Biopolitics – even when understood in its narrow sense of life itself being a political issue – comes in at least two different strands.  The first, which historically precedes the second, was concerned with what Foucault called a “politics of public health.”  In so doing, it takes on standard biopolitical issues of population optimization, public health and so forth as mass issues.   The resulting policies included mass vaccination campaigns, the installation of proper municipal sewage systems, and so forth.  These programs resulted in demonstrable and substantial gains in typical measures of public health, such as life expectancy.

The second strand, evident more recently, is much more individualistic.  It emerges partly with the rise of genomics and partly with the rise of neoliberalism.  For this new biopolitics, life is taken as potentially malleable: no longer are we to simply think in terms of removing obstacles to our health; we are to think in terms of manipulating the organism itself at the molecular level.  As Nikolas Rose exhaustively documents, this new way of looking at health involves (among other things) viewing risk as both personal and actuarial, and centers around the idea that we can view ourselves as “pre-symptomatically” diseased:

“But like risk thinking, the idea of susceptibility brings potential futures into the present and tries to make them the subject of calculation and the object of remedial intervention.  This generates the sense that some, perhaps all, persons, though existentially healthy are actually asymptomatically or pre-symptomatically ill” (19)

Two further aspects of this shift are, first, a reorientation of health policy around this new conceptualization of risk:

“Across the twentieth century, the responsibilities of states in Europe and North America, and to some extent elsewhere, expanded from the collective measures to ensure health that were widely adopted in the nineteenth century – pure water, sewers, food quality, and so forth – to the active encouragement of healthy regimes in the home and interventions into the rearing of children” (22)

And second, we see an emphasis on personal responsibility:

“This is an ethic in which the maximization of lifestyle, potential, health, and quality of life has become almost obligatory, and where negative judgments are directed towards those who will not, for whatever reason, adopt an active, informed, positive, and prudent relation to the future” (25).

 This thesis – that this second, neoliberal way of thinking about health is coming to supplant the first – seems basically sound to me.  That doesn’t mean that we should view the practice of healthcare as monolithic, however, and the ways that the conflict between the two strands plays out in contemporary medical practice are important.  Any characterization such as the one above is dealing with ideal types and general tendencies. So the details matter.

One area where the details help is on the question of disease screening, such as debates over the actuarial value of PSA screening for prostate cancer (the USPSTF now recommends against it), and early mammograms (where the USPSTF recommended against routine screening for women aged 40-49, but survivor narratives were used by advocacy groups like the Komen Foundation to pushback against this).  If you put on your neoliberal hat, you’ll realize quickly that entrepreneurial, health-maximizing individuals will want to get themselves tested for diseases as early as possible, either because knowing the disease is coming allows you to make the most of your shorter life expectancy (as in the case of Huntington’s Disease), or to maximize your odds of avoiding or beating the disease (as in the case of the BRCA1/2 mutation).  But for anything where environmental factors matter, there’s difficult questions about health policy and the relative benefits of screening and old-style public health prevention.

Huntington’s is the standard example where the genetics are deterministic, but it’s the example that proves the rule going the other way: genetics accounts for relatively little of the overall risk for most diseases, even those with a defined genetic component.  The disparity between what mass and individualized approaches consider is clear in the case of breast cancer screening.  Although a woman carrying the BRCA1/2 mutation has a greater than 50% lifetime chance of developing breast cancer, the mutation only accounts for 5-10% of all breast cancers.

A current example is evident in the decision of Medicare not to cover lung cancer screening in high risk individuals, citing the lack of certainty that the benefits outweigh the risks (especially of false-positives).  Although the decision is strictly actuarial, Medicare is very much a public health organization that makes policy for the population at large. Not surprisingly, many of the people opposed to the adoption of screening favor smoking cessation programs on the grounds that they are a better use of scarce resources, and the Affordable Care Act now requires insurers to cover smoking cessation programs, citing evidence that simply offering smoking cessation programs to patients reduced overall smoking rates by a significant amount.  My own health plan – the one for North Carolina state employees – now offers a substantial rate preference to individuals who either testify that they don’t smoke, or enroll in cessation programs.

