Some years ago, at the end of an evening that probably involved more alcoholic beverages than it should have, I found myself as a member of a small party of four, composed of two colleagues (and incidentally, good friends) and one PhD student (all three male). As the conversation progressed, I ended up saying things that were somewhat sexually explicit (as some readers may recall, I don’t shy away from talking about matters pertaining to sexuality – see a recent lecture of mine on the science of female orgasm). To be clear, what I said could not have been construed as ‘flirtatious’ in any way, but the next day I came to deeply regret the whole episode. My reasoning was as follows: had I been a male individual, and had the student in question been a female individual, what I said would have been undoubtedly inappropriate, by my own lights. (Similar considerations could be offered concerning interactions with colleagues, but I was particularly concerned with the asymmetry between me and the student).

This episode led me to formulate and since then apply a principle of parity to regulate my behavior in professional situations: not to say or do anything that would be construed or viewed as problematic, had I been a man dealing with (especially more junior) women, be they colleagues, students etc. Until then, I would on occasion make remarks during class (e.g. ‘here, size does matter’ when talking about some issue pertaining to model-theory) which seemed to me to be ok (and in a sense, even a ‘political statement’ in some way), but which would not have been appropriate if uttered by a man. I do not make such remarks in class anymore.

In a sense, I take this principle of parity to be a case of ‘erring on the side of caution’. Of course, there is no such parity or symmetry in the background in the first place: there is a whole power structure in place such that the power dynamics between a male senior individual and a female junior individual is simply not the same if the genders are inversed. Still, I see good reasons to endorse this principle, and in fact it guides me not only in my actions and interactions with colleagues and students, but also my own thinking on matters pertaining to gender and sexuality. For example, it is the parity ideal that makes me oppose and criticize male genital cutting as much as female genital cutting of babies and children (and of non-consenting individuals in general).

Now, the point of this post is to raise a question regarding norms for relationships between faculty and students, and how parity does or does not apply. We’ve all heard of the recent cases of senior males arguably engaging in professional misconduct towards female students (both undergraduate and graduate students). In this respect, a guideline that I endorse myself, and which I’ve discussed in detail with a prominent philosopher/friend recently, is that romantic and/or sexual relationships between faculty and undergraduates are always bad, and such relationships between faculty and graduate students are usually bad (indefeasible principle in the first case, defeasible principle in the second case).

Combining this guideline with the principle of parity I’ve been articulating, the conclusion would be that relationships between female senior individuals and male junior individuals would be problematic and potentially blameworthy to the same degree as relationships between male senior individuals and female junior individuals, ceteris paribus. (Obviously, things are not ceteris paribus given the background of established gender power dynamics, but again, I refer to my response to this objection above.) And yet, my feeling is that (successful, consensual) relationships between female faculty and male (former) students are by and large perceived differently from those between male faculty and female (former) students, i.e. normally judged as less problematic. I may be wrong in this perception, but if I’m right, this difference in evaluation between the two cases clashes with the parity principle I’ve been defending here. Now, I can see all kinds of reasons to reject the parity principle, but I also see many compelling reasons to endorse it, and at any rate the principle has been serving me quite well since I adopted it.

So here is my question for readers: does it make sense to apply the parity principle in the case of relationships between faculty and students? Does it make sense to endorse the principle, generally speaking? I’d be curious to hear what people think. 

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9 responses to “A principle of parity in gender matters”

