In a series of earlier posts (here, here, and here), I suggested that big data is going to pose problems for privacy, insofar as privacy depends on a distinction between information and data.  Here, I want to look at how that problem plays out in a specific 4th Amendment case on thermal imaging devices.

In 2001, Justice Scalia, writing for a 5-4 majority in Kyllo v. U.S.,struck down the use of thermal imaging devices without a warrant.  Danny Kyllo grew marijuana inside his home, an endeavor that involved the use of high intensity lamps.  A police officer had used a thermal imaging device from his squad car on the street to detect the heat from the lamps.  On that basis, the police obtained a warrant to search the home.  The question before the Court was thus whether the original use of the thermal imaging device constituted a “search.”  Scalia reasoned that the Court had consistently held that “visual surveillance” did not constitute a search. However, “the present case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a home. We have previously reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage point, if any, is too much.”  Scalia reasoned that this case crossed the line:

obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search–at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search (internal citations omitted).

Much of the concern around the case lies with the qualifying “not in general public use” – since it sounds like it ratchets legal permissibility to a rapidly changing technological standard.  What interests me here is that Scalia’s argument revolves around thinking that some data is per se information, or naturally occurs as information (rather than data).  There is no further work required to make that data into information, and only in those cases do we automatically consider something in “plain view” such that it can be seen without an information-producing “search.”

The problem with naturalizing vision, of course, is doing so occludes the sense in which all information involves the representation of data.  This, I take it, is the basic point made by phenomenology from Husserl forward: to see is always to see “as” something, which is to say that what I see is never going to be fully separable from my capacity to represent it.  We know that this representative capacity is heavily influenced by the environment in which it finds itself: this is the point of any standpoint argument, as well as the evidence describing cultural cognition.  But the evidence is pretty good that even the way our brain presents seemingly neutral sensory input relies on cognitive shortcuts (a point made forcefully by Andy Clark).  In short – and I don’t think there’s anything either controversial or new in making the point – there’s good reason to think that nothing is per se information: to see it as information is already to process it.

The reason the point matters in this context is that it poses a problem for any legal regime that depends on a distinction between data and information.  Scalia mocks the dissent for its proposal that the thermal imaging device “makes an inference” about what it “sees,” but that seems to be more of an artifact of the machine processing things not ordinarily on the visible spectrum than any sort of legal principle. Indeed, this doesn’t work as a legal principle at all.  On the one hand, as noted above, the Court had already signed off on a couple of cases (Florida v. Riley and California v. Ciraolo) which are easily read as the reductio of this principle.  In those cases, the pot-growers had shielded their plants from the street (with a fence or a greenhouse).  The police flew over with some optical technology (in one case at 400 feet, in the other at 1000), saw the plants, and obtained their warrants.  In explaining why this was not a search, the Court proposed that the plants would be visible to anyone flying through the airspace on a commercial plane.  It would be very hard to argue that there was less technological augmentation of vision in this case than in the thermal imaging case, and certainly the big lenses “represent” the view of the greenhouse as much as the thermal device.  It’s only a difference in frequency.

On the other hand, the entire jurisprudence of “plain view” becomes unstable.  If you’re a police officer looking for something, it’s to your advantage to argue that it’s in “plain view,” since then seeing it doesn’t require a search: plain view is per se information (see Poe’s “Purloined Letter” for literary confirmation).  In a different case, however, the Court considered a situation where the police entered an apartment looking for weapons, noticed the very fancy stereo in the very un-fancy apartment, looked at the back of the turntable to get its serial number, called that in, and thereby discovered the TV was stolen.  The Court ruled that the numbers were out of plain view, and so required probable cause to investigate.

The cases can be reconciled if one assumes that anything accessible to something like line of sight, no matter the technological enhancement of vision required, is in “plain view” or otherwise per se informative.  Anything else, from turning the object around to detecting infrared spectrum, constitutes an act of representation that triggers the juridical determination of a “search.”

