• The latest trendy idea.  It sounds great in some limited contexts, especially as a way to protect healthcare workers.  It also sounds suspiciously like a way for Trump and Co. not to do the actual work of testing and contact tracing, or to guarantee a general social safety net.  It's like some funhouse mirror version of a Deleuzian control society, coupled with the neoliberal destruction of everything except the imperative to generate surplus value.  Now you need a certificate to join the industrial reserve army…

    What could go wrong?  Hank Greely shows that the answer is quite a lot, while Sam Hull (no relation) outlines the problems from a legal point of view, focusing on discrimination, and concludes by suggesting that they only begin to make sense when paired with a jobs guarantee program.  Both Greely and Hull highlight that any immunity certificate program will generate not just black markets in certificates, testing and so on, but perverse incentives to deliberately get Covid and risk death in order to get the certificate.  Of course… these folks will just be investing in their human capital!

  • Why would you let a pandemic get in the way of voter suppression?  Much better to use it as a tactic of voter suppression.  At least, I can't see any other other coherent way to read the Wisconsin GOP and SCOTUS refusal to either delay Wisconsin's vote today, or allow absentee ballots to be delayed.  Wisconsin GOPs shenanigans to keep itself in power are well-known; we shouldn't forget that the Roberts Court is systematically hostile to voting rights.  The Onion has the right tweet, and reminds us that Wisconsin has 77 Covid deaths today.  Check that space in 2-3 weeks.

    Unless it's that Republicans hate democracy so much they don't even care who wins, as long as fewer people vote.

    Plus ça change…

  • By Gordon Hull

    I argued a few days ago that late capitalism, with its fetishization of efficiency, leaves us unprepared for a pandemic because of vulnerabilities in the supply chain. In a recent blogpost, Frank Pasquale adds some healthcare-specific texture to the point, noting how our healthcare system is almost designed to fail in a pandemic. He cites one of his own papers from 2014:

    “The reduction in hospital facilities and other resources, although “efficient” in normal times, may prove disastrous if there is an epidemic. For example, one national-preparedness plan for pandemic flu estimated that, in a worst-case scenario, the United States would be short over 600,000 ventilators. “To some experts, the ventilator shortage is the most glaring example of the country’s lack of readiness for a pandemic,” one journalist noted. The lack of “surge capacity” throughout the health care industry is a major infrastructural shortcoming, likely to cause tremendous, avoidable suffering if a pandemic emerges” (179).

    The quotes are from… 2006 and 2007, and refer to warnings coming after the SARS epidemic. In other words, we’ve been as unprepared as possible for 14 years, despite a near-miss epidemic and constant warnings from epidemiologists. So Trump is an idiot and an imposter, and his son-in-law supply czar is a feckless idiot who understands nothing about supply, but, as Pasquale underscores, there is another, longer timeline to our pandemic preparation failure.

    In Pasquale’s paper, he notes that part of the problem is how we frame healthcare in terms of aggregate costs (and the need to keep costs down), a construction that makes it impossible to notice that some things are over-funded and others under-funded. In particular, not only can mantras of cost-cutting shield wasteful allocations of resources like those to hedge-fund managers from scrutiny, but it can also hide the fact that some aspects of healthcare (let’s see, hmm. Pandemic prevention!) are radically under-funded. Worse, there is absolutely no way to guarantee that money saved here will actually be reallocated to something more socially useful:

    “If the health care cost-cutters had a plan for reallocating excess health sector spending to pay for care that is now undercompensated or absent, they would merit the influence they have now achieved. But in reality, money freed up by cost-cutting is much more likely to be retained as profit or claimed by capital and rentiers in some other way” (191)

    We see at least three versions of these problems playing out now.

    (more…)

  • Geolocation data is getting increasing attention as a way of tracking social distancing in particular.  Google has just released a bunch of its geolocation data, which tracks changes in trips to retail, parks and other places.

    In the meantime, a new paper in Science says that a good contact-tracing App, if sufficiently robust and adequately deployed, could avoid the need for lock-downs. 

    Of related interest, Zeynep Tufekci has a smart piece in The Atlantic, pointing out that disease modeling isn't useful so much for producing truth or knowledge, but as a guide for how to avoid worst outcomes.  This seems absolutely right to me, and is in line the way health policy folks are pursuing what I've called a maximin strategy.

