he alleged, of the King of Scots, was anything like a nation in say the 18th Century sense. And about when a sense of national identity emerged. My historian colleague in Glasgow Dauvit Broun thinks in Scotland it emerged in the late 12th or early 13th Century among the Anglo-Norman elite who had lands and links across Scotland, England and Northern France largely because the Scottish nobles were worried about the English royal encroachment on the powers of the aristocracy and so became militantly Scottish. So not a noble or glorious or democratic origin, and who knows when that sense of identity percolated down to the ordinary people, very difficult to tell. But certainly long before 1707 there was a very strong sense throughout the Scottish people of national identity which manifested itself in the usual ways: often in hatred of the other. That doesn’t lead me to reject nationalism, in fact I think civic nationalism is the best way to counteract racist and sectarian forms of nationalism, not anti-nationalism, but that’s a long story too.

    Like

  35. Randy McDonald Avatar

    Alan:
    “A terminological dispute about ‘separate’ is not very interesting but I stick to my guns here. It is misleading in the current debate in Scotland.”
    The problem is that “separatism” describes the whole Scottish nationalist project perfectly. The establishment of a durable separateness between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom is what you’re talking about. The creation of an independent Scottish polity separate from the United Kingdom is literally an example given in the definition of the word at the Wiktionary!
    Saying otherwise is special pleading.
    “They are stuck in a late 17th Century model in which big states swallow up smaller ones, by economic threats and threats of war (as England did to Scotland in 1707- there have been no threats of war this time round right enough!) and try to portray a future of independence as one of frontiers and economic warfare.”
    Inasmuch as Scottish separatists want to make the English-Scottish border a state frontier, a future of Scottish independence really is a future of frontiers. (Economic warfare is much less inevitable.)
    “Nor does anyone in the Yes campaign (which though mainly run by the SNP includes also the Green Party and others) think that Scotland can unilaterally decide what will emerge from negotiation; the debate has been about whether what is viewed by the Yes side as essentially an English government is engaged at the moment in bluff and attempted bullying which will disappear if there is a yes vote.”
    Scottish nationalists insisting that Scotland would maintain a currency union with the United Kingdom regardless of what Britons in power actually say do, in fact, seem to be making unilateral decisions about what is and isn’t.
    “My reading of the legal and political experts who have opined on this (but I concede there is no consensus among them) as opposed to politicians in the UK and Europe is still, though, that a political accommodation will be reached,”
    1. As I said.
    2. You acknowledge, then, that Scottish accession to the EU following a yes vote would not be automatic?
    “Weren’t various Indian kingdoms subordinate to the British Empire, (indeed the British East India Company prior to 1858) even though there was a great deal of local autonomy?”
    Ireland is post-colonial; Canada is post-colonial; India is post-colonial. These three countries are not interchangeably post-colonial. Scotland is not a subject state of the British Raj, I’m sorry.

    Like

  36. Alan Weir Avatar

    Randy@35 Bloody hell I’m snookered now, if Wiktionary says it, it must be right!
    It’s people (some not all) in the British nationalist parties who wish to increase the degree of separateness among European nations (including Scotland) by, for example, welcoming border controls and customs barriers between Scotland and England, withdrawing from the EU and staying out of any similar organisation such as EFTA. It’s Scottish nationalists who think we are better together with our close neighbours in England ,Wales, Ireland- Republic as well as the North- and beyond. We just think cooperation should be on the basis of consent, not the larger nation telling the smaller one what to do.
    The example of the British Raj was not in support of the claim that the union of Scotland was a form of colonisation, I don’t think many Scottish nationalists think that but to argue that even where there is an entrenched or customary division of powers one body can clearly be superior to another. It takes the big decisions: about major tax, welfare, war peace, the other the small ones, about fixing roads etc.
    (Actually on the colonial thing I’m not so sure I agree with the consensus here about Scotland. The treaty of union was agreed by a parliament answerable to an electorate of 4,000 out of a population of 1 million and under great duress: threats of invasion from Lord Godolphin and others down South. It was opposed strongly by the majority of the country, we have the testimony of the proUnion Scots such as Sir John Clerk of Penicuik to that effect. And it led to two armed rebellions, in 1715 and 1745. The first, against an unpopular newly arrived German monarch, might well have been successful if the Jacobite commander the Earl of Mar had been half way competent and almost certainly would have been successful if the Stewarts had had a Damascan conversion to Episcopalianism. For of course Jacobitism (which promised to restore the Scottish parliament) became the cause of Catholics and Anglicans, vehemently opposed by Presbyterians and thereby split the country.
    So I’m not so sure it was so different from colonialism initially. And any history text you read will tell you the Union was an economic disaster for Scotland initially. Obviously the Scots eventually became part and parcel of the Empire (which is now being lauded in a stomach-turning way by the unionist parties) and many made fortunes out of it.)

