Guest post by Christian Coseru

One may be forgiven for thinking, on reading Brian Leiter's diatribe against identity politics and the danger it poses for academic philosophy, that there is a swell in 'consumer demand' for expanding the philosophy curriculum in questionable directions and for the wrong reasons. To clarify: the 'consumer' in this case is graduate students dissatisfied with the lack on engagement on the part of Anglo-American philosophers with non-Western philosophical traditions. Or so the story goes.

So Leiter asks: "should we really add East Asian philosophers to the curriculum to satisfy the consumer demands of Asian students rather than because these philosophers are interesting and important in their own right?"

The reality is that there is no such large-scale demand, certainly not in top graduate programs, because one could not have gotten in by announcing one's intention of working in Indian or Chinese philosophy. That is not to deny that there hasn't been talk of opening up the discipline to non-Western traditions and perspectives (more on this below). But even the advocates don't think it can be that easily accomplished (not, at least, through curricular reform alone). Rather, the sense is that some change in the demographics of philosophy departments would have to take place for cross-cultural philosophical reflection to become the norm. Alas, we are a long way from that.

This recent ruckus comes from a former PhD student in philosophy at Indiana University, Bloomington, Eugene Park. In a piece for the Huffington Post, Park blamed his departure from academic philosophy on the lack of representation for non-Western philosophy in the curriculum and the expectation that, in order to have a chance at a career, one must write a dissertation "in one of the 'core areas' of philosophy" (where 'philosophy' here stands exclusively for Western philosophy). This charge of parochialism leveled against academic philosophy is hardly news (see Justin Smith in the NYT, the recent inteviews with Jay Garfield and Jonardon Ganeri at 3AM, an early discussion here at New APPS spurred by David Chalmers, and the occasional APA Newsletter). Nor is there any secret that members of the profession, whether individually or as a group, have very strong views about what counts as real philosophy, who does and does not belong in the canon, and which areas and topics one ought to work on in order to have a chance at a career in the discipline.

What then makes this particular complaint stand out? The allegation that lack of engagement with non-Western philosophy is not just a case of ignorance, unfamiliarity, or the unfortunate outcome of the need to cover the core. Rather, as our former PhD student puts it, the real reason is willful ignorance: "professional philosophers today often perceive non-Western thinkers as inferior" even though, as he adds, "few would say this explicitly."

I think the notion that professional philosophers have any view whatsoever about things outside their specific purview is very charitable. Leiter is probably right that when it comes to non-Western philosophy, plain old ignorance is the norm. But he is wrong to think that anyone is terribly upset about it. My own impression is that few regret their ignorance. And even those few, when pressed, find it excusable: one can only master so much, the argument goes, and it is always easier to go with what one knows best.

As for the question whether Asian philosophers should be part of the core if found to be interesting and important, one cannot but ask: by whom? Who is to decide? The APA already has a committee for Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies. But, as we all know, non-Western philosophy ranks dismally on the PGR, just above Feminist Philosophy and Philosophy of Race, and that too only includes Chinese philosophy. No rankings, for instance, for Indian or Buddhist philosophy.

What can be done about it? Expand the category of non-Western philosophy and rank it higher on the PGR? That might be one way, though inevitably as a category, "non-Western" ends up being treated as fundamentally "the other". A better proposal takes into account the fact that so many of those who work in Indian, Chinese, or Buddhist philosophy already have as their AOS metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, or value theory. So, in that case, one way to proceed is by changing the language in the ads. You want to hire in metaphysics or philosophy of mind, and would like to broaden the curriculum a little? Mention in your ad that you would prefer a candidate who also has expertise in a non-Western philosophical tradition. Of course, there is the problem of being able to assess work in an area one has no knowledge of, but there are enough reliable metrics to make up for that: letters of reference, publications in top journals, pedigree, etc.

Of course, one would want these candidates to come from top programs, and those typically lack the requisite expertise in non-Western philosophy to guarantee adequate supervision. But we must start somewhere, and engaging with those philosophers that are already accomplished scholars of Indian, Chinese, or Buddhist philosophy might be a first step.

