Category: Gordon Hull
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By Gordon Hull In the previous two posts (here and here) I’ve developed a political account of authorship (according to which whether we should treat an AI as an author for journal articles and the like is a political question, not one about what the AI is, or whether its output resembles human output), and…
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As if Sartre didn't produce enough words all by himself! ChatGPT's response to the following prompt is instructive for those of us who are concerned about ChatGPT being used to cheat. Read past the content of the answer to notice the made-up citations. The "consciousness is a question…" line is in fact in the Barnes…
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By Gordon Hull As I argued last time, authorship is a political function, and we should be applying that construction of it to understand whether AI should be considered an author. Here is a first reason for doing so: AI can’t really be “accountable.” (a) Research accountability: The various journal editors all emphasize accountability. This…
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By Gordon Hull Large Language Models (LLMs) like Chat-GPT burst into public consciousness sometime in the second half of last year, and Chat-GPT’s impressive results have led to a wave of concern about the future viability of any profession that depends on writing, or on teaching writing in education. A lot of this is hype,…
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By Gordon Hull Last time, I introduced a number of philosophy of law examples in the context of ML systems and suggested that they might be helpful in thinking differently, and more productively, about holding ML systems accountable. Here I want to make the application specific. So: how do these examples translate to ML and…
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By Gordon Hull AI systems are notoriously opaque black boxes. In a now standard paper, Jenna Burrell dissects this notion of opacity into three versions. The first is when companies deliberately hide information about their algorithms, to avoid competition, maintain trade secrets, and to guard against gaming their algorithms, as happens with Search Engine Optimization…
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In the previous two posts (first, second), I took up the invitation provided by a recent paper by Daniele Lorenzini to develop some thoughts on the relationship between Foucault’s thought and theorizing around epistemic injustice. In particular, Miranda Fricker’s account both draws heavily from Foucault and pushes back against his historicism to advocate for a…
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Now published in Critical Review. Here's the abstract: Foucault distanced himself from Marxism even though he worked in an environment—left French theory of the 1960s and 1970s—where Marxism was the dominant frame of reference. By viewing Foucault in the context of French Marxist theoretical debates of his day, we can connect his criticisms of Marxism…
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By Gordon Hull Last time, I took the opportunity provided by a recent paper by Daniele Lorenzini to develop some thought on the relationship between Foucault’s thought and theorizing around epistemic injustice. Lorenzini’s initial point, with which I agree fully, is that Fricker’s development of epistemic injustice is, on her own terms, incompatible with Foucault…
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By Gordon Hull Those of us who have both made extensive use of Foucault and made a foray into questions of epistemic injustice have tended to sweep the question of the relation between the two theoretical approaches under the rug. Miranda Fricker’s book, which has basically set the agenda for work on epistemic injustice, acknowledges…
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