In the recent Mind & Language workshop on cognitive science of religion, Frank Keil presented an intriguing paper entitled "Order, Order Everywhere and Not an Agent to Think: The Cognitive Compulsion to Make the Argument from Design." Keil does not believe the argument from design is inevitable – I've argued elsewhere that while teleological reasoning and creationism is common, arguing for the existence of God on the basis of perceived design is rare; it typically only happens when there are plausible non-theistic worldviews available.

Rather, Keil argues that from a very early age on, humans can recognize order, and that they prefer agents as causes for order. Taken together, this forms the cognitive basis for making the argument from design (AFD). (For similar proposals, see here and here). He proposes two very intriguing puzzles, and I'm wondering what NewApps readers think:

  1. Some forms of orderliness give us a sense of design, others do not. What kinds of order give rise to an inference to design, or a designer? 
  2. Babies already seem to recognize ordered states from disordered states. How do they do it? What is it they recognize?


1. Which kinds of order give rise to a design inference?  It's remarkable that complex orderliness does not automatically lead to a design inference. Andy Goldsworthy typically makes minimal alterations within the landscape (such as this row of pinned dandelions), but the sense it's designed is almost inescapable. 

Andy-Goldwworthy-Dandelion-Flowers-Pinned-with-Thorns-Cumbria-1985 (1)

By contrast, snowflakes and rainbows don't automatically give the design inference. There seems at least some debate about whether snowflakes say anything about God's existence. Keil cites a Yahoo answers thread where the OP's question "Are snowflakes proof that God exists?", is answered by most respondents with "no". For example, "I think crystal formation and air resistance are really cool. No proof of God or gods here. Remember this maxim: God created gravity so He wouldn't have to hold things together manually.", "It is not a coincidence that snow flakes form the way they do. It is because of the molecular structure of H2O. H2O molecules are not linear, the H atoms are on either side of the O atom but not directly opposite.He angle is such that when liquid water freezes [etc] I hope this helps you understand a little more about science and I hope this does not jeopardize your faith."

More generally, is there something about biological complexity (as Keil speculates, most AFDs seem to draw primarily on biological complexity, although historically, orderly planetary orbits were also admired)? Or is it down to background information? This seems to me the more likely reason why snowflakes don't prompt the design inference. We know – or have some vague idea – about how snowflakes come about, through naturalistic processes. There's no need to invoke design. Likewise,  we know the phenomenon of land art so that we would recognize a Goldsworthy alteration of the landscape, even if we didn't know it was a Goldsworthy. So there, the design inference seems warranted. What about things we don't have background information on, such as the emergence of the forces and constants that shaped our universe? Again, I think there's an important role of background beliefs, this time in the form of assumptions about whether a naturalistic or theistic cause would be likely. 

2. How do babies recognize order? There are several looking experiments indicating that babies of 9 to 12 months expect ordered collections of items to be caused by a human agent (a hand), not by a claw. Apparently, even though the claw is operated by a hand (out of sight from the infant), they don't see it as animate. Infants look longer when ordered states are brought about by claws than by hands. Remarkably, the kinds of order that infants recognize is very diverse: recurring patterns of beads, for instance, as in the illustrated experiment by Xu & Ma - illustrated below -  or neatly ordered blocks as in Newman, Keil, Kuhlmeier & Wynn, or items put into a one-to-one correspondence, as in some of Keil's yet to be published work. Keil seems to presuppose that infants have a concept of ORDER, and wonders how they compute it. What is it that infants recognize when they see ordered states?

Xu

I do not think babies have a higher-order concept of ORDER. It has been vexingly difficult for intelligent design creationists to make sense of the concept of ordered complexity without making, at some point, an analogy with the sorts of things humans do. So my sense is that infants might use experience of the sort of ordering behavior that their parents and older kids engage in, e.g., stacking and ranging items. At 9 to 12 months of age, they will have had some experience on the sorts of states human agents intentionally bring about (and infants can distinguish intentional actions from other kinds of actions). It is still a remarkable feat that infants do spot the difference between regular sequences of beads (as shown in the experiment above) and random sequences, among other things. 