 

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69 responses to “Philosophy’s Western Bias and What Can Be Done About It”

  1. Owen Flanagan Avatar
    Owen Flanagan

    Excellent post Christian. Good recommendation. Thank you. One assumption shared by you and BL that I feel ought to be questioned is about the difficulty of learning about multiple areas. True, there are pressures for philosophers to be extreme specialists. But one can have a specialization or two and study and become conversant in other areas. Philosophers are always writing. I recommend less of that and more reading. It would be better for the profession and for our students.

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  2. Eric Schwitzgebel Avatar

    I see a couple different issues here, Christian.
    One issue is whether one should try to add non-Western philosophers to the curriculum to appeal to students with non-Western backgrounds. Resisting this idea was, I think, Brian Leiter’s central thought. My own view is moderate on that issue: I do think adding ethnic diversity (and other sorts of diversity) to the syllabus is a desirable thing to the extent it helps a broader range of students think of philosophy as something that people like them do. Oddly, I suspect, the instructor’s being non-“cosmopolitan” in this respect — considering cultural origin in deciding what to put on the syllabus — might encourage greater cosmopolitanism among students, if the students can be brought to see, say, both Mencius and Plato as important historical sources for the philosophy of moral development. However, I regard the ideal of diversity as only one of numerous factors that go into shaping a syllabus. To add mediocre or irrelevant material simply from the intention to include non-Western sources is probably not a good idea. Fortunately, there are some decidedly awesome philosophers in non-Western traditions!
    The second issue is how to expand the discipline’s awareness of and offerings in non-Western philosophy. One obvious way is for departments to hire people who are primarily specialists in non-Western philosophy. One problem with this is that departments rarely want to dedicate an entire faculty position to a non-Western specialist. You interestingly suggest another method, which I agree is underappreciated, of advertising a position in a mainstream topic like ethics or philosophy of mind but also expressing an interest in someone who, though a specialist in those areas, is also capable of teaching non-Western material.
    In fact, this is what I often advise UCR philosophy grads who have some interest in Chinese philosophy: Specialize in philosophy of language or whatever, but learn enough Chinese philosophy that you can legitimately claim it as an “area of teaching competence”. I think there are a lot of universities who would love to have someone who can teach a non-Western class once a year, as a kind of side bonus. Being up front about having this teaching interest can help you land a position. You would also then, presumably, have some capacity to integrate non-Western sources into the teaching of general topics, when appropriate.

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  3. Shane Wilkins Avatar

    “But, as we all know, non-Western philosophy ranks dismally on the PGR, just above Feminist Philosophy and Philosophy of Race, and that too only includes Chinese philosophy.”
    I’m confused about this. The PGR ranks departments, not specialties. Perhaps CC means: “Departments that invest heavily in building specializations in Feminist Philosophy, . . ., rank dismally on the PGR.”
    But that doesn’t appear true either. The top program in Chinese Philosophy, per PGR is Duke, which is ranked #24 in the overall PGR rankings. Likewise, the top programs in Feminist Philosophy include MIT (#7 overall) and UCBoulder (#24 overall). Programs listed as strong in Philosophy of Race include Princeton (#3 overall), Harvard (#5 overall) and UNC Chapel Hill (#9 overall).
    I don’t see evidence that PGR reviewers are somehow systematically disvaluing departments that have built strengths in these areas.

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  4. Jonardon Ganeri Avatar
    Jonardon Ganeri

