Here's Clancy Martin's recent Chronicle of Higher Education review of Michael Clune's White Out.  

When googling that for the link I found an earlier London Review of Book essay by Martin that's about as raw as the Neal Young song that he quotes in the Clune review.

For some of the reasons Martin suggests, I find much of the philosophical debates surrounding action theory, autonomy, and akrasia to be nearly inscrutable. I just don't end up having enough of the intuitions that participants in the debates seem to take as shared. . .* but mostly (beyond what can be gleaned from the Neal Young lyrics and melody)** I just find people basically incomprehensible.

As Martin does in his essay and Steve O does in the documentary to right, every person I've known who has  navigated addiction/recovery successfully(i.e. (1) without dying, while (2) managing to recover/sustain a state of basic decency to others) has ended up embracing pretty paradoxical views about volition. At one point in the documentary someone congratulates Steve O for staying clean for over a year, and he just good naturedly deflects the compliment by saying that for all he knows he might get high tomorrow. 

I don't get this at all, because accepting that one has so little control over one's own actions strikes me as absolutely terrifying, but it does seem to be part of the healing process for so many people. I realize that this is all pretty standard AA boilerplate, and that AA should be thought about critically (as Martin begins to explore in the essay). Still, I think there's something true and paradoxical that the AA boilerplate is attempting to give voice to.  

I do know that Martin's own experiences in the international jewelry business profoundly informs his fiction and his philosophical work on deception. Maybe there are some new (over and above the standard higher order belief/desire stuff) philosophical theses to be discovered about autonomy, etc. from the experience of addiction and recovery. 


If I remember right, Nietzsche likens philosophy to alchemy, trying to turn a bunch of garbage into gold. And Heidegger picks up Novalis' romantic view that philosophy starts with feeling out of place, homesick. I worry that such views romanticize unhappiness too much, but there is some truth to them. . . Maybe the problematic part is that the unhappiness is viewed as a kind of currency to purchase wisdom (or, more probably, a clever simulacrum thereof), and then we are as a result actually less sympathetic to one another about our various dysfunctions.*** I don't know. I think I've seen it go both ways in the biz.

[Notes:

*My incomprehension isn't entirely unprincipled: (1) Some of Daniel Dennett's deepest writings comes from his meditations on how his "instrumentalist" model of belief fits with debates about Davidson's principle of charity. To my mind, Dennett argues persuasively that in even pretty simple cases of practical irrationality our ability to attribute beliefs and desires (even to ourselves) constitutively breaks down. None of the work in the autonomy/action theory/akrasia tradition that I've been exposed to strikes me as even consistent with this basic insight, one which was in any case largely misplaced into metaphysical debates about error-theory/eliminativism instead and not take up into debates with more empirical and practical friction. (2) With James Rocha, I think that it has been a disaster to misplace the original tie between autonomy and issues concerning human well-being. Not only do many autonomy theorists act as if there are little sentences in our head from which one can unproblematically read off our first and second order beliefs and desires, but they also act as if the debate just concerns whether those beliefs and desires and the actions they give rise to get a capital A next to them or not. In the earlier tradition which tied autonomy to ethics more tightly (so that a non-autnomous action could not be morally praiseworthy or so that an action that decreased well being could not be autonomous) there is at least some friction so that I know what people are attempting to talk about. (3) Possibly in tension with Rocha's point (I don't know if there's an antinomy here, there might be), Alisdair MacIntyre's late period masterpiece, Dependent Rational Animals, should make us all very worried about valorizing autonomy too much. So the whole issue is confusing and confused. I haven't kept up in recent work though, so if action theorists are taking (1)-(3) on in a systematic way, I'd love to read the resulting debates.

**With "You Can't Always Get What You Want" The Rolling Stones became the anti-Neil Young, the kind of band you are supposed to hate as a fan of punk rock. It's not only the vapid, hypocritical Baby Boomer preachiness that makes the song so horrible. How could Mick Jagger possibly have any idea what I want or need? Do human beings really know this about themselves as a rule? If Jagger had any special wisodm here, would would he really go around singing that song?  

***Evangelical Christians can often be like this. You might need a story of wretched unhappiness that brought you to God, but then you better wear a smile after that, because if you are still unhappy after accepting Him, then you haven't really let Him into your heart.

In my experience, lots of evangelical Christians really didn't actually start out wretchedly unhappy. But how many philosophy professors do you know that had anything approaching a happy adolescence? At least the original promise of philosophy was that wisdom would allow you to align yourself with reality in some way to address the original unhappiness. 

But I'm now haunted by the thought that Epicurean and Stoic communities were as moronically uncharitable as the churchgoers of my youth. I remember a woman whose husband's terminal brain cancer had made him so violent that he had to be institutionalized being asked if she'd "given it up to Lord." As if it were that simple. And her fault. Again, this is (Weberian) boilerplate, but distressing to think that secular models of salvation might repeat the sin.]

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7 responses to “some recent Clancy Martin essays”