  1. Jason Avatar
    Jason

    Catarina—I need help understanding the implications of the original scenario, which inspired your parity principle, as well as the hypothetical inverse-gender version. I was just chatting with my mom and sisters about this, in a sort of lunchtime, “you guys’ll never believe all this trouble philosophy professors are getting into right now,” tone. I’m a guy, and a newly-minted philosophy PhD. My female interlocutors were a nurse, a finance person, and a sales manager.
    So I started out relaying the allegations (or whatever we’re supposed to call them) from Miami, Northwestern, and now, Yale. And of course the reaction was pretty homogenous: disgusted eye-rolling and condescension toward these figures (the senior male faculty members) who come across as inept, uncultured adolescents, at best. But I had just read your post (Catarina) so I brought up the scenario (along with the hypothetical gender-reversed version) without having in mind any particular comment or insight—basically just treating it as another minor anecdote to cap off the topic. And, honestly, there was utter confusion, bordering on total incredulity, which I confess I had no idea how to deal with—how to be a spokesperson on behalf of your vignette. The point of confusion was not your employment of the parity principle as such, which I presented as a point of principle and so, in a way, not immediately responsive to anyone’s concrete experience. Rather, the point of confusion was the counterfactual gender-reversal version, and why, even if that version had been the actuality, it would inspire “deep regret” in the male-you.
    The scenario is: four colleagues having after-work drinks, one man and two women of basically equal rank/status and, one female junior colleague. You—the male version of Catarina—offer up (we presume) a joke/anecdote/musing, whose content is unambiguously bawdy or erotic, but “could not have been construed as ‘flirtatious’ in any way.” Contrary to your certainty that “what I said would have been undoubtedly inappropriate,” (I’m not sure I understand what you mean by “by my own lights”), none of us could come up with a plausible interpretation that would even make it noteworthy. My female kin—nurse, finance-er, sales manager—were unwavering: this sounds totally average, and not at all harmful. It seems like in most workplace environments outside of academia (I base this on the conversation in question, but I’ve also talked about it with various friends, female and male, in sundry lines of work)—in most workplaces, especially during after-work drinks, dirty jokes just happen. Most women I’ve run this issue by actually seem mildly upset at the thought that a female colleague would find dirty jokes offensive and want them prohibited in all work-related environments. I don’t mean to suggest that women actively want to hear/tell dirty jokes (or whatever); but my sources are pretty clear that banning them on grounds of inappropriateness or offensiveness is a non-starter.
    Anyway, I’ve gone on a bit, partly because I want to be clear that I have a sincere issue/question and and no troll-ish intentions. When it comes to explaining the point of your counterfactual scenario to working women in non-academic fields, I’m just coming up short. Any help? What are your thoughts?

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  2. Catarina Dutilh Novaes Avatar

    Hi Jason, thanks for your sincere and respectful question. It may well be that I’m really erring on the side of caution, but basically I put myself in the student’s position, imagined my remarks being uttered by a male senior person, and it made me feel uncomfortable.
    Here’s an analogy: a long time ago I worked as the personal assistant of someone who organized a big international trade fair, back in Brazil. I was really young, maybe 20 or 21, and one of my qualifications for the job was my mastery of foreign languages (English, French, Spanish). At some point my boss was talking to a client in my presence, and the client said: “that hostess over there speaks 6 languages; imagine what she can do with her tongue…” I felt extremely uncomfortable, and I think my boss also got very annoyed at the client. So that’s the kind of thing I have in mind when thinking that if the gender roles had been reversed, the junior woman in question would have likely felt uncomfortable.

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  3. Maximus Planudes Avatar
    Maximus Planudes

    For what it is worth, your principle of parity makes perfect sense to me (indeed, it strikes me as totally obvious), with regard both to bawdy jokes and to faculty-students relationships. As far as the former is concerned, I invariably find such jokes, when made in a professional context, or before people with whom you have a mainly professional relationship, embarrassing and out of place.

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  4. Jason Avatar
    Jason

    Yup—I’m sold on that example. What I’m still anxious about (and I don’t think anybody has a definitive answer) is whether we’ll have to err on the side of caution to such an extent that people just can’t tell jokes, or whether there can be something like social phronēsis, such that the virtuous can discern a joke that will hit the target and be entertaining-but-not-threatening. I’ll just go ahead and say it straight-up: I dread the thought of philosophy functions becoming jokeless. And, let’s face it, there just aren’t enough totally clean jokes out there to sustain us for our entire careers!

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  5. Catarina Dutilh Novaes Avatar

    I see the worry, but I think it’s a bit of a slippery slope argument. FWIW, I continue to be someone rather prone to make jokes, including in professional situations, but I’m just a bit more careful with the jokes I make (there’s still plenty left!).

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  6. Charles R Avatar
    Charles R