But here is the point about tendencies: smoking cessation programs, recommended and supervised by your doctor, certainly move in the direction of public health.  But that’s a move toward public health mainly when compared to individualized screening regimes.  If you step back a moment, you realize that all of this is happening instead of public campaigns to prevent smoking or to reduce the availability of cigarettes through older-style public health measures, like raising taxes on cigarettes, restricting advertising, and so forth.  Indeed, most states aren’t spending much on tobacco prevention, even though they have money from the tobacco settlement designated for that purpose.  It's an approach that isn't getting much discussion, even if gains in public health are often gained in ways other than (or at least, in addition to) visits to the doctor.

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17 responses to “Smoking and Two Strands of Biopolitics”

  1. Nathan Avatar
    Nathan

    I happened to read the chapters in the final section of ‘Morality and Health’ edited by Brandt and Rozin today. It is from the early 90s and most of the chapters there discussed US anti-smoking measures (including the ban on smoking on flights!). It also connected ‘secular morality’ to epidemiology in the same way Foucault/ Rose would (although without citation as they are not talking the same language). The final chapter focused on ‘Moraliization’ as a process. I wondered if this could not be understood as a synonym for (or translation of!) ‘biopolitics,’ at least in the context of health. Worth checking out.

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  2. Gordon Hull Avatar

    That sounds like a useful cite indeed – I’ll go have a look!

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  3. Daniel S. Goldberg Avatar

    Gordon (if I may),
    There’s a lot in this post that is really central to my research and writing in public health ethics/population-level bioethics. It’s hard to know where to begin or end, but I’ll offer two quick points:
    First, the turn to personal responsibility is not new. Howard Leichter points out its prevalence in late 19th-early 20th c. public health discourse (and this is my period as an historian, so I can say with a modicum of authority that he is IMO absolutely correct). While it may be clothed in languages of neoliberalism, when it comes to the history of public health, what is new is often old, and vice-versa. While conventional wisdom holds that the U.S. is a highly individualistic political culture, political scientists that have studied the question have confirmed that the common sense in this case is indeed sense. (There are some good Pew studies on this as well).
    Second, your point that many dominant public health interventions are in some sense individualized is both good and important, and, at risk of even more shameless self-promotion, is one I directly address in this paper:
    http://phe.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/104.abstract
    There is an important debate going in within U.S. public health, in which I am fortunate to offer a very, very small voice regarding the ethical justification for what I term “broad” models of public health that emphasize collective action on social determinants of health and “narrow” models in which the individual agent is the locus of intervention (smoking cessation programs being an excellent example of the latter, which I discuss in my above paper).
    The latter, I argue, are ethically suboptimal both b/c robust epidemiologic evidence suggests it is far less effective than whole population interventions, but also because we have good evidence that individualized interventions tend to expand health inequalities.
    Anyway, there’s reams of cites and debate on many of these important points, which I’m happy to refer if you’d like.
    Great post!

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  4. Gordon Hull Avatar

    Hi Daniel,
    Thanks – that’s very helpful. I should probably say that don’t know the history/details of smoking cessation policy beyond it being in the news, so I’m being somewhat speculative here. Your point about health disparities is very important, and population-level interventions have to be better than individualized regimes on that score. I know the debate around BRCA1/2 testing a lot better (some of that shows up here). In many ways, smoking cessation doesn’t fit either the BRCA debate or the changes Rose outlines, because smoking cessation programs don’t rely on genetic testing. In other words, smoking cessation on the model of emergent biopower traced by somebody like Rose would involve patients determining their susceptibility to lung cancer and then deciding whether to smoke. Here’s a few more thoughts…
    First, I think it might be useful to try to disentangle “moral” and what I’ll call, for lack of a better word, “actuarial” responsibility. I remember heavily moralized anti-smoking rhetoric from my childhood in the 70’s and 80’s. The actuarial sense is like the one car insurers use: you’re, say, 20% “at fault” for an accident because if you hadn’t been driving there, the other car couldn’t have hit you. So no moral judgment is implied. That leaves a couple of big issues to disentangle. One is the way that moralizing language works in health policy, and if it’s got any particular affinity with governmental (in the Foucauldian sense) strategies. The other is the extent to which actuarial responsibility – and I think I’m on fairly solid ground in associating this with neoliberalism – is coming to supplant it. That question is going to be complicated by the enormous amount of pop culture that basically glorifies living as homo economicus (easy and therefore probably wrong starting hypothesis: you’re morally responsible for organizing approach to life in an actuarial way, but once you do that, you’re only responsible in the actuarial sense for what happens). There is, as you know, a bunch of literature that says neoliberalism involves the “responsibilization” of individuals for things that used to be considered social problems (poverty, for example). This example may show that we need to think about different ways that this process happens, and different models of responsibility underlying it.
    It seems to me that the current insurance model that assigns responsibility for smoking is actuarial. We get the insurance benefit, for example, either by not smoking, or by showing that we’re in a cessation program. But you don’t have to prove you quit – just that you’re trying. Public campaigns might (necessarily?) emphasize the moral sense, because convincing people that there’s a moral obligation to do something is one of the best ways to motivate them to do it (on this, of course, is chapter 3 of Mill’s Utilitarianism, and then all the discussion of social policy via norms control,, e.g., this paper by Sunstein, which becomes the soft-paternalism argument).
    In the case of smoking, btw, I am very uncomfortable assigning moral responsibility to smokers. The behavior of the tobacco companies over the last however many years seems to me to be sufficient to absolve individuals of too much moral responsibility for smoking. I think the same thing can probably be said about obesity, given what we know about the physiology of eating and the behavior of the food companies (and their capture of the USDA). An easy read on this: Michael Moss’ Salt, Sugar Fat. Among Moss’s more interesting claims is that when Phillip Morris bought Nabisco, the tobacco execs became concerned that they were going to be subject to liability issues for the food products.

