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    Why is this philosophy? redux

    By Roberta Millstein

    It's been a little over a week since I posted my Why is this philosophy? reflections, and I find myself still puzzling over a common sort of reaction that I got to the post. The common reaction seemed to be that other areas of philosophy are subject to similar challenges, and/or that philosophers in other areas are subject to similar difficulties on the job market, etc. And so (the implication seemed to be), what was my point?

    Let me first clarify that I certainly never meant to imply – and looking back over the post, do not see where I said – that philosophy of science or philosophers of science have it worse than anyone else. I do not take that to be the case. I know that there are certain areas of philosophy that are quite marginalized, causing practitioners in those areas to struggle at various points in their careers. So, why speak about philosophy of science? Well, philosophy of science is what I do, and so the particular criticisms of it are in my face more so than criticisms of other areas. I encourage others to speak out about challenges in their own areas, challenges that I am not in a position to speak to. But let's be clear that the challenges in area X, even if worse than the challenges in philosophy of science, don't make the challenges in philosophy of science go away or unworthy of discussion.

    So, what are the particular criticisms that can make doing philosophy of science challenging?

    Well, I think in large part they center around the empirical nature of philosophy of science and the resistance to the discussion of empirical claims by philosophers. There is an obvious history to this resistance, if not a linear or consistent one. I am not sure to respond to this kind of challenge other than what I said in the original post, echoing Subrena Smith's point that most philosophers are not as non-empirical as they might cast themselves to be. I guess I might also point out the value of philosophers engaging with science in a way that can bring clarity to scientific theories or findings, uncover their hidden assumptions (including value-laden assumptions), or shed light on perennial philosophical problems. I would think that other philosophers would value such endeavors and be willing to see them as being of a piece with what they do, but that is unfortunately not always the case.

    A slightly different type of issue arises when one thinks that one has come across a paper where most of the paper is summary of science with only a small philosophical point at the end (as one commenter mentioned). I have seen those occasionally but not often; criticism of those kinds of papers is not my concern. Rather, my concern is the following, which could be confused for a summary paper or a "science" paper (and apologies for quoting myself from the comments):

    I think there are many cases where the author is discussing a conceptual or methodological issue that is relevant to a particular science or a particular finding in science, rather than discussing one of the more canonical issues in philosophy. I think sometimes that those outside of the philosophy of science see only that the author is knee deep in the details of the science without appreciating the philosophical points that are being made because they don't recognize the topic that is under debate. To give two examples from my own work: in some of my research I have discussed the evolutionary process known as random genetic drift — how it ought to be characterized, how it can be distinguished from other evolutionary processes, whether it can be empirically demonstrated, etc. In other research I have explored different types of experiment: lab experiments vs. field experiments vs. natural experiments, using particular cases in science to explore the merits of each. The former is an example of exploring concepts in science, whereas the latter is an example of exploring methodology in science. They are just as philosophical as explorations in, say, the philosophy of mind, but I think they are less recognized as philosophical by people who aren't familiar with the particular issues under discussion, and all they see is that details of science are being discussed — sometimes complicated by the fact that they are grasping to understand the science itself, making it harder to see the philosophical points.

    Here I think the principle of charity might apply. Rather than audience members asking "Why is this philosophy?" which can come off (even if genuinely asked) as insulting (since we're talking about a context where a self-proclaimed philosophers is giving a talk to other philosophers), the questioner could simply assume that the speaker is engaging in philosophical discourse, and instead try to ask questions that would uncover more about that discourse. Here is a sample question (maybe others can improve on this): "Can you say more about the broader philosophical context that your arguments fall into?" That seems like a better way of asking a genuine question that might enhance comprehension and discussion without being dismissive. A similar principle of charity could apply to job candidates,  tenure dossiers, etc.

