Google translate gives me gibberish, but with the possible exception (I can't tell) of comments at the end of both blurbs the gibberish seemed to be downplaying the elephant in the dining room. My German is inexcusably (for someone who lived there for two years as a child) awful, so I'd be really interested to see how the blurb accords with the Derbyshire piece.

In particular a couple of things seem clear to me:

  1. Contra Faye et. al.'s repeated claims, the substance of Heidegger's pre and early 30's philosophy has absolutely nothing to do with anti-semitism or Nazism,
  2. The fact that Heidegger was not a "crude biological racist" is a dangerous non-sequitur (neither were most Nazi's, who had a metaphysical conception of race rooted in German Romanticism),
  3. Heidegger's middle and late work is tainted by the Nazism just to the extent that the history of being (especially the way it is tied to views of the German language and people and their relation to the Greeks) recapitulates central German Romantic themes that actually were central to blood-and-soil Nazism, and
  4. It's possible that the most interesting thing about the black notebooks is that they make this connection much clearer. 

Now, 3 and 4 may be completely wrong, or may be the kind of things that informed people of good will can disagree about*. But if the blurbs are written in a way that forecloses 3 and 4, this seems a little bit problematic to me.


Anyhow, here's the blurb for notebooks II-VI:

Mit Band 94 der Gesamtausgabe Martin Heideggers wird in ihrer IV. Abteilung die erste Reihe der von ihm selbst sogenannten Schwarzen Hefte" veröffentlicht. Die Schwarzen Hefte" stellen eine Form dar, die in ihrer Art und Weise womöglich nicht nur für Heidegger, sondern überhaupt in der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts einzigartig ist. Von den allgemein gebräuchlichen Textarten sind sie noch am ehesten mit dem Denktagebuch" zu vergleichen. Das Zeitgeschehen wird einer kritischen Betrachtung unterzogen und immer wieder auf die Geschichte des Seyns" bezogen. Dieser Band ist der erste von drei Bänden, in denen die Überlegungen" zur Veröffentlichung kommen. Er enthält die Winke x Überlegungen (II) und Anweisungen", die Überlegungen und Winke III" sowie die weiteren Überlegungen" IV bis VI. Das erste Heft dieses Bandes beginnt im Herbst 1931, das letzte Heft der Überlegungen VI" schließt im Juni 1938.

Bei den Überlegungen" handelt es sich nicht um ,Aphorismen' als ,Lebensweisheiten'", sondern um unscheinbare Vorposten und Nachhutstellungen im Ganzen eines Versuchs einer noch unsagbaren Besinnung zur Eroberung eines Weges für das wieder anfängliche Fragen, das sich im Unterschied zum metaphysischen das seynsgeschichtliche Denken nennt". Es ist nicht entscheidend", was vorgestellt und zu einem Vorstellungsgebäude zusammengestellt wird", sondern allein wie gefragt und daß überhaupt nach  dem Sein gefragt wird". In Heideggers Versuch", die Geschichte des Seyns" in ihren alltäglichen Zeichen" zu erkennen, entsteht ein Manuskript, das vom Beginn der dreißiger Jahre bis zum Beginn der siebziger Jahre auch die dunkelsten zwei Jahrzehnte deutscher Geschichte und ihren Nachklang deutet.

The blurb for notebooks XII-XV is HERE, and (as far as I can tell) it at least does mention the elephant at the very end:

Die von Heidegger sogenannten »Schwarzen Hefte« bilden ein in der deutschen Geistesgeschichte nicht nur des letzten Jahrhunderts einzigartiges Manuskript. Von 1931 bis zum Anfang der siebziger Jahre zeichnet Heidegger in vierunddreißig Wachstuchheften Gedanken und Gedankengefüge auf. Zuweilen – wie in den »Überlegungen« (GA 94–96) der dreißiger Jahre – stellen sie eine unmittelbare Auseinandersetzung mit der Zeit dar. Dann – wie in den »Vier Heften« (GA 99) vom Ende der vierziger Jahre – erweisen sie sich als philosophische Versuche, so dass die »Schwarzen Hefte« sich am ehesten als »Denktagebücher« bezeichnen lassen. Weil die Aufzeichnungen sich immer wieder der Nähe der Tagesereignisse aussetzen, zeigen sie sich in einem unverwechselbaren Stil. In den »Schwarzen Heften« scheint der Leser dem Denker so nah zu sein wie sonst nie. Er kann spüren, wie sehr sich das Denken auf sein Gedachtes einlässt. Das bringt mit sich, dass die »Schwarzen Hefte«, wie kein anderes Manuskript des ohnehin leidenschaftlich diskutierten Denkers, umstritten sein werden. Die Härte der Auseinandersetzung mit zeitgeschichtlichen Vorgängen wird mitunter dem Besprochenen nicht gerecht. Manche Hefte enthalten in vielerlei Hinsicht Problematisches. Dann wieder trifft der Angriff das Richtige. Alles gehört zum Eigentümlichen dieser Schriften, deren Veröffentlichung einen besonderen Moment in der Geschichte der Gesamtausgabe darstellt. Die seinsgeschichtliche Deutung des Weltkriegs samt mit ihm verknüpfter Phänomene wie der Totalisierung der Technik in allen Lebensbereichen erreicht in diesem Band 96 ihren Höhepunkt. Alltäglichstes erscheint als »Zeichen« der »Machenschaft«. Dabei verschärft sich der Ton. Nichts bietet dem Denker einen Hinweis auf das »Seyn«. Alles ist besetzt vom »Seienden«. In dieser Stimmung einer vollkommenen Verhinderung des »anderen Anfangs« erreichen Heideggers Angriffe auch das Judentum. Es wird als ein der »Machenschaft« besonders geschickt dienendes »Weltjudentum« bestimmt. So trübt Heidegger das seinsgeschichtliche Denken unheilvoll durch antijüdische Klischees.

This one is much less gibberishy on google translate, but again (on google) it reads as weirdly exculpating in the sense that it doesn't give enough credence to the view that there may be stronger connections between the kind of metaphysically inflected historicism that is often attributed to the late Heidegger and rebarbative political views.** Given the last fifty or so years of the "but Heidegger wasn't a crude biological racist"*** dodge, this would be problematic. But maybe I'm just misreading the German so badly that it's not at all problematic.

In the interest of full disclosure, I think Heidegger was one of the most important 20th Century philosophers and also that much of what he wrote was true. As a Hegelian, I also think that various of the German Romantics got some very important things right. So, just to be clear, I'm neither interested nor qualified in moderating comments from an anti-Heideggerian perspective. I'm interested in learning more about Heidegger and about political issues concerning romanticism more generally. Relevant links and discussion would be greatly appreciated.

[Notes:

*The fact that a philosophical view may lend itself easily to bad political views is not necessarily evidence for its falsity. Just because the Nazis trucked in metaphysical variants of historicism does not mean that some metaphysical variant of historicism isn't correct. Moreover, those who read late Heidegger as primarily a Wittgensteinian anti-foundationaist (e.g this excellent book) are able to easily distance a kind of Heideggerian historicism from the anti-semitism that Heidegger seems to have woven into it.

**See previous note!

***An unnecessary one! See point 1 above.]

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15 responses to “Can someone please explain the publisher’s blurbs for Heidegger’s Black Notebooks”

  1. translator Avatar
    translator

    As a German by birth (who knows very little about Heidegger), I don’t get the impression that the blurbs foreclose 3 and 4. The first doesn’t seem to contain any claims that are relevant to your 3 and 4. As concerns Nazism, it only states that the notebooks contain, among other things, an interpretation of the two darkest decades of German history. The last sentence of the second blurb says that Heidegger tarnished his thinking about the history of being, in a disastrous/ dangerous way, with anti-jewish stereotypes. Other than that, both blurbs point out that Heidegger’s black notebooks are an unusual philosophical (and of course very, very important) text/ source, since they interpret everyday events in light of Heidegger’s conception of the history of being. The jews (‘Weltjudentum’), apparently, are portrayed as servants of the ‘Machenschaft’, a word that I find hard to translate into English. It could perhaps be rendered as ‘machinations’, but I wouldn’t know how the term, as used by Heidegger, is usually translated.

