By Gordon Hull
In a 1998 paper, Thomas W. Merrill argues that the presence of the right to exclude others is the necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of a property right. In this, he views himself as arguing against a “nominalist” interpretation of the right. This nominalist interpretation, associated with legal realism and the familiar Hohfeldian “bundle of rights,” says that property is best conceived as being located in a conventionally established set of rights, the exact contours of which will vary between jurisdictions and time periods, and within which no one element is necessary. At the risk of importing a somewhat anachronistic term, we might say that the Hohfeldian bundle leads somewhat directly to a “family resemblance” theory of property (Julie Cohen applies it to property in the paper I’m using below; the approach has also been used to good effect for privacy, and with explicit reference to Wittgenstein). In defense of this proposition, Merrill offers three kinds of justifications: a logical one, a historical one, and one based on established legal use. More about the first in a moment; the latter two rely on accumulated historical record and precedent.