    It is important to attend to the tone or implicature of Brian Leiter’s piece, as well as to what is said explicitly (as a lawyer, this is a distinction he is fluent in). Thus he says that Eugene Park wrote “purporting” to explain his departure from the PhD programme in philosophy; he adds in parenthesis that “Mr. Park, oddly, never explains, or even affirms, the merits of these [Asian] thinkers”; he redescribes Park’s grievance as an “attack on philosophy”; he juxtaposes this with a presentation of himself as upholding the tradition of European cosmopolitanism against anti-semitic smear; he uses the term “minorities” to categorise Park and others and refers to “so-called ‘feminist’ philosophers”. The import of the piece is: the cosmopolitan ideal is threatened by the inclusion of approaches to philosophy that carry cultural specificity, for the main reason someone might want philosophy from other cultures in the curriculum is to meet the consumer demands of members of ethnic groups. In reply to this, I would make three points. First, the idea that cosmopolitanism entails dissociation from culture is quite incorrect, as many writers such as Kwame Anthony Appiah have shown in detail. Cosmopolitanism is the ability to be at home in a plurality of cultures, to move easily between different encultured ways of attending to the world. Indeed one can argue that this ability is precisely a source of creativity, in philosophy, mathematics, music and many other fields. So the philosophical profession, in excluding philosophies from diverse cultures, is denying itself an important source of philosophical skill. Second, it is not the case that what motivates people like Park to want the discipline to be more conceptually inclusive is mere identity politics. They know that their philosophical cultures are rich in philosophical argument, reasoned debate, and conceptual subtlety; they want the discipline of philosophy to know the good it is foresaking in ignoring all this. It is hardly appropriate to put the burden of explaining this on a PhD student, and to read their failure to do so as significant. Park was, nevertheless, extremely articulate in explaining that he felt driven out of the discipine (and the loss of such talented, articulate people as him must surely be a matter for shame for the discipline) because his efforts to get the philosophers in his department to open their eyes to ideas of philosophical significance was met with “a pressure to accept and conform” and advice to transfer to Religious Studies. Third, willful ignorance is often culpable, no more especially so than when one willfully ignores philosophical thought that is important to the very problems (perception, consciousness, agency, tolerance, etc) that one is working on, simply because one is unwilling to access the relevant translations or secondary literature (as if a philosopher of language could reasonably say that they will not listen to Frege because they cannot, after all, be expected to learn German or read German translations).
    What is to be done? The philosophical curriculum needs to be expanded, so that hires can be responsive to curricular pressures, as they are now to the presence of ancient philosophy in the curriculum for instance. The availability of graduate training should be properly advertised, so that graduate students who want to (and these are by no means all members of ethnic groups I should add; indeed “minorities” are in the minority here) know where to apply. It is indeed astonishing to me that neither Indian nor Arabic nor Buddhist philosophy is even ranked in the graduate school ranking Leiter supervises. For example, I am available to supervise or co-supervise on Indian philosophy in the NYU graduate programme being now in the NYU global network. Christian recommends that departments seek a diversity in philosophical cultures as an AOC, and as a short-term solution I think this is a good idea. But as Eugene Park himself pointed out in his excellent post, this tends only to perpetuate the status quo, which is that non-Western philosophy is at best a side interest, a hobby. Only serious curricular reform will in the long run address the problem.

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  5. Chike Avatar
    Chike

    Prof. Ganeri, I think your comment is generally excellent and insightful, but I wonder if you misunderstands Christian’s proposal (or if perhaps I do). I did not take Christian to be saying non-Western would be sought as an AOC but rather that expertise in the AOS will be considered greater if it includes knowledge of, interest in, and ideally work accomplished in the study of non-Western traditions (that is, the study of the topic that is the desired AOS insofar as that topic has been contemplated in non-Western traditions). The idea, as I understood it, would thus be that expertise in the non-Western tradition would be sought neither as a specialization distinct from others or as a side interest but rather as an integral aspect of the topically (rather than geographically) defined specialization. While your point that this is not a total solution would stand, I take it that the aim is precisely to avoid the treatment of non-Western philosophy as a side interest and to inculcate rather the belief that familiarity with non-Western traditions is vital to really knowing any particular topical area.
    (Let me also take the time here to add how very excited I am that you will be joining forces with Peter Adamson to help him tell the Indian part of the “History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps.”)

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  6. Owen Flanagan Avatar
    Owen Flanagan

    Thanks again Christian and Eric S. and Jonardon. It is worth emphasizing that the problem is most serious at research universities. PhD programs are protective of “the profession,” where this often means what their faculty do, not what their students will do. In my experience, excellent liberal arts colleges in America, but not top PhD granting institutions, often have excellent philosophers (not always initially trained in these areas) teaching cross-cultural philosophy (as well as much more feminism and race). Smith, Williams, Wesleyan, Middlebury, Macalester, Colorado College, Carleton, College of Charleston, Holy Cross, Fordham College, Baruch College, to name a few (World Philosophies is frequently taught at good public colleges and community colleges). PhD programs resist because they are more concerned (much too concerned) with replicating the profession. Philosophy will wake or or our perceived irrelevancy inside the academy and in the wider world will continue to be secured. I am more hopeful than not. But this is a very significant political battle.