  • By Gordon Hull

    I know there’s a lot of ways to develop that thesis!  Let me focus on one: the fetishization of “efficiency,” and its corollary, just-in-time supply chains.  In a recent piece in The Atlantic, Helen Lewis argues that a lot of the disruption in consumer goods (toilet paper, etc.) is initially attributable not to hoarding, but tiny, unanticipated fluctuations in demand.  Stores don’t carry extra product in the back any more; rather, they keep their shelves stocked by way of a very elaborate, data-intensive logistical operation that delivers enough product to keep items on the shelf, but no more.  Hence the name “just-in-time” capitalism.  Why would you prefer such a system?  Excess stock is inefficient: it just sits there taking up space when it could be sold elsewhere, and you had to pay people to make it, even though you’re not getting paid for selling the product that’s sitting in the back of the store.

    The innovations to supply-chain that enable just-in-time capitalism go well beyond the idea that stores should keep minimal stock, however.  If neoliberal financialization has taken a lot of the theoretical attention since 2008, it’s important to remember that financialization hasn’t been the only point of late capitalism.  For example, a pair of McKinsey reports in the early 2000s looked back on productivity growth in the late 1990s, widely attributed at the time to developments in IT.  As one argues, IT was not the cause: within the sectors that grew, “the most important cause of the productivity acceleration after 1995 was fundamental changes in the way companies deliver products and services.”  In “The Wal-Mart Effect,” McKinsey’s Bradford Johnson argues that:

    “More than half of the productivity acceleration in the retailing of general merchandise can be explained by only two syllables: Wal-Mart. In 1987, Wal-Mart had a market share of just 9 percent but was 40 percent more productive than its competitors as measured by real sales per employee (the measure used for all company-level analyses in this study). A variety of Wal-Mart innovations, both large and small, are now industry standards. Wal-Mart created the large-scale, or “big-box,” format; “everyday low prices”; electronic data interchange (EDI) with suppliers; and the strategy of expanding around central distribution centers. These innovations allowed the company to pass its savings on to customers. By 1995, it commanded a market share of 27 percent and had widened its productivity edge to 48 percent” (McKinsey Quarterly 2002:1, p. 41).

    In other words, our current retail scene – the one existing before Amazon – is attributable to Wal-Mart.  The efficacy of this logistical innovation was evident in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, in which Wal-Mart was able to deploy trucks of aid to the New Orleans area much faster the George W. Bush’s mismanaged FEMA.   Amazon, in a sense, represents the intensification of this trend: maintaining brick-and-mortar stores is inefficient, if the logistical operation can be made sufficiently nimble and efficient.

    (more…)

  • As I noted earlier, cellphone tracking data is proving an interesting tool in trying to understand the spread of COVID-19.  You'll recall that Florida beaches featured a whole bunch of tightly-packed WOO-HOO SPRING BREAKers.  And that they then presumably left the state.  Where did they go?  Here's a map based on cellphone data.

    Thanks Gov. DeSantis, who I never even had a chance to vote against!

  • By Gordon Hull

    A recent piece in the Guardian points to the limitations of models in understanding the spread of COVID-19: principally, those models are often not based on reliable data specific to the disease, so they can be wildly off.  As I argued earlier, the bottom line is that we really have no idea what we’re doing, and that lack of knowledge is an important reason why we’re having to adopt non-risk-based strategies like maximin to deal with the virus spread.  The decision to move to those strategies needs to be understood as a (bio)political one (just as the general preference for risk is); that they are not risk-based is probably part of why right-wingers are deciding it’s time to go “back to work.” It’s not that they have any better idea what’s going on than anybody else, they’ve just adopted a different political epistemology, and have decided that their idea of economics is more important than everybody else’s view of human life.

    In the middle of any efforts at modeling or analysis are indicators.  These have been the subject of a fair amount of recent interest, as for example the recent (2015) anthology, The World of Indicators.  As the editors note in the book’s introduction, “indicators are typically presented as taken-for-granted facts. Yet, indicators are not neutral representations of the world, but novel epistemic objects of regulation, domination, experimentation and critique” (5).  More specifically, there is a fundamentally socio-political process at work behind any indicator.  We can all see the point with indicators like “women’s social equality,” since that concept means different things to different people.  So too, the point is clear enough in psychological categories like “normal” or “deviant” or “personality disorder,” as Foucault made clear.