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    8 responses to “Why is this philosophy? redux”

    1. Rob Stainton Avatar
      Rob Stainton

      Your blog posts have provoked me to reflect on philosophy of science in new ways. Thanks for that. Here I want to add two quick points.
      One is that I pretty much never encounter claims about the “non-empirical nature of philosophy” from folks who specialize in, or even dabble in, history of philosophy. Granted, there have been periods in which philosophy’s self-image has been a prioristic, but for vast swathes of its 2500 years, Western philosophers have seamlessly mixed in (what we would now call) “science” with (what we would now call) “philosophical debates”. In fact, here’s a fun parlour game: identify three pre-20th Century philosophers whose metaphilosophical walk and talk were both genuinely and universally a prioristic.
      The second issue that came to the fore in my reflections was this. There is a usage of ‘philosophy of science’ which is broad and inclusive, extending to philosophy of economics, philosophy of linguistics, and philosophy of the social sciences generally. (Heck, there’s a usage which is broad enough to include epistemology-writ-large.) But there’s another usage of ‘philosophy of science’ which calls to mind only philosophy of the natural sciences, especially biology and physics. There are two interesting points here. On the one hand, those toiling in philosophy of science broadly construed seem to me less apt to face, from their philosopher peers, the ‘Why is it philosophy?’ challenge. On the other hand, those same broad-types are far more likely to face ‘Why is it philosophy of science?’ from other philosophers of science. (I can’t imagine that a philosopher of physics has ever been confronted with that question.)

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    2. Subrena Smith Avatar
      Subrena Smith

      Your quoted remarks capture very well the nature of some of the discomfort about work in the philosophy of science. The fact is, and it is a fact, that we all know that some individuals in some sectors of our profession are uneasy with the science part of philosophy of science; particularly when the issues being addressed don’t appear to wear their philopsophic-ness obviously. For some people, it’s not apparent that there could be philosophical questions/worries about, say, evolutionary theory. What could be conceptually out of order and could be made right by bringing philosophical tools to bear on it? In my very short career, I have had the displeasure of being asked to show the philosophy in my work.
      I think that it is unfortunate that some people have failed to see Roberta’s point.

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    3. Dan Hicks Avatar
      Dan Hicks

      Are you familiar with Dotson’s “How is this Paper Philosophy?” http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/comparativephilosophy/vol3/iss1/5/
      She proposes replacing philosophy’s “culture of justification” with a “culture of praxis.” The upshot here would be that “One will no longer be asked to justify one’s projects according to some set of justifying norms, but rather one does need to identify a point of contribution within contemporary philosophy, outside of contemporary philosophy, and/or in our surrounding worlds.”

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    4. Patrick S. O'Donnell Avatar
      Patrick S. O’Donnell