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  7. Brian Avatar
    Brian

    I find this “commentary” on my non-diatribe mystifying, as are some of the comments: I wonder whether any of you (apart from Eric) read Mr. Park’s piece or my response? The silence about ignorance of post-Kantian Continental philosophy, the other focus of my essay, is especially telling in this “response”: part of my point was that the narrowness of too much “analytic” philosophy manifests itself not only in ignorance and neglect of non-Western philosophy, but even ignorance and neglect of huge parts of Western philosopohy.
    I’ll just correct one ridiculous factual error in Coseru’s piece: the sub-fields of philosophy are not ranked vis-à-vis each other at all in the PGR.
    Indian Philosophy used to be included in the PGR, but it is so poorly represented in Anglophone departments that it can’t be ranked, so it was dropped. (When it was ranked, as I recall, the top schools were the one where Prof. Ganeri was at the time and UT Austin, with Stephen Phillips.)
    I disagree with Appiah’s dubious understanding of cosmopolitanism, but this is not the space for that argument.

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  8. AY Avatar
    AY

    I think the discussion that has taken place so far is excellent. But what I really want to pull apart is the association between Asian philosophy students and Asian philosophy. I’m a philosopher of Asian descent who has worked almost exclusively in “core” areas of philosophy. Despite being Chinese, I know very little of Chinese philosophy, and I’ve never really gone out of my way to study it, though I think it’s very interesting. I think it’s a mistake to suppose that just offering more courses in non-Western philosophy will attract non-Western students to the discipline, or at least that it would keep us in the discipline. I don’t think you’re actually saying this, mind you, but I think that many people do think it unreflectively. But I think there’s something deeper that keeps us away, that has to do with the ignorance that you mention in your comment.
    I agree that philosophers are not generally upset over their lack of expertise in non-Western traditions, and also that this is, to some extent, unavoidable. Specialization in more than one field is possible (but sometimes tiring), but I think that the community tends to hold very different attitudes towards fields that many of our members have no expertise in. From my own experience, science is valorized. Being trained in science is seen as desirable, obviously for philosophers of science, but also for many logicians, philosophers of mind, etc. Being trained in non-Western traditions….meh. I often get the impression (like the previous commenter) that many people do simply see it as recreational or a hobby, and not a field of deep interest that many of us just don’t have time to be trained in.
    It’s that latter attitude that makes it really alienating for me personally, despite doing Western philosophy. A lot of the work I do is accepted as philosophy without challenge. But the fact that it’s pretty obvious to me that a lot of my community really doesn’t care or see anything valuable about the culture that I come from nevertheless makes me feel like an outsider. Just being of Asian descent and conscious of the dismissal of Asian philosophy can be enough to make you feel unwelcome – having it be one of your academic interests just makes your situation even worse. One of the very positive things that I can see in this recommendation is that it tells us a way to value non-Western philosophy, even if it doesn’t result in a big increase in the number of courses in it that are taught, or non-Western philosophers on our syllabi (though that would certainly be a plus).
    And indeed, what makes the undervaluing even worse are the incredibly patronizing dismissals like those from BL. If I wasn’t already in the midst of this career, and aware that not everyone in thinks like him, the undertone of that post—that increasing diversity in the profession is something like “tapping into the Asian market” (talk of students as consumers, and wanting to see “our people” included)—would have me seriously questioning whether this is a place I want to be.

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  9. Jonardon Ganeri Avatar
    Jonardon Ganeri

    Thank you, Chike. I see now that this is indeed Christian’s suggestion, and I think it is an excellent one.

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  10. Christian Coseru Avatar

    Eric: on your first point about adding ethic diversity to the syllabus, I agree that thinking of it in terms of whether it might benefit a broader and more diverse body of students certainly has much merit. But built into it is the assumption that ethnicity shapes one’s interest (dare I say, taste) in philosophy in some major way. On an extreme version of that view, one’s Scottish or German ancestry should play a role in whether one ends up on the side of Hume or Kant (a fearsome thought!). Even granted that one’s Chinese or Indian ancestry involves more substantive cultural differences (and barring full assimilation in the dominant culture), it’s still hard to make that case (the comment from AY seems to suggest as much). I think a truly cosmopolitan approach (that, of course, still needs to be define) should, in priciple, act as a counterweight to the potentially corrosive effects of identity politics.
    Owen: yes, one can (and some do) master more than one area, though my impression is that grad students and early career philosophers are often adivised to resist the cosmopolitan impulse. Again, that may vary a great deal on what areas of specialization we’re talking about and who is doing the advising.
    As for the reference to how well non-Western philosophy fares on the PGR there is no suggestion (as Brian Leiter implies) in my initial post that the specialty areas are ranked against each other. That was simply meant to point out just how underrepresented those fields (under the non-Western rubric) actually are, and suggest an alternative proposal.

