As Protevi likes to keep reminding everyone on Facebook, it's been awhile now since I first started arguing that we haven't been paying sufficient attention to the role of institutional debt as a driver of the increasingly alarming developments in U.S. universities, especially those in the public sector.  I've gestured in this direction before on NewAPPS, but the appearance of a new piece on the subject by Josh Freedman on Forbes.com provides a perfect opportunity to develop the point a bit more.  

Let me begin, then, by making a fairly bold claim. Taking the problem of institutional debt seriously makes it possible to provide a consistent account of many of the major problematic trends in U. S. higher education: rapidly accelerating tuition costs; significant declines in financial aid coverage; cuts to or elimination of low-enrollment departments and programs, experiments with mass-market distance learning and online education, and a general move toward 'Responsibility Centered Managment' (RCM) administrative models; dramatically increasing pressure on faculty at the level of compensation, workload, job security and working conditions; the outsourcing of many university functions to private contractors; building booms, especially those aimed at increasing campus amenities or leveraging university owned real estate for commercial purposes; and finally, continuing increases in administrative spending, especially in development offices and other areas concerned with financial management and business operations.

All of this, which may otherwise seem contradictory and difficult to make sense of, can consistently be referred back to the urgent pressure that rising institutional debt imposes upon university operations: the need to maintain a sufficiently robust revenue stream to satisfy credit rating agencies and thus keep borrowing costs, and the costs of servicing existing debt, from exploding. Freedman provides, especially in the later parts of his article, an excellent discussion of how this works. 

Freedman's article is not just a discussion of the mechanics of the debt problem, or of its operational consequences.  He also makes important contributions to a genealogy of the current debt crisis, discussing the structural and historical factors that set the stage for the move to institutional borrowing—factors which in some cases institutional borrowing also reinforces in a relay relationship.  

Thus he begins by pointing out the one structural factor that forms the major enabling condition for the movement I describe above: "the financial model of many colleges and universities—based on high tuition and high financial aid—has put the educational and financial goals of universities at cross purposes." Under the current conditions of financial crisis, this factor alone has made a very significant contribution to the erosion of public institutions' ability to fulfill their designated roles of serving in-state students (who provide less revenue) and of providing an education accessible to poorer students (who are more expensive to serve because they require more financial aid).

Indeed, without even turning to the factor of rising institutional debt, it is hardly surprising that declines in state funding (median 10% since 2008, but ongoing for much longer than that) can be seen to correlate to moves by public institutions to maximize revenue (by raising tuition and pursuing out of state students) and minimize financial aid expenses (by pursuing wealthier students or students who are ineligible for financial aid).* These consequences are to some degree already more or less baked into the structure of the U.S. public higher education funding model as the likely—and entirely predictable—outcome of any significant decline in public funding. Neither of them, in other words, strictly requires the additional factor of rising institutional debt to come about.  And all of them should have been foreseen by the policymakers who have instituted cuts in public funding for higher education in advance of and in response to the crisis of 2009.

Nevertheless, the depth, intensity, and durability of the systemic fiscal problems remain remarkable—as does the ability of any new fiscal shock to produce a new, apparently existential crisis in many institutions.  It is at this point that institutional debt arises as a more significant consideration

As both Freedman's article and this earlier study by The New York Times both show, there has in fact been a significant increase across the board in institutional indebtedness. And in many cases, this debt has been taken on precisely for the purpose of making improvements to campus amenities that will, it is hoped, benefit institutions in college rankings or otherwise make them more attractive to precisely the sorts of wealthier, out of state students our analysis above shows that institutions in fiscal difficulty will likely be seeking to attract.** Indeed, taking on debt seems to be something that very often initially comes about as universities try to reposition themselves to better compete for a relatively small pool of fiscally 'desirable' students, an enterprise which is seen to be urgent enough that it cannot be pursued through the slower, but less risky mechanism of capital campaigns.***

But if such debt is initially taken on as a way for universities to acquire more flexibility to reposition themselves on a sounder footing, it quickly becomes a trap, forcing them to move their operations further and further away from an education-centric model and making it almost inevitable that public universities, in particular, find themselves with very little choice but to significantly depart from their traditional missions.

Freedman sees this very clearly: once the process of debt-accumulation gets started, and indeed however it gets started, it will substantially increase the pressure on university administrators to maximize and diversity their revenue streams in ways that will be pleasing to credit ratings agencies.  

Colleges issuing more debt face this paradox even more starkly. To keep their borrowing rates as low as possible, colleges want to keep their credit ratings as high as possible. But credit rating agencies, like Moody’s, could not care less about how accessible the school is to low- and middle-income students when they are assigning a credit rating. What they do care about is how stable a school’s revenue source is, which means encouraging a higher percentage of wealthy and out-of-state students.