The problem is that if we admit the phenomenological point, and say that all seeing is seeing-as and therefore involves an act of representation, then either everything is a search, or nothing is. On the one hand, for me to see that you’re growing pot on the front porch requires that I know what pot looks like (and what if I normally wear contact lenses?), and perception is in any case an extremely complicated process.  Acknowledging this complication could easily overwhelm the “plain view” category. On the other hand, if we move in the other direction, and decide that since vision is representative, then other technologies are like vision, it will be very hard to establish any sort of non-arbitrary limit to surveillance.  In other words, if you eliminate the category of the per se informative, Scalia’s argument in Kyllo no longer works.  And as odd as it is to say this, our privacy jurisprudence in an age of big data needs Scalia’s argument to work.

 

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8 responses to “Big Data and Privacy 4: Kyllo and the Collapse of the per se informative”

  1. Robin James Avatar
    Robin James

    Hi Gordon, loved this post for so many reasons. For my own purposes, it’s really helpful how you’ve established that conventional notions of privacy naturalize not just vision, but a particular regime of visuality (if you wanna use some Ranciereian terms). What would you think of the claim that big data doesn’t see or gaze so much as visualize (ie institute a new regime if visuality)?
    Also, this just begs for a critical disability reading. How doe this precedent naturalize a type of human embodiment, of subjectivity, etc?

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  2. Allan Olley Avatar

    I would say that if thermal imaging devices were in general public use then many people would make use of countermeasures against it, just as we currently draw our blinds, curtains etc. to avoid exposing all our activities to the people on the street outside our window. So such a standard is not only about rapid change in technology. What general public practice is changes the inferences which those who might be investigated make about when they are in “public” or “private” and also changes an observer can infer from what they may detect with instruments or observation.
    To my mind a major concern of privacy laws with respect to law enforcement is to curtail the ability of law enforcement agents to go on giant fishing expeditions against people they have no real evidence against merely unfounded suspicion or animosity. Allowing such arbitrary investigation can harass those investigated and even if they do not turn up some criminal pretext to prosecute may turn up information that will embarrass or otherwise damage them that could be leaked or otherwise used to compromise the person. The level of effort in processing/examining is certainly a factor in this, but clearly even examination that requires less effort can be an effective way to carry out such an expedition if carried on for a long enough time.
    I have meant to say and it is too late now, but in a technical computer context information and data tend to be synonymous, since the mathematical/formal “information theory” is about information as a signal, something rather formal and merely distinguishable states subject to formal classification rather than the sort of thing with connotations, the result of inference etc.. Knowledge, belief, or some other term might work as the contrast to data.

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  3. Gordon Avatar
    Gordon

    Hi, and thanks for the comments. I think you’re generally right – both about the need to stop law enforcement fishing expeditions and about the changing public practices which then inform what counts as “private.” That’s of course a worry, since incremental increases in surveillance capacity can then quietly erode privacy expectations quite a bit, as people adjust to them. The other concern about countermeasures is that the cost of privacy goes up: as surveillance becomes cheaper, privacy gets more expensive. Now we don’t just need curtains: we need insulation and heat-shielding windows! I think you could win the argument that a significant increase in the cost of obtaining privacy is a decrease in privacy, though that’s indeed an argument that needs to be made.
    I should say something about the information/data distinction, because I’m not trying to track information theory (about which I don’t know very much). I’m certainly open to revisions of the terminology, or perhaps a better initial proviso that my use is stipulative and mainly for the purposes of highlighting the distinction I’m making. I’ve spent a bit of time with Luciano Floridi’s work in particular, and am not sure how to situate my own concerns relative to his engagement with more formal information theory. I remember an older paper of his basically argued that we should accord some sort of non-zero moral status to information, such that creating entropy becomes a basic wrong. That always bothered me, because if what counts as information is the product of the device that represents it as information, it’s hard to understand how you make entropy in the sense he meant it: at most you’d create new layers of information, or new relations of information, or something like that. Either that, or everything you did would create entropy, since it would change the infosphere at some level. In any case, the limit case for an ethics/political analysis would be where you deliberately create purely randomized noise, as in the various “file shredding” programs. Assuming for the sake of argument that it’s possible to create truly randomized noise (and I did enough programming to know that random numbers on a computer aren’t really random: we are dealing with ‘random enough,’ which will be a sliding standard), the presence of that kind of static in an otherwise informationally-structured context would still be interpreted (by, say, the NSA) as highly informative, since it would clearly indicate the attempt to destroy information. The focus would still need to be on our capacities to see useful information in what appears to be merely noise.
    What all that probably means is that what I’m calling “data” is already well on the way to being “information” by virtue of its having been selected from background “noise” (which is “noise” by virtue of having not been selected) as potential information. That would help to explain the almost inquisitorial model of some of the rhetoric around NSA programs: there must be something potentially bad in what you’re doing, because look! we have all this data about you. The worry then falls along somewhat traditional lines: there’s KDD/data mining, on the one hand, and there’s also the ability of surveillance technologies to generate a lot more “data” by recording what would previously have never made it to being “data.”

