In "Changing Places" David Lodge describes "the humiliation game," where English professors have to list the most important book they've never read. The winner is the person for whom it is the most humiliating to admit s/he hasnt read the book s/he gives.

In the novel, humiliation ends up generating something analagous to a Priest type enclosure paradox with respect to practical reasoning.* Howard Ringbaum represents a particular kind of hyper-competitive obnoxious American academic, and so of course at a party with all of his colleagues present the game renders him momentarily speechless as his will battles out what to do. He has to win the game, but you win by looking the stupidest, which for someone like Ringbaum also means losing game in a broader sense.**

Lodge's game worked perfectly as satire given the level of status anxiety of the star culture of the 1980s English departments. I don't know the extent to which it works for philosophy today. First, we don't quite have that star culture any more. With punk/grunge DIY, the internet and open access, our swath of academia is increasingly starting to resemble folk art, where you get small groups of people making philosophy for each other*** (in the Baby Boomer era Lodge satirizes, all of the pressures worked to push people to ape mass art with respect to academic celebrity). Second, analytic philosophy isn't really a culture of the book.

Continental philosophers can I think still play humiliation in its original form. What's the most important philosophical book that you haven't read? For analytic philosophy at least, the analogue would have to concern a position or argument or maybe paper. It would be something like this- Given your area of expertise, what is the most important argument about which you are shockingly ignorant.

All philosophers could amend the game in this way. What is your most strongly held commitment that is deemed least plausible to those around you? Call the contest involving this question "humiliation-prime."


There's something generally paradoxical about humiliation-prime, because one of the surest way to get on the map is to become recognized as the canonical defender of a position that nearly everyone else deems to be radically implausible. In virtue of being the go-to person for a humiliation inducing view, you are not only not humiliated, but lauded. If you are Timothy Williamson, epistemicism about vagueness is a feature. The paradox is that it is a feature for you precisely because for anyone else it's a bug.

I think a lot of views and figures are humiliation-prime paradoxical in this way. Examples:

  • Standard set theory is incoherent (Graham Priest).
  • There is one correct logic and it is not classical (Michael Dummett).
  • A divine sense gives us factual knowledge (as opposed to merely affective moral intuition) about the world (Alvin Plantinga).
  • There are no moral beliefs (insert name of famous meta-ethicist).
  • There are no beliefs (Churchlands).
  • Possible worlds have the same ontological status as the actual world (David Lewis).
  • Zombies are conceivable, so possible, and so consciousness isn't physical (David Chalmers).

One could probably continue this list into the high tens at least. I don't know the extent to which its existence ruins humiliation-prime as a parlour game. I also wonder about the extent to which fields other than philosophy have an analogous list of humiliation-prime paradoxical figures. Perhaps they serve the role of Descartes' evil demon in contemporary philosophy. We are to learn what is true by seeing how they are wrong.

This can't be the whole story though because many of us are willing to humiliate ourselves by "actually believing" (said scornfully or with the rising intonation of a question) humiliation-prime paradoxical views.  I don't know what else is going on though.

[Notes:

*There might actually be something interesting here with respect to intrinsically self-defeating games and Priest's enclosure schema. I don't know.

**He ends up blurting out "Hamlet!" in a scene certainly to some extent modelled on poor Tom Sawyer's "David and Goliath!" And as a result of winning the game he doesn't get tenure. It really is very nicely done. Please read the novel if you haven't. "Morris Zapp" is based on Stanley Fish. I don't know how well the fictional character has worn over the years. As noted above, Lodge's academic caricatures aren't quite as incisive in a neo-liberal era. . . There was a great supernatural academic novel from a few years ago where the library burns in the end and the university is privatized. I can't remember the name of it though.