This first move, and borrowing to make oneself more attractive to wealthy and out of state students who are fiscally easier to serve, thus leads to an increased pressure to tailor a unviersity's operations to those students—and beyond that, to make those operations pleasing to the ratings agencies. Thus the first move often leads to many others that are driven by the same pressures (and reinforce their effects): to keep the borrowing and the debt service manageable.  Curcial among these moves is one to which Freedman devotes considerable attention,  that of seeking to shift risk by pledging some of universities' general funds, including future tuition revenues, as collateral for loans (see also Bob Meister's piece on this).  But we should also note the increasingly common practice of universities pursuing non-educational sources of revenue (and often taking on even more debt to do so): "rather than put funds into education, [universities] are investing in areas with potential income streams. New buildings like medical centers, sports stadiums, or dorms can bring in fees and sales, regardless of educational value – and therefore create new openings for more money to come in." Nor should we forget the increasingly common moves to outsource administrative functions that universities had previously fulfilled themselves to private contractors, who pay universities for the privilege of charging fees to students (thus converting an operating expense into a stable revenue stream, all at the expense of students). A bit more reflection should make it clear how some of the other phenomena I listed at the outset can also arise from the same sources.

And finally, there is the endless squeezing of faculty, the perpetual demands on them to be more 'efficient,' the constant multiplication of sites of precarity, the ever-present threat to increase their workload, the multiplying demands that they cover much of their own salaries in grant funding, the attempts to claim ownership of their research and any royalties proceeding from it, and the increasing refusal on the part of institutions to support or maintain academic programs that are not merely sustainable but indeed wildly profitable.  We have seen any number of instances of this over the past few years, and proof that we are far from done seeing them has been supplied to us this week by the awful circumstances at The University of Southern Maine, where many programs have been gutted, many faculty essentially forced into retirement in order to save the jobs of some, but hardly all of their younger colleagues—and not just already visibly precarious faculty, but tenured faculty who, if they were fortunate enough to survive this round, now face the more or less permanent specter of "retrenchment." 

Many of us have likely heard administrators at our institutions tell us that all of these things, where they are happening—and most of us have seen at least some of them happen—are matters of institutional survival. The terrifying part of it is—if the fiscal consequences of slipping credit ratings are as extreme as they seem to be, and if many institutions are so substantially leveraged that their ability to service their debt is meaningfully in dobut—those administrators may not simply be lying to us.

Having said that, however, we should also return to the genealogy which Freedman provides above, and take note that the origin of this problem is not simply to be found in institutional debt. The circumstances which have more or less forced many institutions to submit themselves to the whims of the credit market are the result of a set of deliberate policy decisions. This is true across the board, and it is certainly true in Maine, where the conservative governor has appointed a number of trustees to The University of Southern Maine's board, and thus to exercise considerable control over how the crisis that administration's cuts has created has played out for that institution. The immediate crisis, there and elsewhere is a result of policy choices. And more far-reachingly, the fact that unviersities—even public universities—are made to operate on a structural model that exposes them to a such a basic contradiction with respect to their mission as centers of education, scholarship and research, is also the result of policy choices. Such choices, having been made, can be unmade—and indeed, if we are to get anything like a sustainable resolution to the crisis in which we now find ourselves, it is almost certain that they must be unmade. 

 

*Indeed, Freedman notes that "[u]nder the high tuition, high-aid model, schools with fortress-sized endowments (think: Harvard, Amherst, Stanford, etc.) are under less pressure. They can dip into their deep pockets to subsidize more low-income students." So that, paradoxically, rich private institutions are increasingly in a better position to cultivate robust diversity among their student body than public institutions.  At a systemic level, this is a catastrophe, since there are by no means enough schools in the 'rich, private' class to subsidize the students who need it (as of 2008, roughly a quarter of U.S. undergraduate students were in private institutions)—and thus we find ourselves confronted with one of the aspects of this problem that politicians have taken notice of, declining access to higher education for large segments of the population. 

**Tangentially, one can easily argue that the perceived marketing value of big-time Division 1 sports programs provides much of the rationale for the exorbitant and not otherwise visibly profitable spending on them which many universities undertake.  

***The fact that this sort of construction is being treated in many cases as a matter of urgent necessity, and thus funded by endowment spending and debt issue rather than a capital campaign is part of why I found the story of La Salle's new business school such a telling example. If one wanted to find another case more directly pertinent to the question of public universities, one might consider Temple's new $216 Million, 26 story luxury dorm, which is part of a larger plan to remake the university's urban campus to be more traditionally 'campus like' and so attractive to suburban, out of state, and foreign students. Needless to say, this sort of facility is hardly aimed at the lower-income students from Philadelphia that it has historically been Temple's mission to serve.