      By way of expanding on something Rob said above regarding what might be termed “metaphilosophical” reflections on the nature of science (or ‘sciences’: natural, social, and ‘folk’), and assuming it is true as Roberta says that there’s “the value of philosophers engaging with science in a way that can bring clarity to scientific theories or findings, uncover their hidden assumptions (including value-laden assumptions), or shed light on perennial philosophical problems,” I wonder if it is worth examining the possibility that some of the anxiety over what constitutes “philosophy of science” is the sense that philosophers of science (and those who question their ‘philosophizing’) may not have come fully to terms with the fact that science is no longer what John Ziman terms “academic science,” that we’re now in a world of “post-academic” (hence continuity and difference) science such that the nature of scientific practice has decidedly changed, for better and (perhaps more for the) worse. I wonder if at least some philosophers of science have failed to appreciate this relatively “new model of knowledge production,” one that goes hand-in-hand with a “real cultural revolution in its working practices and institutional arrangements.” In short,
      “In less than a generation we have witnessed a radical, irreversible, worldwide transformation in the way that science is organized, managed and performed.* [….] These changes are taking place in all epistemic institutions–universities, research institutes, government establishments and industrial laboratories.”
      Here is where the boundaries between the new field of “science and technology studies (STS) and philosophy of science become blurred and porous, a fact that may cause some philosophers discomfort, particularly those who entertain an older and more idealized picture of what science is all about. Here we enter the realms of “Big Science” and “technoscience,” and thus the epistemology of science, as Ziman explains, becomes inextricably tied to its sociology, “primarily at the level of research practice.” I doubt there is sufficient appreciation of this by at least some if not most philosophers of science and those doing philosophy generally (that’s my impression, but perhaps its skewed or mistaken). This departure more or less from the (Mertonian) norms of academic science finds scientists with few opportunities for control over research questions and agendas, as norms and principles of scientific practice are largely determined by institutional, corporate, and government policies. While this involves explicit and implicit recognition of the “trasnsdisciplinary” nature of many of the practical problems that scientists deal with, it also means the traditional structure of science is “challenged at every turn, affecting personal autonomy, career prospects, performance criteria, leadership roles, intellectual property rights, and so on.” To the extent that science is pressed into service for the national Research & Development system, in other words, operates as “wealth-creating, techno-scientific motor for the whole economy” we see more and more that “discoveries are evaluated commercially before they have been validated scientifically,” and because many scientists have not been trained to focus first and foremost on the utility of their work (and that, too, may be changing), “expert peer review is enlarged into ‘merit review’ by non-specialist ‘users.’”
      Multidisciplinary research teams become dependent on project grants in a decidedly market-driven scientific environment. In addition to enhancing the “Matthew effect,” “[c]ompetition for real money takes precedence over competition for scientific credibility as the driving force for science. With so many scientists relying completely on research grants or contracts for their personal livelihood, winning these becomes an end in itself. Research groups are transformed into small business enterprises. The metaphorical forum of scientific opinion is turned into an actual market in research services.” There are myriad and disturbing effects that result from this, one of which is that scientific knowledge often becomes the “private property” of a research community or organization, so contracts will preclude scientists from immediately disclosing and thus sharing their results. In Ziman’s words, “Secrecy in science is a form of ‘epistemic pollution’ to which post-academic science is all too open.” Post-academic scientists may still have sufficient motivation to “tell the truth,” but there are substantial and prevailing material interests that often preclude them from telling “the whole truth:” “They are often prevented, in the interests of their employers, clients, or patrons from revealing discoveries or expressing doubts that would put a very different complexion on their testimony. The meaning of what is said is secretly undermined by what is not said.” Corporate and political interests have an increasing and troubling role in the very nature of scientific knowledge production, which accounts for a “proprietorial attitude to the results of research.” The organization of post-academic science reflects dependency on market principles (Philip Mirowski is helpful here), and I wonder if many philosophers of science has sufficient appreciation of this fact. That contexts of application are largely defined by material interests outside of science proper cannot but help change the character of science in ways that should concern us and philosophers should be well-suited to address.
      * I have a list of titles that treat this topic here: https://www.academia.edu/9985005/Sullied_Natural_and_Social_Sciences_A_Basic_Reading_Guide

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    5. Patrick S. O'Donnell Avatar
      Patrick S. O’Donnell

      Oops…penultimate sentence: “…if many philosophers have sufficient appreciation of this fact.”

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    6. Roberta L. Millstein Avatar
      Roberta L. Millstein

      Interesting thoughts, thank you! Yes, perhaps one of the things that would help is a greater awareness of our own history. It is not my area of expertise by a long shot, but my impression was similar to what you say, so I’m glad to hear it confirmed. No one has taken you up on your parlour game yet, though! I’m really not sure. Wikipedia (yes, I went there) says Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza, but that doesn’t sound right to me, at least not for Descartes, when you look at the whole body of his work. But I am happy to be corrected by those who know better.
      As for your second point, I’d be pleasantly surprised to learn that philosophers of social science face the “why is this philosophy?” question less often, but you’re right that they face the “why is this philosophy of science” question. However, the PSA has been working very hard to send the message that it is seeking to be more inclusive in what is considered to be philosophy of science, and hopefully that message has been getting out. (Philosophers of social science — please send your work to the journal and to the meetings!)

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    7. Roberta L. Millstein Avatar
      Roberta L. Millstein

      Thanks, Subrena. “For some people, it’s not apparent that there could be philosophical questions/worries about, say, evolutionary theory.” Exactly so.

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    8. Roberta L. Millstein Avatar
      Roberta L. Millstein

      Yes, I like that paper a lot. Unfortunately, I have seen a number of people endorse that paper and then go on to ask the “why is this philosophy?” question. So, something more is going on, or something more needs to be said, and that is what I am groping toward.

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