    Like

  37. Tomatisblog.wordpress.com Avatar

    “There has never been any such controls between the UK and the Republic of Ireland.”
    The UK and Ireland have what is called a Common Travel Area, that’s true. Because they judge it to be in their interests to have it. Either party or both could abandon it tomorrow. That’s because they are both soverign states with the appropriate attributes for so doing. It’s not some inherent, natural feature of the relationship between independent and, dare I say it, seperate, states.
    I have no stake one way or another in the debate but I wonder why Scottish Nationalists can’t bring themselves to say, “yes, we want to be finally and completely shot of the rest of the UK, and then when are we will decide on what level of cooperation with it suits us and we are willing to risk some negative consequences from that decision, because we can’t know in advance what level of cooperation the other party might be interested in.” That’s a totally respectable position. The current one, so far as I understand it, is that everything will simultaneously change in a really fab and exciting way yet effectively remain the same.

    Like

  38. Alan Weir Avatar

    Tomatisblog@37: The relevance of the fact that there has never, since the institution of both the Irish Free State then the Irish Republic, been borders is to illustrate how unlikely it is that the English will introduce borders to punish the Scots for breaking free (like the Irish, Canadians, Indians, Americans, Kenyans …). And the break-up with Ireland was violent and nasty, moreover the Irish (as a state) stayed neutral in WWII, deprived the UK of the ‘treaty ports’, which would have helped combat the U-boat war, revoltingly paid compliments to the German Embassy on Hitler’s death etc. The UK state retaliated by granting all Irish citizens in the UK (of which there were many) the vote and the same welfare rights. And yet the unionists tell us the English are a petty people who will seek to ostracise us (and if it were true, is that a good reason for union?).
    Why, you say, don’t Scottish nationalists say ‘yes, we want to be finally and completely shot of the rest of the UK, and then when are we will decide on what level of cooperation with it suits us and we are willing to risk some negative consequences from that decision, because we can’t know in advance what level of cooperation the other party might be interested in.”
    Well we don’t at all want to be completely shot of the rest of the UK any more than we do of the Irish Republic. But the more important point which relates to something Randy said at, is: do the Scottish Nationalists portray independence as a no-risk policy which will be all gain and no loss? The answer is no, the leadership will admit if pressed there are no certainties. But only if pressed, in general they attempt to play up the positives and downplay or ignore if possible the negatives. They are politicians! Their opponents to likewise but opposite.
    While that might be standard politics I think in this instance at least it is inappropriate and probably counterproductive. So of course there will be costs, start up costs, probably permanent ‘border friction’ economic costs which occur across international boundaries even in custom unions and so on. And, here in response to Randy, certainly there is no guarantee that there will be a formal customs union or seamless membership of the EU. I think it would be better for the Yes campaign to be more up front about that with the electorate and discuss worse case scenarios etc.
    I still think we’ll probably be better off, certainly in the long run, independent, the economic situation of the other small northern European states (including the much derided by the British, Iceland and Ireland) leads me to think that. But maybe we won’t: if we are not prepared to accept that risk then we should think about giving up calling ourselves a nation and accept we are just a quaint English region. So I think I’m partly in agreement with your sentiments here.