Posted in , , , ,

3 responses to “Revenue at Any Cost: Institutional Debt and the Crisis of U.S. Higher Education”

  1. Jamie Avatar
    Jamie

    Hi Ed,
    Thanks for posting on this important issue; the descriptions are both informative and alarming. I do have one objection: the narrative of borrowing to survive and compete for greater revenue streams does not fit the statistical data in the NYTimes article (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/14/business/Greater-Debt-Loads-at-Schools.html?ref=business). In the time series graph, “Total debt as a share of total financial resources” shows that, in the years leading up to the neoliberal crisis of 2008, debt as a share of assets were declining for both public and private institutions. There is an upward spike roughly around 2008-09 and then a slow decrease, again for both public and private institutions. This is more plausibly attributed to the precipitous decline in university endowments due to the 2008 crisis and systemic financial fraud rather than the long-term imperative of surviving and competing for revenue streams as public universities became privatized (http://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/Tellusendowmentcrisis.pdf). If the latter hypothesis was indeed the case, there would have been a long-term upward trend in the time series. Alas, I am not sure the sample (n=505) is random, so I am not sure the data is representative of the entire population of US universities.
    As a long-term political strategy, critical discourse is necessary but insufficient. To regain broad support for public institutions, it is necessary to articulate a counter-hegemonic vision of positive freedom and universal prosperity that is not merely negative freedom from taxation and the private accumulation of capital. A discourse about universal interests anticipates and undermines conservative attempts to particularize the public sector as a “special interest.”

    Like

  2. homespun Avatar
    homespun

    This is a great piece and important argument. One thought: it’s worth thinking about pushing back against the frame that locates the origin of the crisis in politics at the state level (e.g. “conservative governors” or even budget cuts), because this frame dovetails with administrators’ claims that they have no choice, that they’re just responding to objective conditions. The point isn’t to question whether or not higher ed budgets have been slashed (they have) but to complicate their causality. An alternative argument would be that administrations are key protagonists in these changes, and that in some ways state governments are the ones responding to the restructuring of the university.
    Rather than the conventional “budget cuts” story, the counter-argument could distinguish between “restricted” vs. “unrestricted” revenue. One of the insights in Bob Meister’s classic piece was that in California at least, state funds are restricted to strictly educational uses, while tuition is not: “although tuition can be used for the same purposes as state educational funds, it can also be used for other purposes including construction, the collateral for construction bonds, and paying interest on those bonds. None of the latter uses is permissible for state funds, so the gradual substitution of tuition for state funds gives UC a growing opportunity to break free of the state in its capital funding.” As a result, the shift to tuition is actually in the interest of university administrations that want to secure flexibility and managerial control. In other words, administrators in some ways WANT the state to cut support for higher education, since it enables them to raise tuition and by doing so increase unrestricted revenue flows.
    This argument still needs to be fleshed out for both California and other states, but it has a lot of potential. It’s worth noting that the cycle of anti-privatization struggle and building occupations that took place at UC in 2009-2010 was informed by Meister’s revelations.

    Like

  3. Ed Kazarian Avatar

    Sorry for being a little slow to respond to this, but thank you for the really great comment.
    First off, I’m really attracted to the line you’re running here and I think it’s in principle correct. In fact, I think it ties in with Freedman’s point about the budgetary importance of credit ratings in a really important way, namely that unrestricted forms of revenue would also probably be generally pleasing to credit rating agencies.
    Second, as for the chicken / egg question here between cuts in public funding, tuition hikes, the search for different / non-restricted forms of revenue, I’m inclined to see this as a bunch of mutually reinforcing phenomena. I might even say that once it becomes clear that state funding is both restrictive and unreliable (cuts may not be necessary, just the threat of them or uncertainty about state appropriations in general), then a lot administrators are going to see the key to institutional survival lying in finding, as you say, unrestricted revenue streams. Tuition is the most obvious / easiest of those to access, but not the only one. Turning the university into a source of rents is another, as is getting into non-educational businesses, etc. All of those, however, require capital outlays that may or may not be possible simply on the basis of capital campaigns, donations, etc. In fact, even tuition hikes of any considerable sort require capital outlays because you have to start competing for a different class of student, ‘luxury buyers,’ to reap the real benefits of the hikes. So with all of that, especially the need to do some of it ‘right now’ in order to stay competitive, we’re back to borrowing, which in turn reinforces the need for flexible revenue streams under managerial control—and then you have a cycle where I think the analysis that says “sure, have them cut and give us the excuse to just blow up tuition and be done with this nonsense” starts to look like a really, really plausible motivation.
    The interesting question is how far along that path do you have to get before you don’t really want to be state affiliated at all, or only in the most minimal way, and you’re using state cuts as cover to do what you want to do anyhow. I suspect in some cases, not very far. I’d also say that in the case of any institution in the past couple of decades that got a big capital windfall somewhere, one of the first things that they might have thought of was ‘how do we leverage this to make ourselves more or less an independent agent?’
    Lots to think about, for sure, and thank you again for a great comment.

    Like

Leave a comment