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  4. Gordon Avatar
    Gordon

    Thanks. Here’s where this probably goes, if you pursue the logic of the argument all the way. It turns out that visibility is just a special case of representation. What we’re developing the ability to do now is tap all those other ways of representing. That’s of course always been true for a bit – identifying people’s race by their patterns of speech, for example. But there’s a lot more out there that’s going to turn out to be meaningful. So big data is a process of both treating more things as data, and then developing regimes of visuality around it.
    If that’s right, then the focus on visibility and its critique will turn out to have been a distraction. Perversely, visibility will have been more privacy protective than subsequent regimes, because it artificially limited the kind of data it could represent. So the “modern” period (Descartes to a few years ago) will turn out to be anomalous in the same way that urban anonymity will turn out to have been anomalous. The new norm will be the assumption that everything is meaningful, just like they thought in the renaissance. Except now we have the modern surveillance state to make that assumption.

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  5. Allan Olley Avatar

    I meant to share an anecdote to show that thermal imaging becoming a common technology might not be simply an idle thought experiment. I have a 1979 book on personal computers, and the author imagined that by 1990 we might expect to have our houses run by our personal computers and parents might consider a thermal imaging devices hooked up to the computer to check up on their children in their beds at night (this prediction was couched in a fiction imagining the day in the life of an average family in 1990, the father had convinced the mother that such thermal imaging devices would be an intrusion on the teenage children`s privacy).
    Obvious such futurist dreams are dubious predictions, but I thought it suggestive that someone could imagine a future where such technology was a consumer technology that anyone might use.

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  6. Robin James Avatar
    Robin James

    “Perversely, visibility will have been more privacy protective than subsequent regimes, because it artificially limited the kind of data it could represent. So the “modern” period (Descartes to a few years ago) will turn out to be anomalous in the same way that urban anonymity will turn out to have been anomalous.”
    This idea that the material affordances/limitations of modern/ist visual media are anomalously inclined to protect privacy just seems right in a lot of ways. And it means that we have to rethink the basis of our critique of surveillance. I need to think more about this but your point here just struck me as really insightful & productive.

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  7. ck Avatar

    Gitelman suggests that ‘raw data’ is an oxymoron. It’s tough to dispute that. One can of course retain a distinction that points to the data v. information (or raw v. cooked) split, but the distinction has to be relative rather than absolute or, what amounts to another way of saying the same thing, methodological rather than metaphysical.
    So I guess I don’t understand why privacy is supposed to depend on a distinction between the raw and the cooked.
    Scalia’s argument, for all its flaws (and there are many!), seems to me to offer in the passage you cite a relatively-usable distinction between information gathered via intrusive technologies and information gathered without any intrusion (that said, I would not draw the line that this distinction helps us carve exactly as Scalia does). That particular distinction is not the same as a distinction between raw and cooked, is it? Or what am I missing?
    It is interesting to surmise that following Katz, Scalia’s distinction would have to be interpreted as, using Stewart’s language in the Katz concurrence, intrusion not into places (e.g., homes) but intrusions into the privacy that persons carry with them as a set of reasonable expectations. Of course, Scalia seems to not like Katz. Just one more reason not to like Scalia (especially on privacy).

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  8. danny lee kyllo Avatar

    I agree with what your saying and think this article is one sided to just give up all our privacy. I will say this as a man that won in the Supreme Court in 2001, dealing with your home or castle as I put it. I don’t care about any new technologies, if it is shined or pointed towards a private domain without a warrant it is a crime and I know I will fight it to the full extent of the law! Remember never surrender your right for freedom!
    Danny Kyllo

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