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  5. Shelley Tremain Avatar
    Shelley Tremain

    Thanks very much for this post. (And thanks also to Barry Stocker for his recent post about Foucault and Vico!). I’m especially interested in how the sub-field of bioethics (and the discipline of philosophy more broadly) has enabled the expansion of apparatuses and mechanisms of biopower and neoliberal governmentality through (for instance) ideas about autonomy, informed choice, and risk. I’m completing a manuscript on these and other themes entitled Foucault and (A) Feminist Philosophy of Disability (University of Michigan Press, 2015). But I’ve also published a few things that might interest readers of the post. On the topics of prenatal testing, genetic counseling discourse, governmentality, risk, and the constitution of impairment, see my “Reproductive Freedom, Self-Regulation, and the Government of Impairment in Utero” (Hypatia 2006)and on the topics of embryonic stem cell research, biopower, and governmentality, see my “Biopower, Styles of Reasoning, and What’s Still Missing from the Stem Cell Debates” (Hypatia 2010). All this stuff can be read on my academia.edu page here: https://independent.academia.edu/ShelleyTremain. I’ve also put together an edited collection entitled Foucault and the Government of Disability (University of Michigan Press, 2005), a second edition of which is forthcoming from U of M Press at the end of this year. A number of the chapters in the first edition of the book deal with themes Gordon Hull has raised. The new chapters in the second edition do even moreso. They concern neoliberalism, the “war on terror,” and the “war on autism;” euthanasia, neoliberalism, and the idea of “informed choice;” and other relevant themes.

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  6. Gordon Hull Avatar

    Hi Shelley, thanks for the references. I don’t know much about disability studies, but Foucault strikes me as one of the very few “big-name” philosophers who would be really helpful in that context.
    It’s seemed to me for a while – and this dates to before I was together on biopower – that autonomy is often a really dangerous concept (and that troubles with risk, informed choice, and so on may well have their roots in problems with autonomy). The distinction I learned to make first is between formal and substantive autonomy. The problem is that formal autonomy, which is of course the only version of the concept neoliberalism really cares about, provides a pretty empty freedom in a lot of contexts. The example I’ve read most recently is a late 1960s school desegregation decision where a county in Virginia, in which there were two high schools, one white and one black, tried to comply with Brown by announcing that students were henceforth free to go to either school. Of course, nobody switched schools, and the Sup. Court said that such formal freedom wasn’t a “talisman,” and was the start, not the end, of real integration. On that reading, actual, substantive autonomy is, as Judith Butler says, an achievement…
    In any case, all of that by way of saying that, yes, it seems to me that you’re working through some cognate issues, or at least a cluster of issues that overlaps a lot with the ones in the OP.