***This is good and bad, largely depending upon how members of the small communities interact with people not in them. You see this difference at APAs where some groups are really excited and supportive when someone not in them shows up and asking sometimes uninformed questions, and some not so much. This actually corresponds to two stages of religion formation, the earlier where you have missionary zeal to expand the group. And the later where you are angry that your group is no longer expanding. If you ask a Hegel person an ignorant question, they are generally just excited that you are interested. But if you ask a Kant person an ignorant question, they tend to be angry that you don't understand Kant better.**** In the late 19th and early 20th Century, it was almost certainly the other way around.

****These are just tendencies. Individual personality traits intervene, and maybe my impression is wrong in any case. . . I don't know.

It does occur to me that there are enough Hegel and Kant people at the up and coming Pacific that everyone reading this who will be there can test the hypothesis by asking members of both groups ignorant questions. We can then collate the results and get some X Phi people (who will be there anyhow) to help us do statistics and whatnot. Since I'd already intended to ask members of both groups lots of ignorant questions, I'll help to organize the effort.]

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20 responses to “philosophical analogues of Lodge’s humiliation game”

  1. antirealist Avatar
    antirealist

    I believe your “great supernatural academic novel” is “The Lecturer’s tale”, by James Hynes.

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  2. anon grad Avatar
    anon grad

    I’ve played a similar game. I think your worries are overstated. Even if people are sometimes eager to endorse crazy views in order to make a name for themselves, the game occurs in private. Nobody is going to make a name for herself for endorsing a crazy view among friends. Besides, there are potential modifications to the game. For instance, “what’s the craziest view you hold, which nobody knows about?” This would prevent Priest from just listing the views of his found in print.

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  3. Jon Cogburn Avatar
    Jon Cogburn

    Yes. That’s definitely it. It was a wonderful read.
    I do think someone is going to do a better job at neo-liberalism in non-SLAAC publics in the next decade or so.

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  4. Jon Cogburn Avatar
    Jon Cogburn

    I worry that the modification would prohibit me from listing Priest (and he would be a strong candidate for me).* Also if nobody knows about it, it might be too hard antecedently to tell how crazy it would seem.
    [*I believe crazier stuff all the time, just not stably. On certain days of the week I find myself believing very strongly in Aristotelian teleology, but not on others. When I’m particularly scared about something I’m incredibly superstitious, but it doesn’t hold over at all when I’m not fearful. I suspect this kind of thing is common, and I’m not sure that those kinds of things count. Maybe if you put claims about how plausible you find them explicitly in the belief? I don’t know.]

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  5. David Chalmers Avatar

    much as i’m honored to be on this list, i’m not sure that these views of mine qualify. among professional philosophers who responded to the philpapers survey, 27% accept or lean toward nonphysicalism about the mind and 23% of respondents accept or lean toward the view that zombies are metaphysically possible. so i don’t think these qualify as positions that “nearly everyone else deems radically implausible”. i’ll just have to hope to qualify in virtue of other views.
    for the other theses you list, we have only limited survey data. 15% accept or lean toward nonclassicism about logic, although of course that’s weaker that the claim of dummett’s you list here. we don’t have data on eliminativism, modal realism, and the others, but my guess is that most of them would be well under 10%.
    incidentally i’ve played lodge-style humiliation among philosophers a few times. the most memorable occasion was when a pretty successful analytic philosopher of mind admitted to never having read “naming and necessity”. fortunately he already had tenure.

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  6. Jon Cogburn Avatar
    Jon Cogburn