 

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8 responses to “Two puzzles about our recognition of order and inference of design”

  1. Sylvia Avatar

    During perception, higher brain areas actively reconstruct sensory information (top-down processing). For instance, there are certain visual filters that influence how we see something. We are usually not aware of how these processes influence our vision, but we can become aware of them via optical illusions and how lingering afterimages change over time. (See also this article concerning geometric hallucinations.)
    This leads me to the following speculation: since our perception is selective for some kinds of patterns, we may be prone to design things according to (variations on) such patterns. These interventions can be recognized by others (including infants) as man-made and designed, because the patterns match filters in their own sensory processing.

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  2. Charles R Avatar
    Charles R

    “Rather, Keil argues that from a very early age on, humans can recognize order, and that they prefer agents as causes for order. Taken together, this forms the cognitive basis for making the argument from design (AFD).”
    Doesn’t admitting such a biological/material explanation for this recognition of order shows an inherent reason for the human to feel a need for agents behind events their biomachinery, whether by accident or statistical regularities, took on the whole to be an order—and thus why, even when there is no evidence other than this need itself, people continue to feel the need to say the Agent Behind It All is there?
    The same thing explains both positions from their own perspectives. The only way to get around this is to shortcircuit something they both appeal to: agency or cause.

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  3. Helen De Cruz Avatar

    Sylvia, thanks – there is indeed no doubt that top-down cognitive processes are important in our interpretation of perceptual phenomena, for instance, we can “see” motion in pictures (stills) of running athletes etc. So we use background information to decide what is designed and what isn’t. Stewart Guthrie suggested that humans have some perceptual (bottom-up) sensitivity to things like bilateral symmetry, but as Keil points out, those things don’t necessarily invoke the design stance (think snowflakes – highly symmetrical, very complex, yet people on the Yahoo answers page he linked to did not think they appeared to be designed.

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  4. Helen De Cruz Avatar

    Charles: Interestingly, Justin Barrett in his recent book with Templeton press argues for the aptness of cosmological, design etc arguments. He thinks that the human need for causal explanations in terms of agents is evidence for a divine designer who has implanted this way of reasoning (a kind of Reformed approach to natural theology). C Stephen Evans argues something similar in Natural Signs. While it seems a natural conclusion to draw for the believer, I don’t think we can make that assumption without also already assuming God’s existence – so, in other words, I don’t think that the intuitions that drive natural theology are prima facie evidence for God’s existence (I’m not saying you are making this claim, just that it has been recently made).

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  5. Charles R Avatar
    Charles R