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  7. Shelley Tremain Avatar
    Shelley Tremain

    Indeed. Foucault has written more that is useful to philosophers and theorists of disability than any other widely read philosopher. The central concern of his work was how humans are made into subjects (it was not power per se) and especially how people are constituted as deviant subjects through dividing practices (normal vs. abnormal; sane vs. insane; healthy vs. sick; and so on), forms of segregation, the linkage of these techniques to scientific discourses, etc. All of this came together (as you probably know) in his published work in the 60s and early 70s and in the 1973-74 lectures at College de France (published only recently as Psychiatric Power) and the 1974-75 lectures at College de France (published only recently as Abnormal). In the latter course, he introduced the case of Charles Jouy, the 19th farmhand who was initially accused of sexual abuse of a girl named Sophie Adam. He used the case again as an example in the first volume of The History of Sexuality . Feminists have argued (as an earlier post on this blog by John Protevi showed) that this use of the case of Jouy trivialized the impact of sexual abuse and pedophilia on children. In an article that I published last year (Hypatia 2013) entitled “Educating Jouy,” I demonstrate that Foucault was using the case as an example to show the historical constitution of imbecility, not pedophilia, as these other feminist philosophers have believed. The article can be read here: https://www.academia.edu/5812094/Educating_Jouy_A_case_study_of_ableism_in_feminist_philosophy_
    I strongly agree with you that the notion of autonomy is dangerous and that Foucault regarded it as dangerous. Autonomy is of course a central value of mainstream and feminist bioethics. Autonomy is also central to liberal governmentality. In my view (and as I argue in a few places), the best way to conceive of the danger that autonomy poses is this: it enables people to act in order to constrain them; it guides and limits their actions by putting in place the possible outcomes of their acts. This argument is in fact integral to my work, including my work on disability and prenatal test and screening, disability and embryonic stem cell research, and so on.

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  8. Daniel S. Goldberg Avatar

    Hello Gordon,
    Sorry for the delay in responding; I was conferencing for the weekend (on history of medicine and public health, as it turns out!).
    I like where you are going w/ the distinction btw moral and actuarial responsibility, but I’m not sure if it bears out historically. If we take a look at the history of quantification and statistics in the modern era — which is both chronologically consistent and substantively extremely important in the rise of modern public health — we can see a profoundly moral and normative aspect to the entire project (the best source on this is Theodore Porter’s fabulous book, Trust In Numbers), but there’s some older strands one can see in Steven Shapin’s work as well.
    So I would want to suggest that for both historical and conceptual reasons, the concept of actuarial responsibility is value-laden in the way that statistical analysis is so. But if we presume that I am mistaken in this, then of course attributions of actuarial responsibility do not define the scope of moral responsibility, as you point out.
    The last point I might make regarding the convergence of actuarial and normative strands actually integrates some of Shelley’s important and valuable concerns about disability. There is some litigation brewing regarding the rise of corporate wellness plans that link insurance benefits to attempts to quit smoking, lose weight, etc. While it is true that such programs typically subsidize the effort rather than the result, many of the acts required to earn the subsidy are simply unavailable to many persons with disabilities. So essentially, the programs, and the laws and policies that enable them, are penalizing already-marginalized persons further by cutting off an insurance subsidy, who may lack the capacity even to take the acts which would merit the subsidies.
    I want to say that this state of affairs certainly reflects a normative position regarding inclusion/exclusion/marginalization of people with disabilities. There’s a searing essay on this from the inimitable Paul Longmore that I teach sometimes: http://dps.sagepub.com/content/16/1/38.short
    Thanks again for the great convo!

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  9. Shelley Tremain Avatar
    Shelley Tremain

    Daniel, thanks so very much for linking to Paul’s article. I certainly regarded Paul as a mentor, deeply admired and respected him, loved him dearly, and miss him.
    Thanks also for your kind and generous words about my remarks and my work.
    I’m very interested in the normative implications and aspects of classification and statistics, both of which have been indispensable for the constitution of the disabled subject.
    🙂