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  11. Here is a Name Avatar
    Here is a Name

    I teach a good deal of Asian philosophy despite it not being my area of research, both in courses with that as a focus and sporadically as parts of other (topical, non-history) classes. I do occasionally get a student with an Asian background who seems particularly interested in this because it connects with their heritage, but, honestly, it doesn’t happen all that often. I do, however, get quite a few students who think Asian philosophy is somehow mystical or radically different than Western philosophy and thus cool and more interesting. (I work very hard to dispel that image while still locating some interesting differences of focus and theme.) I think the evidence, even my anecdotal evidence, that teaching non-Western philosophy will attract students with an Asian backgroud, for example, is very limited.
    But even if it were otherwise, it seems to be a bad idea to simply teach Asian philosophy or any other subject to attract a certain body of students. Not of course because attracting students of various backgrounds is bad–quite the contrary–but our first goal has to be to present the best we can to our students. Any other goal is secondary. Tokenism is a terrible idea, and patronizing to boot. Fortunately, there genuinely is a lot of first-rate non-Western philosophy and do keeping with our commitment to teach the best doesn’t exclude teaching non-Westerners, and having a diverse lineup doesn’t have to be tokenism.
    It seems to me a field like Asian philosophy or non-Western philosopher or whatever you want to call it ought to be thought of in the same way we think of the other areas of the history of philosophy. We have historians to help us fully understand and appreciate the contributions, arguments, and thoughts of the great geniuses of the past. An AOS in non-Western philosophy ought to be treated just like an AOS in, for example, Modern European philosophy.
    And more than that: Philosophers more generally should have some knowledge of non-Western philosophy in the very same way that almost everyone has some knowledge of Descartes, Plato, and so on. We don’t need to be able produce research on, say, Confucius or Nagarjuna and we don’t even need to be able to teach a class on him, but it wouldn’t it be very odd if you met a philosopher who simply knew nothing or very, very little about Descartes or Plato? We should have that very same attitude towards non-Western philosophy and our need to know it.

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  12. Chike Avatar
    Chike

    Brian, while I understand why you focus on the mistake concerning whether sub-fields are ranked on the PGR (I wonder if Christian might have been thinking of this: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/w8/~andru/cgi-perl/civs/results.pl?id=E_0176acd76a7cc5b9), what do you think of his proposal? You say in your post: “I certainly think that more study of non-Western philosophical traditions would be salutary and illuminating.” Would you agree with Christian that his proposal is a good way of encouraging such study?

