A while ago, Daniel Zamora’s (re)publication of a series of essays designed to say that Foucault ended up embracing neoliberalism caused quite a stir in the blogosphere. As one of those invited to contribute to a forum in An und für sich), I argued that Foucault saw both that neoliberalism realized the need to create markets (as opposed to liberalism’s assumption that they just happened), as well as the need to create homo economicus as a form of subjectification. As I put it then:
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It occurred to me, in the midst of a conversation where folks were marveling at the money being spent by a flagship state university on a marketing initiative, that it should, at this juncture,* be possible to formulate a very simple test for evaluating the wisdom of this and other university spending initiatives:
"How many part time lines could be made full time and / or how many adjunct lines could be made permanent with the money being spent on this**?"
*A conjuncture defined, let us say, by the circumstance that the majority—or even a significant portion—of faculty at US universities continue to be employed, against their preferences, in contingent positions without the full measure of academic freedom and the full participation in shared governance afforded by tenure and / or in positions that, by virtue of low salaries, lack of benefits, etc., make their very material existence substantially precarious.
**Depending on the conversational context, one may wish to add something like "bullshit" here. Use your judgment.
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The PSA Women's Caucus is delighted to announce its first Highlighted PhilosopHer of Science, Merrilee Salmon. You can read about Merrilee's many-splendored career over at Science Visions. Congratulations, Merrilee!
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In the coming weeks I hope to be updating you with more details and analyses, but for now I am simply announcing that the final report for APDA is complete. Feel free to ask questions or comment below.
*Update: we noticed an error in one of the charts and some potentially confusing language in that section, so we have updated the report at the link.
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By Catarina Dutilh Novaes
What does philosophy have to say about difficult life decisions? Recently, there has been quite some interest in what philosophers have to say on this; for example, Ruth Chang’s TED talk on how to make hard choices has had over 3,5 million views. And recently, the new book by L.A. Paul, Transformative Experience, has been making quite a splash in the American mainstream media, with references in venues such as the New Yorker and the New York Times. A transformative experience is one that so fundamentally changes the person who undergoes it that she acquires a new self altogether, because she is transformed in a profound way. (See here for the shorter, article version of this idea.) The quintessential transformative experience for Paul is becoming a parent, and other examples include the death of a loved one, emigrating to a new country, among others.
One of the upshots of this conception of transformative experience is that, for many of the most important decisions in life, we simply have no way of evaluating the pros and cons of each side because we have no idea of what we’re getting into. As put by the influential journalist David Brooks in the New York Times,
Paul’s point is that we’re fundamentally ignorant about many of the biggest choices of our lives and that it’s not possible to make purely rational decisions. “You shouldn’t fool yourself,” she writes. “You have no idea what you are getting into.”
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The idea of a fully articulated philosophy of the novel does not really get going until Georg Lukács wrote Theory of the Novel during World War One, though it was not published until 1921 by which time Lukács’ political world view had changed. There may be some large scale work on the philosophy of the novel I have missed before Lukács, but there is nothing which has lasted as a point of reference.
Of course there is important work on the philosophy of the novel before Lukács in remarks by Friedrich Schlegel (as well as other Romantic ironists), G.W.F. Hegel, and F.W.J. Schelling. Going back further there is some work which indirectly addresses the novel. The New Science of Giambattista Vico is the most obviously relevant since he gives great importance to epic, particularly those attributed to Homer. Not only are there ways in which the novel is the continuation of the epic that give Vico relevance: the way in which Vico places the epic in the context of a transition from heroic-aristocratic world to legal-democratic world sets up thinking about the novel and might have been influenced by the early modern evolution of the novel as a literary form.
The whole development of aesthetic philosophy around ideas, sentiment, complexity, judgement, community and sympathy in Alexander Baumgarten, Anthony Ashley Cooper (Shaftesbury), Frances Hutcheson, Edmund Burke, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant, even though they do not attach importance to the novel, can be seen in the context of the growing importance of the novel as a form of narrative which incorporates these in the prose of a world of changeable and plural points of view, in which the nature of subjective experience is always an issue.
As the general silence of eighteenth century philosophers on novelistic form suggests, the novel had limited status as an aesthetic type. The end of the century sees some discussion of the novel, with the Romantics tending towards an elevated view, while Hegel and Schelling take a more sceptical view, though Schelling does at least allow some greatness to Don Quixote.
Kierkegaard does not exactly directly suggest that the novel be taken as the aesthetic equal of any literary form, or even devote a major text to that topic, but the novel acquires considerable significance across his writing. Taking the early From the Papers of One Still Living first, Kierkegaard addresses the little known (certainly at the present time in the English speaking world) ‘adult’ novels of Hans Christian Andersen. They suggest a world of uncertainty to Kierkegaard, a world of uncertain judgements and changeable perspectives. This at least establishes the novel as important in the culture of the modern world.
Sometime this work of Kierkegaard is regarded as just judging contemporary novels by the standards of a previously established aesthetic, but as the supposed aesthetic given different sources, including Hegel and Ludwig Tieck, by different commentators, it is perhaps possible to say that Kierkegaard made an original contribution. A contribution that continues a few years later in The Concept of Irony, which is more focused on Socrates than the modern novel, but does have notable discussion of the novel, which amongst other things suggests that thinking about Socratic irony may help understanding of the novel. The discussion of the novel there is also the discussion of German Idealism and Romantics, with Schlegel’s novel Lucinde bringing the theory in relation to aesthetic practice.
Again this is sometimes seems as a not so original discussion, since Kierkegaard often seems to be following Hegel’s Aesthetics including Hegel’s relative endorsement of Karl Solger amongst the Romantics. The Kierkegaardian use of Hegelian references should not be confused with a Hegelian point of view, however, as Kierkegaard continues the earlier discussion of the nature of subjectivity, which is quite distinct from that in Hegel.