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  10. Gordon Hull Avatar

    So, yes, “moral” and “actuarial” probably aren’t entirely apt in a Foucault context, since a lot of what bothers the Foucauldian is the pretext of “science” and objectivity to disguise purely normative judgments (I’ll go have a look at the book you cite – I certainly think even a book like Leviathan and the Air Pump shows how much the move to numbers is suspect. I like this paper on the theology of financial derivatives). Maybe the distinction would be better captured by something like “moralizing” vs. “actuarializing” (?). The example that comes to mind is the distinction between, say, the way Foucault talks about the institution of the nuclear family at the end of Abnormal (there’s still science, but it is in support of the concept of “degeneracy”) versus the way he presents Becker as emphasizing that there is no “criminal” so much as acts committed when the incentive structures are wrong. I was just reading this paper, which critiques law and economics for treating deontology as though it cared about consequences, rather than actions. So that was somewhere in the back of my mind too.
    All of that said, I think (this is the paper of mine I linked to earlier) the emergence of statistics is central to biopower, probably more so than the topic of life. So that commits me to the thesis that neoliberalism is characterized by the ability or desire to individualize all the risk analysis. Where the old-fashioned moralizing shows up is then in the effort to convince folks to become proper neoliberal subjects.

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  11. Shelley Tremain Avatar
    Shelley Tremain

    Gordon, with respect to your last points, I would say you have gone in the wrong direction. 🙂 Here is what I think, some of which I have written, in a few variations, in a few places:
    Biopower is a historically-specific coalescence of disciplinary normalization and population management conducted through vast networks of production and social control. These networks of force relations target the problems that the phenomena characteristic of a group of living beings, when circumscribed as a “population” (a concept which itself is introduced by this form of power), pose to governmental practice, including problems with respect to its birthrate and mortality, its health and longevity, its sanitation and housing, and not least of all, its racial purity. Foucault pointed out that since the 18th century these problems have steadily become a central preoccupation for the government of populations and individuals and, in response to them, an immense network of strategies, mechanisms, and techniques (such as systems of classification and statistics) designed to manage them has emerged, namely, biopower. Biopower has worked toward increasingly efficient and economical management of the problems that these phenomena pose by taking as its object “life itself.” Biopower, Foucault wrote, is “what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (History of Sexuality, vol. 1, 143). In short, life itself—its enhancement, amplification, quality, duration, continuance, and renewal—has become an urgent economic and political concern that government policy and practice addresses. So, there is the introduction of the strategies that you mentioned in the OP: widespread vaccination, public sewage systems, etc. This concern with life, coupled with liberalism (not as a theory or political organization, but as what Foucault called an “art of governing”), facilitates the emergence of capitalism. As an analytical tool and philosophical-political-economic concept, the idea of biopower enabled Foucault to address issues at the macro-level of society and thus respond to Marxists who had argued that his focus on practices at the micro-level of the subject neglected overarching and systemic forms of power.

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  12. Gordon Hull Avatar

    Hi Shelley,
    That’s certainly a correct report of the conventional wisdom. But I also don’t think it holds up to careful scrutiny. A short version of my reasons is here. The gist of the argument is that if you make the zoe/bios distinction with Agamben (so life itself vs. form of life), it becomes fairly clear that in Foucault’s own terms, although zoe is the point of initial application of biopower, the core of it is about managing bios. Here’s a quote: in addition to ensuring that people live, policy “must also ensure that everything in their activity that may go beyond this pure and simple subsistence will in fact be produced, distributed, divided up, and put in circulation in such a way that the state really can draw its strength from it” (STP 326). So, yes, people need to live, but it’s all about optimization. And you just can’t do it without developments in statistics. Once you make this move, then you have a strategy to integrate economics into the picture; it turns on a recharacterization of the oikos: “to govern a state will thus mean the application of economy, the establishment of an economy, at the level of the state as a whole, that is to say, [exercising] supervision and control over its inhabitants, wealth, and the conduct of all and each, as attentive as that of a father’s over his household and goods” (STP 95). You can then argue that neoliberalism is essentially about the form of subjectification proper to contemporary biopolitics. In any case, the paper is somewhat more drawn out (it’s from a SPEP paper, so it’s still fairly short).
    The advantage of this reading is that it lets you see the emergence of risk analysis in the economy as an aspect of biopoilitics. In other words, it explains how he can be talking about Gary Becker in a course nominally on Biopolitics.
    It seems to me that the core of Foucault’s response to Marxism was (a) to go after the idea of any sort of last-instance determinism, by trying to complicate the sense of systematicity involved (and really, this is already in DP, with the “swarming of disciplines” and so forth) and (b) to insist that philosophy can’t be about telling struggling people what to do or how to struggle. The second point is very clear in the interviews around the publication of Discipline and Punish, where he refers to the book as a toolbox etc.