    Like

  39. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Alan @ 36 and 38,
    You go too far in comparing the case of Scotland with those of “the Irish, Canadians, Indians, Americans, Kenyans.” First of all, the Irish, Indians and Kenyans were actively oppressed. Recall what I said in the original post: “I abhor the very idea of separation except in conditions where the separating entity is actively being oppressed.” Of course, I don’t expect you to agree with my sentiment. But your case is different.
    As for the Canadians, Indians, Americans, Kenyans, all of these were colonies, not part of “metropolitan” UK (to use a French term). This is the difference between “breaking free” and separating, as much as you dislike the term.
    And here is what I think you should give due respect to: the Indians and Kenyans were, in addition, oppressed racially. And, I should add, Scots did a good bit of the oppressing. So whatever you might say about Scottish national identity, please do not compare yourselves to Indians or Kenyans or Irish (or for that matter, Americans or Canadians, though these comparisons don’t bother me nearly as much). This is not, and cannot be, the burden of your case.

    Like

  40. Alan Weir Avatar

    Mohan: The situation here is 5 million people in an affluent country having a bit of an identity crisis. So it isn’t a major world issue, it’s only really relevant to us, and to England which will lose one third of ‘its’ land mass. So I agree it’s not comparable to the brutality of the British Empire, of which Scots (and Irish, in very large numbers) were part.
    My point was only that the English got over losing all these places (and many many more) without taking a permanent huff against them, so it was clumsily meant to praise the tolerance of the English not minimise the sufferings of others. (And even if you go pre 1603 I agree the Scots did not suffer at the hands of England as much as Ireland but there was, depending on when you want to date the inception of the ‘nation’ which is rather arbitrary, 600 years or so of regular warfare which was very bloody on both sides, but on which, as the smaller party, continually under threat of being overrun, we usually came off worse.)

    Like

  41. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Alan @ 34: A couple of small points.
    First, I conceded that subordination was probably the right concept in the UK, given that the British parliament can in theory revoke the Scotland Act. On this point, I think we agree. Though with regard to the status quo, the relationship is nothing like that of the His Majesty’s Government of India and “various Indian kingdoms.” No, I don’t think that the UK parliament’s authority to make Scots fight a war constitutes subordination: Scots elect that parliament, no less so that residents of East Anglia.
    I don’t get your point about the US siting nuclear missiles in Canada. What’s the analogy here? The US is clearly a different country; we don’t vote for their President or legislators; we are subject to different laws; we are not beneficiaries of their tax policies or power or anything else. Of course, a Canadian politician who suggested siting missiles 30 miles from Toronto would be considered a US poodle (unless of course Rochester NY was the place in question).
    Finally, I accept all that you say about Scottish identity. And I think separate identity is a reasonable ground for separation. I just don’t agree with it, unless there is oppression now.

    Like

  42. Mohan Matthen Avatar

    Fair enough, Alan @ 40. The English are tolerant to a point, very much so when you compare them to the historical comparators. I was reacting to “break free like the Indian and Kenyans,” and I am glad you didn’t mean that the way I took it.

    Like

  43. Alan Weir Avatar

    Mohan@41 This I think gets to the nub of what is going on in Scotland just now:
    ‘No, I don’t think that the UK parliament’s authority to make Scots fight a war constitutes subordination: Scots elect that parliament, no less so that residents of East Anglia.’
    That’s exactly the British nationalist position, the ‘Secretary of State for Scotland’ as he is called, has explicitly said that the fact that the Scots have been ruled for Tories so often in the last decades against their wishes is no different from Tory Surrey being ruled by Labour as it has been when Labour was in power. And if you think Scotland is an English/GB/UK (the name is not so important) county or region like Surrey or East Anglia, that’s a completely coherent position.
    Of course people like me don’t think we are like East Anglia, we think England is another country as the US is to Canada: which is why we react to the UK govt siting its nuclear defence near Glasgow as we do. But we make up between around one third to 40% of the voters, depending on how the polls go. The interesting part, it’s got some philosophical mileage in it I think, is that the other two thirds to 60% also agree we are a nation like Canada (or perhaps better, given our size, Denmark, Norway). This isn’t just mere verbal agreement, they are clear we have a right to ‘secede’. But in other respects they behave pretty much as the citizens of East Anglia or Surrey do, with respect to Westminster. The position is, I think, unstable, both as a political philosophy and practically: it has been crumbling for 50 years or so now but might take a while to break down completely into either ‘Ukanian’ nationalism or Scottish nationalism, and probably cause some bitterness and damage in the process.

    Like

Leave a comment