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  2. Jon Cogburn Avatar

    Thanks, that’s very helpful.
    The one about the first set of notebooks is maybe still weird then for missing the elephant?
    Re: the second Maybe I’m being dense. The way you describe the second one still does seem to foreclose on 3 and 4, because it does then presuppose that the thinking about the history of being is separable from the anti-semitism. The idea is that there is this separate thought about “the history of being” which gets tarnished by Heidegger’s views about Jewish people. But the entire idea of a history of being, especially one leading up to the properly ontological German language, is the kind of view that is likely to lead to more destructive forms of nationalist chauvinism.
    Again, I think that at this point it should be clear with the early stuff and much of the later stuff that there is no important connection between his thinking and naziism, but I’m not sure that the weird thoughts about the history of being are so seperable. This seems like an important debate that shouldn’t be foreclosed by a blurb.
    Again, I should note that the Heidegger/Wittgenstein folks do have an anti-foundationalist reading of Heidegger’s historicism that (for whatever other problems it might have) certainly isn’t tied to destructive forms of national chauvinism.
    But it’s possible I’m being dense about your spiel here as well as google and my own crappy German.
    Generally, I wish we could know what the heck Heidegger was thinking when he scheduled these to be released in 2014? Maybe nothing. I don’t know. It’s just really strange.

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  3. translator Avatar
    translator

    I’m not sure what to respond to what you say about the foreclosure issue, mainly because I really don’t know Heidegger very well. But perhaps its helpful if I attempt to translate a little more of the end of the second blurb:
    “Weil die Aufzeichnungen sich immer wieder der Nähe der Tagesereignisse aussetzen, zeigen sie sich in einem unverwechselbaren Stil. In den »Schwarzen Heften« scheint der Leser dem Denker so nah zu sein wie sonst nie. Er kann spüren, wie sehr sich das Denken auf sein Gedachtes einlässt.”
    Because the entries expose themselves again and again to a closeness to everyday events, they exhibit themselves in an unmistakable style. In the ‘black notebooks’ the reader seems to be closer to the thinker than anywhere else. He can feel how strongly the thinking engages with what it [the thinking] thinks.
    “Das bringt mit sich, dass die »Schwarzen Hefte«, wie kein anderes Manuskript des ohnehin leidenschaftlich diskutierten Denkers, umstritten sein werden. Die Härte der Auseinandersetzung mit zeitgeschichtlichen Vorgängen wird mitunter dem Besprochenen nicht gerecht. Manche Hefte enthalten in vielerlei Hinsicht Problematisches. Dann wieder trifft der Angriff das Richtige.”
    As a result, the ‘black notebooks’ will be controversial, more so than any other manuscript of the thinker, who is, in any case, passionately discussed. The harshness of the engagement/ struggle with events of contemporary history sometimes does not do justice to what is discussed [in the notebooks]. Some notebooks contain things that are problematic in many respects. But at times, the challenge/ attack hits the right target.
    “Alles gehört zum Eigentümlichen dieser Schriften, deren Veröffentlichung einen besonderen Moment in der Geschichte der Gesamtausgabe darstellt. Die seinsgeschichtliche Deutung des Weltkriegs samt mit ihm verknüpfter Phänomene wie der Totalisierung der Technik in allen Lebensbereichen erreicht in diesem Band 96 ihren Höhepunkt.”
    All this belongs to the peculiarity of these writings, the publication of which marks a special moment in the history of the edition of Heidegger’s collected works. The interpretation of the world war in the perspective of the history of being, together with the interpretation of phenomena connected to the war, such as the totalization of technique in all spheres of life, reaches its pinnacle/ highest point in volume 96.
    “Alltäglichstes erscheint als »Zeichen« der »Machenschaft«. Dabei verschärft sich der Ton. Nichts bietet dem Denker einen Hinweis auf das »Seyn«. Alles ist besetzt vom »Seienden«. In dieser Stimmung einer vollkommenen Verhinderung des »anderen Anfangs« erreichen Heideggers Angriffe auch das Judentum. Es wird als ein der »Machenschaft« besonders geschickt dienendes »Weltjudentum« bestimmt. So trübt Heidegger das seinsgeschichtliche Denken unheilvoll durch antijüdische Klischees.”

    The most mundane things appear as ‘signs of the machination’. Concomitantly, the tone [of Heidegger’s entries] becomes more strident/ harsh. Nothing offers the thinker any indication of being. Everything is occupied by what exists [Seiendes]. In the context of this complete blockade of a ‘new beginning’, Heidegger’s attacks also reach the jews. Jewry is portrayed as ‘world jewry’ that serves the ‘machinations’ in a particularly clever way. In this way, Heidegger tarnishes the thinking of the history of being, in a dangerous way, with anti-jewish stereotypes.

