I have recently been working on a paper about some of the testable implications of DRT (discourse representation theory) and related dynamic semantic frameworks. One of the questions I am stuck on is that of how to put the semantics of proper names to the test. The general framework of DRT does not commit us to a special theory of proper names. However, Hans Kamp traditionally treated them as individual constants, which is consistent with the philosophical (and post-semantic) theory that non-empty names stand in causal-historical relations to their referents. In subsequent work Kamp has treated names as predicates but with an anchor to a particular individual satisfying the predicate. This, too, is consistent with a causal-historical constraint.
There have been a number of EEG studies of various aspects of DRT and other dynamic semantic theories. Several EEG components have been linked to particular linguistic levels of processing. The N400 effect is a negative deflection that peaks around 400 ms after word unset. It is usually associated with difficulty of semantic integration. For example, 'John went into the kitchen and buttered his toast with socks' gives rise to a comparatively greater N400 component than 'John went into the kitchen and buttered his toast with butter'. The P600 effect is a positive effect that peaks about 600 ms after word onset and has been associated with certain syntactic errors (as has the LAN effects). Finally, the Nref effect is associated with difficulties locating a referent of a definite description. For example, the discourse fragment 'One of the two girls was reading at her desk, the other was on the phone. John told the girl ….' will give rise to an Nref effect.
As far as I can tell, the question of how proper names refer has not been tested using EEG. I am aware of the x-phi literature on reference but I am not sure that this literature can provide any obvious starting point for empirically testing how proper names refer. For example, Machery, et al (2004) presented a version of Kripke’s Gödel case to 40 undergraduates at Rutgers University and 42 undergraduates from the University of Hong Kong. The specific case they used was the following:
Suppose that John has learned in college that Gödel is the man who proved an important mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness of arithmetic. John is quite good at mathematics and he can give an accurate statement of the incompleteness theorem, which he attributes to Gödel as the discoverer. But this is the only thing that he has heard about Gödel. Now suppose that Gödel was not the author of this theorem. A man called “Schmidt”, whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work, which was thereafter attributed to Gödel. Thus, he has been known as the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Most people who have heard the name “Gödel” are like John; the claim that Gödel discovered the incompleteness theorem is the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel. When John uses the name “Gödel”, is he talking about:
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? or
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work? (Machery, et al, 2004: B6)
It was found that intuitions varied across culture. The Westerners were significantly more likely than the Chinese to give causal-historical responses. The researchers speculate that the difference in intuitions may be grounded in differences in cognition between Westerners and Chinese.
The research casts doubt on a certain methodology used in philosophy of language, known as ‘intuitions about cases’, but it does not provide any obvious starting point for neuroscience to investigate the reference of proper names.
It remains an open question how most speakers in John’s situation who learned in college that Gödel is the man who proved the incompleteness theorem and who then subsequently learn that a man named ‘Schmidt’ discovered the incompleteness theorem would update the existing DRS (i.e., the mental representation) to reflect this fact. If speakers know nothing else about Gödel, it is plausible that they would integrate the name ‘Schmidt’ into the DRS as another name for ‘Gödel’. In that case, their uses of ‘Gödel’ and ‘Schmidt’ would both fail to refer to any actual individuals, as Gödel and Schmidt are different people. So, answering this sort of question about brain processing would not tell us anything useful about the reference of proper names.
If participants learned that the man who was baptized ‘Gödel’ didn’t discover the incompleteness theorem but that a man named ‘Schmidt’ discovered it, they would in all likelihood reject the information they learned in college but this sort of discourse revision would merely reflect their knowledge of how we name people. This type of revision would be consistent with the condition ‘Gödel(x)’ mapping onto an individual only if he is named ‘Gödel’. It wouldn’t demonstrate a required historical-causal relation between ‘Gödel’ and that individual.
The upshot is that at the moment I can't seem to locate a good way to test the reference of proper names empirically. I welcome any suggestions.
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