    Wow! “Naming and Necessity.” I once knew a virtue theorist who copped to never having read MacIntyre (unfortunately, during a job interview). I think my friend would have beat the Kripke non-reader, but that probably shows that your area and the circumstances in which the game are played are relevant to determining the winner.
    Four brief things:
    (1) The view was “Zombies are conceivable, so possible, and so consciousness isn’t physical,” which wasn’t on the survey. It might be hard to extrapolate statistics on how implausible people find the whole extended inference from statistics on what people think about the embedded propositions singly. This might be analogous to the Dummettian claim including the fact the non-classical logic one favors for some application is in fact “the one true one” but rather that it works well in some domain).
    (2) I have a new working theory about how (at least an earlier time slice of) you (see (3) below), Dummett, et. al. don’t just serve as the evil demon. Maybe it’s only possible to work through certain concepts if you are willing to seriously consider views that people think are antecedently implausible.
    Thus, for example lots of your work on consciousness and modality generally wouldn’t have been done without the zombie inference.
    But here zombies et. al. might in fact work just as the set-ups do in thought experiments of physics (without which science would be absolutely impossible). But here’s the weird thing. These set ups often if not always themselves involve physical impossibilia! So you probably win in the end.
    (3) The property of provoking incredulous stares is contingent, and changes with time. Bertrand Russell said that one generation’s heresy is another’s common sense. Fifteen or so years ago I think that the zombies inference was still incredulous stare producing, but people accepting the component theses and inferences separately might show that it’s no longer on the list.
    (4) I think I’d be a very strong player of humiliation-prime (I am stably a Priestian, and non-stably a Dummettian and Chalmersian). So no offense was meant!

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  7. Jon Cogburn Avatar
    Jon Cogburn

    O.K. Here’s my proposal for a Chalmers humiliation-prime paradoxical proposition:* Panpsychism is more likely to be true than physicalism.
    [*FWIW, one that I believe stably.]

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  8. Jack Samuel Avatar

    I’ll endorse that one! I’m a little rusty on how panpsychism works and I don’t have any settled view about that sort of thing, but I’m pretty sure I’m either a neutral monist, an absolute idealist, or a Karen-Baradian pan-discursivist, and panpsychism seems to fit naturally into that grouping. Anyway physicalism is surely false so I’ll take that bet either way.

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  9. Charles R Avatar
    Charles R

    It’s an interesting idea, since it calls attention to just how much posturing is necessary for people to ask the right questions at the right time. Ask the wrong questions at the right time, and we get explanations and lessons. Ask the right questions at the wrong time, and we get dead ends and dashed hopes. It’s the fear of asking the wrong questions at the wrong time, the kind of fear we see in our less confident students, we dread in ourselves, since to venture the wrong is to prove one’s infelicity with right. Better to remain silent and nod, ‘lest we remove all doubt, right?

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  10. David Wallace Avatar
    David Wallace

    You underestimate the egotism of philosophers. My “most strongly held commitment that is deemed least plausible to those around you” is to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. Most philosophers find it implausible, but they’re wrong! wrong! wrong! so I don’t find that at all humiliating.
    (On the other hand, as a late convert to Philosophy my Lodge-style humiliation entries would be far too humiliating to mention publicly. Though I have read Naming and Necessity…)

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  11. anonymous Avatar
    anonymous

    Could we just submit our CV instead?
    Then this post could be merged with the one about hiring.

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  12. Eric Schliesser Avatar

    You can’t be late, forever, David!

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  13. Eric Winsberg Avatar
    Eric Winsberg

    Right. that’s why, for example, many worlds in your case doesn’t work. For it be humiliating, it has to be a view that everyone else finds implausible, and about which you haven’t really done a lot of reading or thinking to back up your view. It cant be something you’ve defended in a whole Lakatos-prize-winning book.
    It has to be something which, if you were to admit to it around experts, they would make mincemeat of you, but you continue to hold the view anyway.My example would probably be something like … see: now I’m afraid to finish typing the sentence.

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  14. jdkbrown Avatar
    jdkbrown

    I played this game my entire graduate career by being a reasons externalist at Michigan.