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  13. Manyul Im Avatar

    I read my long-time friend Brian Leiter’s piece about Eugene Park with interest and a bit of disappointment. I doubt that “identity politics” is really the motivating force behind Eugene’s exit from philosophy. In what follows, I’m going to try take off my professional philosophy hat and indulge in some first-person reflection about my own experience as an Asian American in a mostly white field. If you will indulge me as well, maybe that will help to explain some of what Eugene said in his piece in ways that labels might not.
    I actually advised Eugene while he was a student at Cal State Los Angeles and I was a philosophy faculty member there; I think I even helped him to get admission into Indiana’s grad program. My recollection was that he had not really been taught any non-Western philosophy formally and his interest in it partly came from my contact with him, since Chinese philosophy is my area of research. We bonded tacitly over the fact that we were both Korean Americans and that we were both “in philosophy.” I remember that he asked me why I had gotten interested in Chinese thought. So, let me say what I told him: I was really interested in ethics — having seen something fascinating in an applied ethics course while I was a freshman Math and Computer Science major. I liked application of systematic thinking to problems that I had been raised to believe were matters of unreasoned conviction. An important part of my immigrant, Korean American upbringing was being always part of a some devout Protestant Christian community of Koreans so I grew up in two cultures — a domestic one (largely Korean) and a public one. None of this should be unfamiliar to readers who have had similar immigrant community experiences. So, systematic thinking about morality was at once refreshing, alluring, threatening, and if there was any motivational force left-over, also intrinsically interesting to me. I don’t think in my intellectual history those forces should be separated out; we are what we are at college age. Unless we are outliers who publish on metaphysics while in high school, we’re motivated by all kinds of things in pursuing philosophical study.
    While I was finishing up my studies at Berkeley, I happened to take a Moral Psychology course from Kwong-loi Shun, who had begun thinking about some issues in virtue ethics, rejections of modern ethical theory, and aspects of the Confucian tradition that he had studied with David Nivison at Stanford. Wow. I felt like I had accidentally struck an oil gusher. The issues about discontent with modern ethical theory had already drawn me in when I had taken a course with Sam Scheffler, but as I studied further into the Confucian tradition, I really started to feel like I understood some things about my own upbringing and my cultural heritage, things I might simply have shrugged off and moved on from if I had only been engaged in study of Western philosophy.
    I was fortunate to be able to pursue further study of Confucianism in an excellent graduate program that was mostly devoted to Western philosophy, at Michigan, but that had a faculty member who shared appointment between it and the Asian Languages & Cultures program. That graduate program, as Brian Leiter knows firsthand — we were cohorts — was not a walk in the park and given my particular intellectual history, I might not have stuck with it if I didn’t have the personal history and investment in my object of study. Part of my own personal difficulty, as graduate study wore on, did have to do with feelings of isolation — that I was in a severe minority in terms of the type of expertise I was seeking; however, unlike Eugene Park, I did have a handful of colleagues whose interests were the same as mine (Steve Angle, Brook Ziporyn, and Sinyee Chan briefly). An important additional form of support came from colleagues who were ethicists but who were open to taking my work on Mencius seriously (John Doris, Michael Weber, and an important faculty mentor, Steve Darwall). Though this might read like acknowledgements in a dissertation or book, I honestly have to thank those people for getting me through to remaining in the profession. Seriously; I’m not one of those people who thinks he just boot-strapped himself to success (such as it is).
    Returning to Eugene’s case, lacking that kind of intellectual-emotional support in a graduate program can raise questions — different kinds of questions about philosophy as a field, some having to do with ethnic or gendered isolation in a field, some with breadth or diversity of traditions taken seriously in the field, and some legitimate questions about who the stakeholders are for the teaching that most philosophy departments do. Hovering over all of those questions is a very broad pair of questions, a pair that I think links together Eugene’s variety of points: Should the profession of philosophy be more consciously open to broadening the scope of texts, traditions, and whole demographic groups that it takes seriously? Are there real obstacles to that or merely perceived and/or self-serving obstacles?
    I’m not sure that calling Eugene’s apologia for leaving the profession an exercise in identity politics meets him at eye-level. Eugene’s experience has received much more attention than I think he ever imagined it would. I think that is because it has struck a nerve — maybe more than one — about our profession, a nerve that seems to be fired off at regular intervals recently through openness about the experience of the profession from negatively affected perspectives. I applaud him for adding his voice to the chorus.

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  14. Anonymous Assistant Professor of English Avatar
    Anonymous Assistant Professor of English

    Dear Philosophers,
    Our discipline spent half of the 90’s uncritically aping Derrida, and the other half of them having the canon wars you are preparing to begin. After the dust of our infighting had more or less settled with no decisive victor, John Guillory wrote a pretty good book called Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation. I recommend it to you highly, if you haven’t read it.
    A fellow traveler.

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  15. Eric Schwitzgebel Avatar

    AY: Just to be clear, I think you might have misread at least one aspect of Brian’s post. Brian explicitly says that he would like to see “more history of philosophy, both European and otherwise”. So it seems uncharitable to read him as having a negative attitude about increasing the geographic diversity of the philosophers we study or as not valuing non-Western philosophy, if that’s how you’re reading him. Rather, I think Brian opposes increasing the geographic diversity of philosophers if one is doing so for reasons specifically having to do with identity politics.
    On the issue of the extent to which philosophers without expertise in non-Western philosophy have a dismissive attitude toward the field as merely a “hobby” vs. seeing it as a field of deep interest — my wager would be that this is the type of thing that varies enormously from department to department, depending on the department culture. I agree that the first attitude is problematic, and I hope my comments about the value of Chinese philosophy as an AOC don’t encourage such an attitude.