    I dabbled a bit when I was younger in the Van Til versions of presuppositional apologetics, so I get why an idea how humans need agency types of explanations is so persuasive to those who think along these lines. It’s something like a more material explanation for what Plantinga was doing in Warranted Christian Belief: instead of a vague sensus divinitatis, with greater study of neuroscience and neurodevelopment we’ll eventually point to a specific biocomputational area (or so) in the brain where we are primed to think and feel God’s movements, thus proof that we have been designed by God to interact with God.
    I do agree with you, and I’m clumsily saying, that this isn’t really enough to move the argument along, since it’s a complicated form of begging the question about agency to begin with (what is really going on when we think the difference between order and symmetry? I think your questions and thoughts in this post are great). What I’m thinking is that someone who thinks God or gods are constructed ideas having no corresponding materiality can point to this same underlying biological object as grounding a pursuit in God, leading consciousnesses towards the divine explanation as feeling right, the way the inner ear gives an overwhelming sense of orientation (putting aside proprioception) through how it feels inside our bodies to be oriented a distinct way. Subjecting a mind to the right magnetic frequencies creates all kinds of haunting sensations; the sensation of a malevolent evil crawling upon a person during hypnagogic/hypnopompic is extremely difficult to shake off or deny as ‘real’. But we can create and manufacture these experiences of the otherworldly, even those out-of-body experiences Metzinger discusses in his stuff. I guess I’m trying to say I don’t think it’s going to be so conclusive if we even find the specific region or the larger pattern of interactions in the nervous systems leading to feelings or thoughts of designers. I agree with how you’re challenging these positions. To work within them, we’ll have to bring in a lot more conceptual machinery than just looking at how humans come to think the difference between order and symmetry.
    What I find fascinating are the kinds of anti-design arguments found in certain Augustinian traditions; I’m thinking mostly of how Pascal argues towards thinking of God as hidden rather than revealed through examples of order in the universe. The revelation in nature follows the revelation in scripture: the things revealed are inconsistent, broken, and incapable of elevating the onlooker towards understanding alone. They need explanation since, on the surface, none of it makes any sense. As much as we think the future will repeat the past, it’s really just a gamble on the one hand and selective memories and viewpoints on the other. I think Pascal goes very far in terms of thinking how sin corrupts, but he argues in such a way that undermines multiple kinds of responses to why reason is trustworthy. For example, to make sense of nature or scripture, we need a cipher, and it is built up from the pieces needing interpretation themselves. It’s a puzzle where it’s not about fitting the pieces together with how it feels to be right, but about fitting them together so that the big mystery—why are people so bad at anything that matters and worse on the ones that don’t but they think matter?—finally has an answer. (I guess one way of exploring children’s development into thinking about order is to later ask them about puzzles. Puzzles: those states of disorder that have just enough of a hint of hidden order [maybe someone even says it’s a puzzle, but what was our first puzzle, the first time I was a child trying to make sense of something uncanny?] enabling us to think there is a goal that will explain to us how we got this jumble from a series of steps and inferences and applications of rules to that perfect beginning, the way lost.)
    Pascal doesn’t see order on the surface, but it’s in the patterns and structures underneath. Here the same structure has meaning in the differences and inconsistencies and contradictions on the surface by being different things; the differences come from the structure’s translation into other perspectives. There’s this odd passage in the Pensées where he imagines we can see how a bad poem is bad if we imagine the model of what makes that poem bad placed into a woman whom we will judge by her beauty. But the problem is that if our sense of aesthetic beauty is shaped by our culture, which he amasses a lot of evidence to demonstrate strongly, and our culture is just an irrational and arbitrary construct, then how things appear to be right is based on the geography of our own personal history. In a sense, something like what Sylvia is saying (I think): seeing the world within a certain pattern replicates a world according to that pattern, and people will build things and shape the world reinforcing the pattern and its schematizing of the world. Which is it, then: all in my head or all in my god?
    Pascal just keeps hitting this wall this way: how will I know how to answer this? The order is hidden behind a mystery I don’t even know for sure actually is a puzzle. But if it is real, if I act as if it is true and live by it, then order works for me by saving me into infinite life from the abyss of the nothing. It works for science to think this way about the natural world; it works for religion to think this way about the scriptural.
    So, you can see why I think you’re right about these arguments thinking our need for designers points to The Designer. I do think for them to work, they will need additional—perhaps too implicit—premises and assumptions and value schemes. They need them because they’re not willing to see what Pascal sees, what I think a lot of people see, that we have to admit the non-rational and vain love for our own viewpoint is getting in the way of finding the cipher. Once we admit this, then every position we hold is radically undermined, because we’d be blinded from within to see it right. How will I know I chose the right god, the right love, the right truth to start from, if I cannot trust this one who is the thinking thing I am because of its vanity?
    We have to gamble and pick a side, and then work to forget through habituation that it was ever a choice at all.

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  6. Helen De Cruz Avatar

    This is indeed where the audio of our presentations is available.

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  7. dmf Avatar

    indeed, would have been interested to hear the replies to Maurice Bloch’s talk.

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