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  15. CJ Avatar
    CJ

    Merely not having read a book isn’t nearly humiliating enough. Here’s another variation: what’s the most important book you tried to read but couldn’t get through? (Mine is ‘Philosophical Investigations’. Part 2 was fine, but the something about the tone in Part 1 just became really wearing. And I might have, er, skimmed bits of Kant’s critiques.)
    Similarly, asking for unpopular views would be more humiliating if they had to be views you had once taken seriously but since recognised the silliness of. Or the question could be: what is the worst reason you ever had for a serious philosophical belief? (E.g. I once thought that logicism about mathematics was false on ordinary language grounds. I got over it.)
    A question for after at least three drinks: what is the most politically dangerous opinion you have come to on philosophical grounds? (I half agree with Plato that most forms of art should be heavily regulated/censored.)

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  16. Neal Hebert Avatar
    Neal Hebert

    In Theatre we routinely play this game, only our variation is “what play have you never read?”
    A scholar that I love and esteem won this game at a conference when s/he said “Death of a Salesman” by Arthur Miller.
    I once (somewhat notoriously) claimed that I disliked almost all plays written between 400 BCE and 1945 CE. I was only kind of lying, too.

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  17. Neal Hebert Avatar
    Neal Hebert

    And since I mentioned the above Theatre History game, I might as well mention a couple of my entries into the “Plays I Embarrassingly Haven’t Read” game.
    Shakespeare’s “King Lear” (I’ve seen it multiple times, read numerous bits of research about it, but never read it).
    Eugene O’Neill’s “The Iceman Cometh” and “Long Day’s Journey Into Night” (more scandalous to people outside of theatre than inside it; we usually teach “The Hairy Ape,” “Moon for the Misbegotten” and “Desire Under The Elms” because of their role in introducing expressionist design elements to American Theatre practice).
    Tennessee Williams’ “Streetcar Named Desire” (another one that I’ve seen a ton, but never actually read)
    DISCLOSURE: I think it’s less scandalous in theatre history to not have read a play than it is to a philosopher not to have read certain foundational works of philosophy. We’re a new discipline, and all of us in the profession have blind spots given the sheer breadth of material we’re expected to cover – a generalist theatre historian like me is expected to be able to competently teach pretty much everything from the Abydos Ritual in Ancient Egypt through what’s on Broadway right now. And obviously, if I was to teach/direct these I’d read them.

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  18. Against Avatar

    “First, we don’t quite have that star culture any more.”
    Jon, I think if anything, the advent of blogging and the making explicit of the social networks in our discipline make this claim less plausible. There are surely subcultural niches that have been burrowed out by tiny creatures that can access areas where the larger predators and other threats don’t prey, but that is not the absence of “star culture” (to mix metaphors). That’s making spaces for discussion that will never really be taken seriously by the mainstream of philosophical culture (for the foreseeable future). Otherwise, the net effect, regarding the phenomenon you raise, is that philosophy celebrity culture has been extended down into more recent graduates of programs with more illustrious pedigrees. The idea that the internet somehow doesn’t affect us like it does other people seems to be wrong.

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  19. Jon Cogburn Avatar
    Jon Cogburn

    The downside of using tenure to follow the muse might (depending upon where the muse takes you) be that you can become less aware of how mainstream culture works (even while you are firmly in it). Maybe this is a luxury that the non-tenured don’t have?
    Maybe you’re right. Re: “punk/grung DIY”- note that after Punk and Grunge we got American Idol, infinitely worse than what punk was revolting against. Maybe something analogous is going on.
    I don’t know. I’m pretty sure that things are radically different from what Lodge portrays and that this is a generational shift. I think that people that are widely read do tend to be much more accessible now (partly as a result of the communications revolution) and I’m not sure we have superstars on the order of Quine or Derrida any more. I have also seen so many healthy micro-communities that don’t fit with the Baby Boomer type celebrity thing. On the other hand, I know some brilliant people in these micro-communities that are unemployed or criminally underemployed. So maybe there is less Morris Zapp type academic celebrity in philosophy now, but just because the vile economic base doesn’t need that kind of superstructure any more.

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  20. Jon Cogburn Avatar
    Jon Cogburn

    Those are fantastic!
    I’ve been thinking about my answers all day. Maybe after three drinks I’ll share. . .

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