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  13. Shelley Tremain Avatar
    Shelley Tremain

    Hi Daniel, thanks for your response to my comment. I don’t disagree with you and in fact I think this remark I made indicates that I agree with you about the optimization of life: “In short, life itself—its enhancement, amplification, quality, duration, continuance, and renewal—has become an urgent economic and political concern that government policy and practice addresses.” I think that my understanding of biopower also allows for the emergence of risk. Some of Foucault’s students and friends actually did a lot of work on risk with his ideas (e.g. some of the chapters in _The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality). Foucault himself talks about the emergence of calculations and statistics with biopower, insurance mechanisms, etc. I like the work that Ian Hacking has done with Foucault’s claims about the emergence of statistics, for example, in the former’s paper “Avalanche of Printed Numbers.” Finally, my remark about Foucault and Marxism was intended only to provide an explanation for his introduction and use of the concept of biopower. I wasn’t suggesting that this explanation exhausted the ways that Foucault addressed Marxism.

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  14. Shelley Tremain Avatar
    Shelley Tremain

    My apologies to both Daniel and Gordon. I see now that I incorrectly addressed my previous comment to Daniel rather than Gordon. 😦

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  15. Daniel S. Goldberg Avatar

    Hello Shelley,
    Thanks for your kind response (#9). I’m a huge fan, if it isn’t obvious and if you’ll forgive the gushing!
    Hello Gordon,
    I would tend to agree that the “emergence of statistics is linked to biopower.” But here I must confess that although I rely heavily on Foucauldian frameworks, I think his most important work on health, illness, and medicine in particular is The Birth of the Clinic, which, ironically is relatively understudied in Foucault studies in general. Or so I have argued. 🙂
    I’ll leave the learned and fascinating discussion on biopolitics to Shelley and yourself! 🙂

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  16. Shelley Tremain Avatar
    Shelley Tremain

    Daniel, I myself had hoped that the discussion would return to the point that I made about the role that the sub-field of bioethics has played and continues to play in the strategies of biopower, especially with respect to disability, accompanied by return to a remark that you made and this article to which you linked: “I want to say that this state of affairs certainly reflects a normative position regarding inclusion/exclusion/marginalization of people with disabilities. There’s a searing essay on this from the inimitable Paul Longmore that I teach sometimes: http://dps.sagepub.com/content/16/1/38.short.”
    The sub-field of mainstream bioethics (and, alas, some arguments in feminist bioethics) is a significant mechanism in both the production and circulation of biases about disabled people and the reproduction of their subordinated social status and plays no small role in the virtual exclusion of disabled philosophers from professional philosophy. Nowhere in the profession do I see open, diligent, and critical discussion of this remarkable state of affairs, despite the calls from various corners of the profession for increased “diversity and inclusion.” Quite the contrary: there seems to be hostile reception of such interventions and suppression of them. This suppression is actually facilitated by the dominant discourse on underrepresentation in philosophy that focuses almost exclusively on “pipelines” and implicit biases and seldom considers the exclusion of disabled philosophers from the profession. Readers of this comment might therefore be surprised to learn that the field of bioethics and bioethicists are generally disdained by members of the disability studies community and disabled people’s movements. Though such general disdain neglects to account for variation within the sub-field of bioethics itself, in many cases, disdain is not unwarranted. Some of my publications focus on these issues. Here are a few additional examples* of how disability scholars and activists have responded to claims made by leading bioethicists/philosophers:
    An op-ed in the NY Times by the late Harriet McBryde Johnson: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/magazine/unspeakable-conversations.html
    A recent blog-post by disability scholar William Peace: http://badcripple.blogspot.ca/2014/05/a-reply-to-what-
    should-we-do-about.html?spref=fb&m=1
    A recent article by feminist philosopher Melinda Hall: http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3870/3406
    *I would be happy to supply additional references to anyone who wishes to follow this line of inquiry.

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  17. Shelley Tremain Avatar
    Shelley Tremain

    The link to William Peace’s blog-post above didn’t come through properly. The full and correct link to Bill’s blog-post is here: http://badcripple.blogspot.ca/2014/05/a-reply-to-what-should-we-do-about.html

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