  1. Charles R Avatar
    Charles R

    A lot of what he’s describing in both of those pieces, about the sense of powerlessness, sounds how it feels on the inside of depression at times, at least for me.
    Having been a convert into evangelical Christianity, I get the parenthetical comment about the need for a great story describing going straight. I don’t have that kind of story myself, since I started relatively happy.
    But since, I’ve gone through and still go through wretched unhappiness, and it seems my solace these days come from extended and tearful reads through Pascal’s Pensées. I recognize in what he describes about despair something similar to the paradox you describe of the healing or consolation found in acknowledging one’s helplessness to addiction. A lot of people focus on the Wager—usually not even the explicit one Pascal carefully constructs but some other version—but tend to forget what Pascal has the interlocutor say afterwards. Even if reason, being unable to prove God exists or doesn’t, shows it’s smarter to believe and act as if God is, we’re still in the body bound and unable to change. The hands can’t reach across the table to turn over the cards to see what’s won. We can’t make either decision to change, we just don’t know either way, and we couldn’t if we wanted to. So instead of using knowledge to decide the outcome, we immerse ourselves in a community who is likewise interested in pursuing those habits that deaden the passions (what Martin describes in that 2009 piece about the company of last men is brutal). Becoming centered upon the community of others, helping them and being helped by them in mutual love, you reduce the very thing that’s been causing you to believe yourself bound and unable to act: your distinct love for yourself and your own afflictions. Avoiding the romanticization of one’s despair begins by acknowledging, at the beginning, that it’s still just another symptom of one’s vanity. I read Pascal, throughout the larger argument, as making the case that it’s vain to continue the misery and fear and despair, because we are still believing in our unique perspective as the truth over all other perspectives, including those where the world is getting better or where courage is not a joke. So, if you want to achieve success and overcome the despair, you have to acknowledge the problem is you. Not just in the fact that it’s your will and your discipline, but that it’s your privileged way of seeing yourself and your problems.
    Something similar sounds like part of the narrative for some people in AA. You have to deflect the success story, the whole story others sell of self-discipline and one’s will to overcome triumphing over a disease of the mind or soul or body, deflect it away from all of that temptation to think we did it ourselves. Because if that’s true, then really hope is lost, since your self is exactly the person you’ve come to trust least to be honest about anything dealing with that feeling of hopelessness, of being bound to something you know is going to kill you. It has to come from somewhere outside, if you don’t know for sure whether you are on your side or not. By reinforcing a decentered self, an other-centered self, you might not have total assurance that you’re cured because now you can’t trust yourself to know the cure, but at least you are being a true friend to others and accountable towards them.
    I don’t think this is a universal solution, but it feels like one that’s helpful to some. Maybe aligning one’s self with reality means, if reality is disordered and fragile enough, acknowledging one’s own disorder and fragility… tomorrow is another dealing of the cards, another flip of the coin.

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  2. Neil Levy Avatar
    Neil Levy

    Research on addiction suggests otherwise. People give up successfully when they form the firm conviction they will succeed.

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  3. Jon Cogburn Avatar

    Neil,
    I don’t think there’s a strict contradiction between what you are saying with what AA is trying to give voice to, maybe a tension, but I think a real one that has to be worked through. It’s quite possible that one has to decenter the self as Charles describes (and giving voice to this decentering in the way that Steve O and Clancy Martin do) while doing other things that psychologists can correctly describe as “forming the firm conviction they will succeed.”
    The interesting thing about the Steve O quote is that the manner in which he says “I could use tomorrow” is that it functions to deflect a compliment and I think not pat himself on the back for being clean. But he’s not having an anxiety attack about it, which suggests that giving up the self-centered search for perfection is part of forming the conviction that he will succeed.
    In another part of the documentary during his first string in rehab he kept himself going by thinking that he was going to be a great role model for youth with addiction problems. But this way of thinking totally broke down and he had to get back into treatment (luckily it didn’t take a relapse to realize this). If you watch the way Steve O puts things, I think that Charles describes what went on pretty well. Even though the idea that he was going to be a great national role model was ostensibly other centered, it was still based on this egoistic view that he had to be perfect. I think the “I could use tomorrow” in part functions as a reminder that he’s not perfect and that perfection is a horrible motivation.
    Part of the problem is that the very notions of conviction/belief/desire etc. are so philosophically difficult (see Note * I added above) and therapeutic types are incredibly ham-fisted with respect to them. As I note above, this might just be unavoidable because we are forced to take the intentional stance and it breaks down precisely in such cases.
    I do think that there is wisdom in the Buddhist and Christian traditions to which Charles gestures, that part of the solution is making one’s discrete motivations other-directed and compassionate, which is entirely different from being motivated to become a compassionate person. One of the great (and true) paradoxes of Buddhism is that one cannot become a Bodhisattva if one desires to become a Bodhisattva!
    My biggest problem with the manner in which AA gives voice to this paradox is what 12-stepism does to a lot of teenagers who are not addicts are being forced into rehab as a way to not let their lives be destroyed by the war on drugs. In rehab they are given the boilerplate about not being in control, which is one of the worst things you can tell someone dealing with the (at least for sensitive kids) normal agonies of adolescence. Research strongly suggests that, all else being equal, a teenager sent to rehab for just being caught smoking pot is far more likely to develop a real problem than a teenager not so sent.
    In any case, I’m just noting that there is something deep, interesting, and essential that the AA boilerplate is giving voice to, but I think that Charles R gives voice to what’s going on there much better than I’m able to.

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  4. Jon Cogburn Avatar
    Jon Cogburn

    Oh thanks for that. It looks great.

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  5. Mark Silcox Avatar
    Mark Silcox

    Your points about how the Dennett/Davidson ideas and the “earlier” tradition of treating autonomy as a principally ethical concept seem exactly right. See also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joshua_Knobe#The_Knobe_Effect

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  6. Anonymous Grad Student Avatar
    Anonymous Grad Student

    Great post.
    I would be interested to hear your thoughts about how the heuristics and biases line in cognitive and social psych bears on the questions you are asking. I mean, if Kahneman and Tversky and Bargh and Haidt etc. are even remotely on point, a lot of our evaluations, preferences, choice etc. are likely to share strong affinities with the choices of addicts and other compulsives. Being subject to framing or priming effects, for example, often involves being moved by factors whose influence over us we do not acknowledge or understand; which are at least often bad reasons for choice; and which we do not nor would not identify with. That seems to me a prima facie challenge for the commonsense idea that there’s a big difference between the psychology of compulsives/addicts and the psychology of ‘normal’ autonomous agents.

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