    Jason, working as a cop and in cheap labor situations, I found very quickly that the phronēsis you’re talking about only occurs when the levels of trust with one another in the group are all across the field reciprocated. It’s really good friends who can insult one another with the worst racist, sexist, classist, most taboo insults and humiliations (not even lovers are always so capable of accepting one another’s worst). So, add another anecdotal piece for me: outside academia, or maybe more broadly it’s outside institutionally hierarchical organizations, these levels of trust rise and settle into stability much faster. Fraternity organizations and local youth gangs, for example, force these humiliations and worst behaviors upon one another as an institutional way to force everyone in the group to undergo destitution, enabling friendship to form in a different, but structually similar, way. I think Victor Turner’s communitas is what I’m thinking describes this more generally.
    These naturally formed insular communities. We patrol officers had greater trust with one another than with ourselves and the administration. Maybe the faculty-admin situation is a similar way. So, I see how we get used to working in smaller groups, forming friendships with one another faster, and desire this realized experience we feel comfortable within somehow generalize and become the mode we live out in our larger and larger communities. The problem is institutionalized hierarchical organizations create power dynamics strongly and negatively impacting the chance for trust to form, which is why when a mentoring relationship somehow establishes—from either person’s perspective—intense depth to the trust they have with one another, that trust is excessively fragile. Creating new dynamics—economic, sexual, amorous, fame or celebrity, &c—disrupts that fragile balance. Likewise, creating a celebrity or sexual dynamic in the midst of an economic one, or vice versa, upsets the balance of trust there.
    Learning to maintain the fragility of friendship means having to constantly consider how we sound to and look to and create feelings in the other, but in order to model their responses we’re only going to get experience of modeling another person—imagining how they feel things and act in response—by hearing how they hear ourselves. And since we’re changing how we speak by this method, then how we hear how they hear us also changes. And we’ll change again. See, right now I’m imagining this just sounds very odd.
    I guess I’m saying your anxiety is understandable, because you see where I’m going with this: either we accept that social change in the midst of these institutions becomes an abyss of imagining imagineers, or we accept some kind of transcendental reappearance where everyone feels friendship with one another immediately, or we eliminate institutional hierarchy as a paradigm for all relationship dynamics. The last seems very improbable, the middle seems miraculous, the first seems our road in this modern world.

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  7. Jason Avatar
    Jason

    I’m pretty sure I endorse CDN’s parity principle as well. And I also agree that the behavior you’re describing/envisioning is/would be boorish and highly uncomfortable. I condemn the making of bawdy jokes in a professional context—like, say, during a Q&A session or in a seminar—as well as among those with whom you have a mainly professional relationship—like the chair of your conference panel or a visiting lecturer. That said, you’re not being very realistic (or else your experience as a philosopher is widely divergent from mine). I dunno if it’s embarrassing to admit but most of my best friends are my peers from philosophy grad school, and hanging out with them in the bar or the hotel lobby at a conference is (and I recognize my rather melodramatic tone here) an enriching, meaningful experience for me. But my friends and I don’t resemble the philosopher Callicles describes to Socrates, one who “shuns the city center and the public squares … sunk away out of sight for the rest of his life …, whispering with three or four boys in the corner.” There will always be others around when you’re hanging out with your great friends, and it’s not at all unlikely that one of them could be a junior colleague or a graduate student. That sounds to me like exactly the kind of scenario Catarina was describing—not as if the younger colleague was a visiting job applicant, or a prospective grad student having dinner with the admissions committee.

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  8. Philip Kremer Avatar
    Philip Kremer

    A side issue arises out of your comment, “romantic and/or sexual relationships between faculty and undergraduates are always bad, and such relationships between faculty and graduate students are usually bad (indefeasible principle in the first case, defeasible principle in the second case).”
    I don’t quite get the indefeasibleness in the undergraduate case but not in the graduate case. For example, in the summer of 2000, while I was a 39-year old single TT faculty member at McMaster, I simultaneously enrolled as a part-time undergrad at the University of Toronto, taking German 100. Do you really want to say that if a U of T Sociology professor had gotten romantically involved with me that summer, then we would have run afoul of an “indefeasible principle”? Another similar case: I knew a nurse with a well-established career who, in her late 30s, returned to undergraduate study to finish her “Honours Bachelors” (we used to have a distinction between a 3-yr Bachelors degree and a 4-yr Honours degree). The upgraded credential was relevant to her salary. Anyway, she married one of her professors (same age as her), whom she started to date in her 2nd term after she took his class — but was still an undergrad at his institution. Did she run afoul of an indefeasible principle? These are not weird “philosophers’ examples”. In many universities, it is not unusual for successful well-established professionals to return to part-time or even full-time undergraduate study in order to upgrade skills (as in my case), to gain a credential (as in my acquaintance’s case), or just out of intellectual curiosity.
    I am not here questioning the basic generic claim — usually bad — but merely the indefeasibleness in one case, especially in light of the defeasibleness in the other.

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  9. Catarina Dutilh Novaes Avatar

    Ok, I’m convinced by your examples: I’m prepared to acknowledge that the ‘undergraduate student’ is a very heterogeneous concept, and thus that the rule against faculty-student relationships should be defeasible in both cases (undergrads and grads), so as to accommodate these differences. Thanks for bringing that up.

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