More indirect contributions to the understanding of the novel can be found in the slightly later Either/Or in discussions of tragedy and opera. Here Kierkegaard gives a view of the distinction between ancient and modern literary forms, also looking at Mozart’s Don Giovanni in terms related to his earlier understanding of the novel.
He returns to the novel as a form a bit later in A Literary Review, in which he discusses the contemporary novels of Thomasine Gyllembourg, which he touched upon in his earlier discussion of H.C. Andersen. Here Kierkegaard suggests both that the novel is a limited form in dealing with the absolute, but also that it does show important features of modernity including a longing for the absolute in the opposition between monarchist and revolutionary politics.
The issue of Kierkegaard and the philosophy of the novel must also take account of the novelistic nature of some of his own writing. This is most clearly the case in Repetition, which is a short novel, but also applies to Either/Or and its sequel Stages on Life’s Way. These are not unified narratives on the lines of Repetition, but they are presented as fictional products containing a large amount of narrative mixed in with the essays by characters in these works. ‘Diary of a Seducer’ in Either/Or can be taken as a discrete novel within the book as a whole and is indeed often published separately. The status of literary aesthetics is not the guiding issue of Kierkegaard’s writing, but it plays an important role, particularly with regard to the status of the novel as an object of philosophy and as a way of writing philosophy.
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By Catarina Dutilh Novaes
(Cross-posted at M-Phi)
This is the second and final part of my 'brief introduction' to formal methods in philosophy to appear in the forthcoming Bloomsbury Philosophical Methodology Reader, being edited by Joachim Horvath. (Part I is here.) In this part I present in more detail the four papers included in the formal methods section, namely Tarski's 'On the concept of following logically', excerpts from Carnap's Logical Foundations of Probability, Hansson's 2000 'Formalization in philosophy', and a commissioned new piece by Michael Titelbaum focusing in particular (though not exclusively) on Bayesian epistemology.
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Some of the pioneers in formal/mathematical approaches to philosophical questions had a number of interesting things to say on the issue of what counts as an adequate formalization, in particular Tarski and Carnap – hence the inclusion of pieces by each of them in the present volume. Indeed, both in his paper on truth and in his paper on logical consequence (in the 1930s), Tarski started out with an informal notion and then sought to develop an appropriate formal account of it. In the case of truth, the starting point was the correspondence conception of truth, which he claimed dated back to Aristotle. In the case of logical consequence, he was somewhat less precise and referred to the ‘common’ or ‘everyday’ notion of logical consequence.
These two conceptual starting points allowed Tarski to formulate what he described as ‘conditions of material adequacy’ for the formal accounts. He also formulated criteria of formal correctness, which pertain to the internal exactness of the formal theory. In the case of truth, the basic condition of material adequacy was the famous T-schema; in the case of logical consequence, the properties of necessary truth-preservation and of validity-preserving schematic substitution. Unsurprisingly, the formal theories he then went on to develop both passed the test of material adequacy he had formulated himself. But there is nothing particularly ad hoc about this, since the conceptual core of the notions he was after was presumably captured in these conditions, which thus could serve as conceptual ‘guides’ for the formulation of the formal theories.
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By Catarina Dutilh Novaes
(Cross-posted in M-Phi)
There is a Bloomsbury Philosophical Methodology Reader in the making, being edited by Joachim Horvath (Cologne). Joachim asked me to edit the section on formal methods, which will contain four papers: Tarski's 'On the concept of following logically', excerpts from Carnap's Logical Foundations of Probability, Hansson's 2000 'Formalization in philosophy', and a commissioned new piece by Michael Titelbaum focusing in particular (though not exclusively) on Bayesian epistemology. It will also contain a brief introduction to the topic by me, which I will post in two installments. Here is part I: comments welcome!
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Since the inception of (Western) philosophy in ancient Greece, methods of regimentation and formalization, broadly understood, have been important items in the philosopher’s toolkit (Hodges 2009). The development of syllogistic logic by Aristotle and its extensive use in centuries of philosophical tradition as a formal tool for the analysis of arguments may be viewed as the first systematic application of formal methods to philosophical questions. In medieval times, philosophers and logicians relied extensively on logical tools other than syllogistic (which remained pervasive though) in their philosophical analyses (e.g. medieval theories of supposition, which come quite close to what is now known as formal semantics). But the level of sophistication and pervasiveness of formal tools in philosophy has increased significantly since the second half of the 19th century. (Frege is probably the first name that comes to mind in this context.)
It is commonly held that reliance on formal methods is one of the hallmarks of analytic philosophy, in contrast with other philosophical traditions. Indeed, the birth of analytic philosophy at the turn of the 20th century was marked in particular by Russell’s methodological decision to treat philosophical questions with the then-novel formal, logical tools developed for axiomatizations of mathematics (by Frege, Peano, Dedekind etc. – see (Awodey & Reck 2002) for an overview of these developments), for example in his influential ‘On denoting’ (1905). (Notice though that, from the start, there is an equally influential strand within analytic philosophy focusing on common sense and conceptual analysis, represented by Moore – see (Dutilh Novaes & Geerdink forthcoming).) This tradition was then continued by, among others, the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, who conceived of philosophical inquiry as closely related to the natural and exact sciences in terms of methods. Tarski, Carnap, Quine, Barcan Marcus, Kripke, and Putnam are some of those who have applied formal techniques to philosophical questions. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the use of formal, mathematical tools to treat philosophical questions, in particular with the use of probabilistic, Bayesian methods (e.g. formal epistemology). (See (Papineau 2012) for an overview of the main formal frameworks used for philosophical inquiry.)