    I suppose this could be read as suggesting that Heidegger’s critique of modernity is separable from his anti-semitism.

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  4. translator Avatar
    translator

    I just translated the second blurb, but your comment-function ate it. Anyways, it seems to me, after going through the exercise, that the second blurb could be read, as you suspect, as suggesting that Heidegger’s history of being is separable from his anti-semitism. The blurb goes to considerable lengths to acknowledge that Heidegger was an anti-semite, and that some of the entries in the notebooks are problematic and misguided. But it also claims that the critique of modernity ‘hits the right target’ in some respects.

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  5. Heine Avatar
    Heine

    The most reasonable starting point in this debate is to get the facts straight: Heidegger was a Nazi (http://laphilosophie.blog.lemonde.fr/files/2014/01/heidegger-heil-hitler.1202854281.thumbnail.jpg). No word from him about that after 1945, despite several friends asking him to say something.
    Concerning friends, there are some more well-known and indisputable facts, e.g.
    http://www.zeit.de/2014/05/martin-heidegger-schwarze-hefte/komplettansicht
    http://www.zeit.de/2014/06/heidegger

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  6. Neil Avatar
    Neil

    I believe it was Habermas who suggested that the entire sending of Being shtick – the determination of ideas by the epoch of Being – was motivated as a way for Heidegger to avoid taking responsibility for his Nazism.

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  7. Christopher Ray Avatar

    I think that Heine’s post above is a more than adequate point of departure for this discussion, but it is precisely that, a point of departure. What is troubling is the tendency to then respond by marginalizing or negating entire domains of Heidegger’s thought, thereby severing them from their context. The more charitable position, it would seem, would entail acknowledging what Jon has already signaled in the above, namely, that there are in fact two distinct yet interconnected questions of great interest here: it is one thing to ask what it means for Heidegger to have been a Nazi, and quite another to ask about how the question of interpreting Heidegger’s philosophy demands a responsible engagement with the horror of National Socialism and the ideologies underpinning it. The latter question would certainly necessitate an examination of what Heidegger said about Nazism and its correlate concepts and crimes, but this is only the beginning of the question. Its continuation requires an even greater degree of responsibility, as the question then becomes one of searching out the structural elements in that thought that allowed Heidegger to act in the way he did while still thinking in the way that he was. I say elements, a word I choose over “flaws” only because I don’t wish to identify ALL of those features as necessarily flawed, but maybe only potentially so in a way that is undecidable (I am thinking here specifically about the notion, forwarded by both Badiou and Žižek as I understand it, that the moment of the (political) act is fundamentally undecidable from outside of an engaged perspective, but necessary if that perspective is to be attained; the issue would then be that of whether or not any system that situates its political questioning on an ontological horizon could ever NOT run this risk). I think that Žižek is particularly good at pointing out the more dangerous areas of Heidegger’s thought, as evidenced in some of the later chapters in the last “big fat book” on Hegel, and in this article (http://www.egs.edu/faculty/slavoj-zizek/articles/why-heidegger-made-the-right-step/), so maybe that would also add something to the conversation for those who are interested. I guess that what I mean to say is, in short, that for any committed Heideggerian this next volume of the Gesamtausgabe, whatever surprises it brings with it, is unlikely to change what I see as being the key to a productive engagement with Heidegger’s thought: vigilance and responsibility for one’s own thinking remains the order of the day.

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  8. Yan Avatar
    Yan

    “the question then becomes one of searching out the structural elements in that thought that allowed Heidegger to act in the way he did while still thinking in the way that he was.”
    I often think this, but then I worry that there is a dubious assumption behind this formulation. It may assume a higher degree of logical consistency in human character and behavior than is really normal.
    After all, no one really need their beliefs (philosophical, political, religious, etc) to “allow” them to act abhorrently. We behave in ways inconsistent with our own thoughts all the time. There are usually plenty of emotional incentives for evil behavior, without the need for philosophical ones.
    So, why assume there must be elements of Heidegger’s philosophical thought that allowed or enabled his Nazism? Why not the reverse question: what are the elements of Heidegger’s otherwise despicable character and behavior that allowed him to think in the way that he did?
    How did he fail to make his philosophical ideas as unambiguously awful as he made his person and life?