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  16. Eric Schwitzgebel Avatar

    Interesting comments coming in! Since NewAPPS moderates comments and since the topic risks heated tempers, I have to read each comment before approving, and I have to dash off to do some other things for a while. Please feel free to continue commenting, but be patient if it doesn’t show right away.

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  17. Elisa Freschi Avatar

    Some readers might be interesting in some further comments on the issue on the Indian Philosophy Blog: http://indianphilosophyblog.org/2014/09/17/christian-coseru-on-philosophys-western-bias/#comment-40112

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  18. Meilin Chinn Avatar
    Meilin Chinn

    I have a very hard time understanding why the exclusion of non-Western philosophies seems difficult to address. Here are two easy options: 1) Departments that do not regret their ignorance should change their names to Department of Western Philosophy. This would accord with the naming conventions of Department of Asian Studies, etc. 2) Departments that do regret their ignorance should hire philosophers with expertise in the areas where they are ignorant. There are plenty of experts out there, and as Christian rightly states, it’s not that hard to figure out who is good.

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  19. Sara L. Uckelman Avatar
    Sara L. Uckelman

    I’ll point out one big stumbling block when it comes to introducing more non-western philosophy into western philosophy programmes (that is, philosophy programmes in the west, not programmes in western philosophy): The language barrier. There are not many trained philosophers out there who know Sanskrit, and there is, at least in some areas, a serious derth of sources available in translation for those who don’t. I will be including a few lectures on the relationship between pramana and knowledge in the medieval Indian Buddhist tradition in my course on Philosophical Logic this fall, but it won’t be more than “a few” simply because there are so few sources that are accessible, both linguistically and philosophically, to undergrads who know even less Sanskrit than I do.
    It makes the situation in medieval philosophy look so much better in comparison: Sure, there are far more texts available only in Latin than are available in translation, but at least the likelihood that I’ll have a few grad students who studied Latin in high school (particularly those who grew up in Europe and not in the US) is high enough to make organizing reading groups possible!

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  20. Justin Tiwald Avatar

    A few quick points on this stimulating discussion.
    1. I think of Brian Leiter as a friend to Chinese philosophy. He features and links to blog discussions about (or within) Chinese philosophy, is careful to include Chinese thinkers in some of his polls, and occasionally remarks that philosophy would benefit from including them (as he does at the end of the post in question).
    2. It is almost certainly true that many East Asian college students (especially students who grew up in Chinese cultural contexts) feel more at home in philosophy where the founding figures in East Asian philosophy are taken seriously. My evidence is anecdotal, but it’s a very long list of anecdotes, as someone who has taught a couple hundred first and second-generation Asian-American students. The reasons are complex, and A.Y. is able to describe them with greater nuance than I, but it might help to point out that many college students who come from China embrace Confucianism or Daoism as a philosophical (not religious) identity, far more than Americanized students adopt any philosophical identity (including “Objectivism”). And there’s a great deal more pride in it than one might expect from teaching other students who adopt a philosophical identity.
    3. The Chinese philosophers stand on their own merits, and the case for greater inclusion can be made on their merits. Even if you think (mistakenly, in my view) that Kant is 33 times more philosophically important and interesting than, say, Mencius, it’s just wrong by any sane standard to say that Kant is 33 times more important and interesting than the entire history of Chinese philosophy from start to finish. And yet in the prominent and notable U.S. and Canadian PhD programs there are 33 times as many specialists in Kant as in all areas of Chinese philosophy combined, according to a count I did six years ago (APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies, 8.1 [2008]). If we could get intelligent, non-reactionary American philosophers to read the better literature on Confucian ethics, Daoist and Neo-Confucian theories of moral agency, early Chinese Buddhist epistemology and medieval Buddhist mereology, there would be little question that the current distribution of expertise is wildly out of proportion.