    Less obviously, it applies in more narrowly medical situations as well.  Consider malaria.  Malaria is a thing in that it’s a disease caused by a parasite.  Everyone knows that – it’s not an essentially-contested concept like “privacy.” And yet, as Rene Gerrets indicates in his contribution to the anthology, similar problems apply to malaria tracking in sub-Saharan Africa. 

    (more…)

  • Stuart Elden at Progressive Geographies is curating a list of "geographers, sociologists, philosophers etc. on covid 19."

    There's a ton of fascinating material there, and he is updating it regularly.

  • At company called unacast has used cellphone tracking data to produce a “Social Distancing Scorecard.”  It breaks down the US by state and county to measure the distances that cellphones travel as a proxy for social distancing.  It then grades areas from A to F based on the percentage decrease. Obviously this is a rough proxy social distancing, but it’s currently the best we have.

    It’s interesting to note geographical disparities.  Eyeballing it, urban areas are doing more social distancing than rural ones.  The Mountain West is doing less.  All of that tracks what we know about how different demographics and political orientations are responding to the virus.  Interestingly, Alaska is doing much more than most other areas, with the exception of the far north. 

    My own Mecklenburg County (which includes the city of Charlotte, though the metropolitan area encompasses several other counties, and which just issued its stay-at-home order today) gets an ‘A,’ for a reduction of 43%, despite the County Health Director’s repeatedly telling media that people aren’t adhering to social distancing guidelines.  Next-door union County gets a ‘B,’ but that’s for a 40% reduction.  There are a couple of counties in the eastern part of the state that have seen an increase.  The state as a whole gets a ‘B’ for a 36% reduction – probably in part because the governor has been quite proactive in pushing social distancing.  Ohio is down 40%, presumably also because of a proactive governor.  It wouldn’t be hard to use this data to track the effects of specific policy interventions.

    If you go down to Florida, the Miami area (and the cities up the coast) are all down 50% or so.  The Panhandle, where a lot of WOO HOO SPRING BREAK happens are doing a lot less distancing.

    And so it goes.  The Washington Post has a write-up that gets at some of the privacy and other issues.  It should be noted that social media data is already useful in public health surveillance.  To cite only one example, one study found that content analysis of Twitter was able to predict community cardiovascular disease mortality – a significant result, since the average age of Twitter users is quite low, and (as the authors put it) “the people tweeting are not the people dying,”

  • By Gordon Hull

    In a follow-up to a controversial piece in which he argued (in late February) that the social distancing and quarantining in Italy presented the temptation to universalize the state of exception, Agamben says this:

    “Fear is a bad counsellor, but it makes us see many things we pretended not to see. The first thing the wave of panic that’s paralysed the country has clearly shown is that our society no longer believes in anything but naked life. It is evident that Italians are prepared to sacrifice practically everything – normal living conditions, social relations, work, even friendships and religious or political beliefs – to avoid the danger of falling ill. The naked life, and the fear of losing it, is not something that brings men and women together, but something that blinds and separates them. Other human beings, like those in the plague described by Manzoni, are now seen only as potential contaminators to be avoided at all costs or at least to keep at a distance of at least one metre. The dead – our dead – have no right to a funeral and it’s not clear what happens to the corpses of our loved ones. Our fellow humans have been erased and it’s odd that the Churches remain silent on this point. What will human relations become in a country that will be accustomed to living in this way for who knows how long? And what is a society with no other value other than survival?”

    To be sure, there are and will be bad actors.  William Barr’s DOJ has apparently seen the epidemic as a good time for a power grab (notably, one that has been sharply critiqued from both the right and the left).  Ohio seems to be using it as a pretext to stop abortions.  So – and this will be my point – we must always be vigilant about the expansion of emergency powers.

    But when you have a leitmotif, you stick with it, and so Agamben reiterates his basic thesis about the combination of state of exception and bare life:

    (more…)