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  9. CJ Avatar
    CJ

    I’m another non-expert, but I had developed the impression, which Jon has partially strengthened in this post, that Heidegger was definitely a romantic nationalist, a radical reactionary, and an anti-democrat, and that these things were pretty central to his philosophy, whether or not the more specific features of Nazism (most pressingly, anti-semitism) were too. Am I mistaken?
    I take it that, while Heidegger himself is already condemned for his association with Nazism, the question is whether his philosophy should also be condemned to some extent (which is not the same as being completely set aside, of course). But if the philosophy is already nationalist, reactionary, etc., as above, then exactly how much does it matter if it is also anti-semitic, or otherwise tied specifically to Nazism? Perhaps I’m naive in thinking this, but it seems to me that anti-semitism isn’t the kind of idea that can really lie at the heart of someone’s philosophy. A reader could always just note it and pass on to the more fundamental ideas that were motivating the anti-semitism. Whereas the nationalism and so on are the more fundamental ideas (and ones likely to explain the anti-semitism).

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  10. Gordon Avatar

    Here’s a more general discussion of the notebooks impending publication:
    http://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/culture/20131206.OBS8603/cahiers-noirs-vers-une-nouvelle-affaire-heidegger.html (h/t Trevor Pearce)
    I’m curious to learn about Heidegger’s views on Bolshevism!
    I’ll say more later if I have time…

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  11. Ed Kazarian Avatar

    I’m glad Gordon mentioned that Nouvel Observateur piece, since I was trying to recall where it was to toss in here. It’s an odd little thing, and and when I did a bit of digging into some of the folks who were quoted, things got weirder.

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  12. Gordon Avatar

    Yes, it’s a weird piece – it mainly caused me to think ‘oh, God, here we go again’ with l’affaire Heidegger. I do have a couple of substantive points that might be helpful:
    1. It sounds like the notebooks will verify the increasing importance of Heidegger’s critique of technology during the period up to and shortly after the war. I like the account in the Zimmerman book, which basically portrays Heidegger as an early enthusiast of Ernst Juenger’s fetishization of technology (in Juenger’s case, war technology in particular). Heidegger slowly sours on that. So by the time of the “Question Concerning Technology” (1954), the main problem with modernity is its inversion of the Greek categories of fusis and techne. For us, the only hope for a good relation to technology is found in Gelassenheit, letting things disclose themselves, or maybe drawing them out, and not ‘enframing’ them from the outside (in other words, we should allow them the arche of their own motion).
    In that context, it actually seems unsurprising to me that Heidegger would conclude that Judaism [Judentum] is a technology in the bad sense, because it involves the imposition of law (i.e., it’s an orthopraxy). If memory serves (=df I can’t produce the cite to back this up, but I think it exists), this tendency to denigrate Judaism on the basis of its status as an orthopraxy, and not an orthodoxy, goes back in German philosophy at least to Kant. I know Hegel thinks Judaism lacks a proper relation to spirit: it gets that there’s law, but treats it as external (I’m getting this from the Philosophy of History lectures, which I’ve only got on campus).
    Assuming a set of legal practices can be considered a technology in Heidegger, then he’s going to say the same thing about Judaism as he’s (I’m assuming) going to say about Bolshevism: it’s an externally imposed arche that overdetermines all the actions of those who live under it. In so doing, it stores up their living energy in order to reorganize it and dispense it according to a different temporality.
    2. Whether this reading is sensible will rest in part with what this curious phrase the “absence of the earth [Terre]” quoted in the Nouvel Observateur piece. I don’t know what the German is on that, and didn’t see it in an overly quick skim if the blurbs. But late Heidegger makes a big deal of the disclosure or opening up of sites and worlds, understood as networks of meanings.
    If I might be allowed an overly glib summary, Heidegger has in mind the Woody Allen (!) line that Jews are “at two with nature.” For Heidegger, that’s a problem, and gets you to deeply disturbing anti-semitism very quickly, not just because he romanticizes nature as technology’s other, but because he also (this, I think, is a variant on the first in his case) advocates the sort of state racism that Foucault describes in Society must be Defended.
    (I remain agnostic about Heidegger’s personal beliefs about actually existing Jewish people, and should underscore that I think his behavior during the Nazi period was reprehensible)

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  13. bzfgt Avatar
    bzfgt

    “I’m another non-expert, but I had developed the impression, which Jon has partially strengthened in this post, that Heidegger was definitely a romantic nationalist, a radical reactionary, and an anti-democrat, and that these things were pretty central to his philosophy, whether or not the more specific features of Nazism (most pressingly, anti-semitism) were too. Am I mistaken?”
    Yes, more or less. It’s much more complicated than that. For one thing, we’d have to distinguish the “philosophy” from occasional remarks in the philosophy if we accepted that distinction and wanted to go in that direction. For instance, it is possible for Heidegger to be right about how nations relate to the ontological situation he calls “technology” or “machination” and wrong that the US and Russia occupy a more or less identical relation to the latter. But even if we leave off trying to separate the philosophy from the guff, Heidegger often uses language that is very close or identical to that of nationalism and reaction but which can be interpreted as taking on different meanings, and even radically diverging from the latter, in the context of his thinking. For instance, he talks about peoples, who seem to be more or less defined by language, becoming rooted or autochthonous. He also indicates that this rootedness is rootedness in being. He also says that being offers no foundation on which we can build. He also says that having this relation to being of rootedness means becoming at home in being homeless (which starts to sound like some people’s idea of what the jews are about, and I say this just to provide a counterweight on a superficial level to the superficial interpretation of Heidegger as a nationalist, not as a claim that he is pro-semitic). He also says that the concept of “nation” is rooted in the metaphysics of subjectivity, which if you don’t know Heidegger is decidedly not something he is trying to promote.
    “Perhaps I’m naive in thinking this, but it seems to me that anti-semitism isn’t the kind of idea that can really lie at the heart of someone’s philosophy.”
    Well, the idea of nationalism IS arguably to a certain extent anti-semitic, in a context where Israel did not exist and the jews were considered decadently “cosmopolitan” and “rootless.” It’s no coincidence that so many nationalisms have been anti-semitic in theory and practice.

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  14. Jon Cogburn Avatar
    Jon Cogburn

    Ooh thanks, that’s very helpful.
    Yeah it’s very important to note that no philosophy is systematic in the sense that Reinhold, Fichte et. al. took to be necessary. There are defensible readings of Heidegger where the later turn to language and history of being stuff are actually a fundamental betrayal of Being and Time (a lot depends on how you translate the word “Rede” in that text), and moreover that they are separable from his later aesthetic views and (much more plausibly than I thought before reading your comment) critique of technology.
    The point about nationalism and anti-semitism is spot on. Not only does nationalism require excluding members of other nations but it also requires excluding the nationless (cf. Hegel and Derrida on these kinds of constitutive exclusion). If the gypsies didn’t exist, we’d have to invent them (and we do, in every part of the world).
    All of the purportedly anti-semitic comments I have seen attributed to Heidegger (the ones marshaled by Faye, for example) involve the idea that “semites” of metaphysical necessity have no home and are as a result a grave threat to any healthy folk. Heidegger of course didn’t invent this slur as it was a central part of Nazi (as opposed to “Christian”) anti-semitism, and which the Nazis got from older cultural strains.
    So the question is really whether you can have transparently chauvinistic views such as that, unlike German, French is not proper for philosophy because (unlike “Es gibt”) “il y a” is “too ontic” without the kind of radical constitutive exclusion that Derrida calls attention to. Note that Heidegger’s silliness about “es gibt” crops up in his very last series of lectures (“Four Seminars”). It’s not something he momentarily partook in during the thirtees and forties. This kind of anti-semitic pan-Hellenic German chauvinism strikes me as a pretty central part of the way he articulated the history of being after his linguistic turn. But maybe I’m completely wrong about this.
    I do know from Braver and others works that one can separate out many of his insights from the chauvinistic nationalism. The problem for me is that I don’t find robust Hegelian teleological views of history to be nearly as silly as most people do, and the “late Heidegger = late Wittgenstein” kind of view robs Heidegger’s late thinking of any last trace of Hegelian robustness (late Wittgenstein is arguably just a kind of thin Hegelianism). As a result the views are a lot less interesting (and only as plausible as one finds such quietistic anti-foundationalism).
    I really like how your interpretation of much of his later work problematizes both the robust and thin Hegelian readings of what is going on. It strikes me as a really interesting way to examine the texts.

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  15. CJ Avatar
    CJ

    Thank you, that’s very helpful.

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