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  21. p Avatar
    p

    It seems to me that it might be important to keep in mind that, at least from my perspective, when one speaks of Indian or Chinese philosophy (at least in US/Europe) one really means the history of philosophy in India and China, in fact, quite often, only up to the 16th century or so (people who know more can correct me). What about current philosophy in those countries? Now in order to be a specialist in those areas (one that could thrive in a current research-oriented philosophy department), I would assume one needs to possess considerable philological skills in addition to the philosophical ones. In other words, no matter how much one can become interested in Ancient Greek philosophy, you just cannot work in it at any professional level unless you know Greek, Latin, French and German at the very least. If you work more closely with manuscripts and transmission, you need to add Arabic, later Greek, and Italian. What are the requirements to work professionally in the history of Chinese or Indian philosophy? My guess is, no less steep. How many people are there to who possess those and can do philosophy in a way in which, say, grad students at Princeton or Chicago or what have you, would find profitable and inspiring? On the same note: how is a bunch of philosophers who have no prior acquaintance with these philosophical traditions decide whether some candidate is good? It’s a problem to do so even now when one is to assess candidates not in one’s subfield, especially if it is history.

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  22. Ed Kazarian Avatar

    I think this reply (Meilin Chinn @ 18) cuts through a great deal of the difficulty here.
    At some level, what’s needed is that, within the scope of the resources available to us, we make a real effort to broaden our curricula to include all world philosophical traditions in a non-tokenistic way. That means hiring experts where possible, and even where it is not, it means that we all should take the responsibility of familiarizing ourselves to a reasonable extent with the broader history of our field. (Some small departments can hire very few experts, who must become generalists in order to support any curriculum whatsoever, and we all manage to do it just fine where ‘Western’ philosophy is concerned; so all this really means is that we’ve got some more work to do.)
    Chike @ 4 above also showed me something I’d missed about what the OP is proposing, and given that reading, I think it’s exactly right. To the extent that we have a broader understanding of all our philosophical precursors, we will be more deeply expert in our areas of study.
    Sara Uckelman’s point @ 19 about availability of texts is also, I think, a very important one. It arises in a lot of contexts, and has been confronted in some of them too (notable recent teaching anthologies of Early Modern European women philosophers, for example). It might also be a good idea to encourage (and reward with things like substantial credit toward tenure and promotion) the work of producing translations and teaching editions of a broad range of texts.

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  23. jim maffie Avatar

    I applaud the foregoing discussion concerning the inclusion of non-western philosophies, yet the issue is being discussed in terms of what Ben-Ami Scharfstein approvingly called the big three: South Asian, East Asia, and Western Europe. I would urge that we broaden the scope of the discussion to include the “indigenous” philosophies of North, Middle, and South America, Africa, Oceania, and elsewhere as well as Africana philosophy. There are different conceptions of philosophy, different conceptions of what problems exist and are important, and different ways of thinking through them. Oral-based philosophizing, for example, challenges us to rethink text-based philosophizing. The Big Three, no less the Big One alone, has no monopoly on philosophy. As Dewey once wrote, “Seen in the long perspective of the future, the whole of western European philosophy is a provincial episode.”

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  24. Monima Avatar

    This discussion is encouraging, I like Christian and Jonardon’s suggestions. But, I think, another way to fix supply and demand issues is begin co-teaching specialised cross-cultural graduate units say in Epistemology, Phil. of Mind, Ethics, whatever. That will get people (Philosophy colleagues and Graduate Students) excited about non-Western Philosophy for the right sorts of reasons. This may require seeking out colleagues from non-philosophy Departments: religious studies, asian languages in some cases but that is certainly not something to frown upon. We have notable philosophers like Georges Dreyfus and Dan Arnold doing excellent work in Buddhist Philosophy in Departments of Religion. The most difficult challenge, I think, is to get philosophy colleagues doing mainly Western Philosophy to partner in this kind of enterprise. The way to rouse interest the latter is to publish in mainstream journals, as Jonardon himself has done, something that is not easy to do what we must strive for. Joint teaching enterprises will lead hopefully to joint supervision and joint publications, or at least that is my hope!

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  25. Govinda Avatar
    Govinda

    True and and meaningful debates.

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  26. Jonardon Ganeri Avatar
    Jonardon Ganeri

    Apropos the representation of Indian philosophy in graduate programmes, I’d like to recommend Andrew Nicholson’s “Philosophical Rasika”. Rasika is “gourmet” in Sanskrit, and the listing of programmes in the US, Canada and Europe is a useful supplement to the PGR.
    There are by now very many high quality translations of Sanskrit philosophical texts into English. Admittedly they are sometimes hard to know about, but Karl Potter does a good job of listing them in his online Encyclopedia. On Indian epistemology, Hattori’s translation of the Compendium of Ways of Knowing and Phillips’ translation of the Gemstone head up what is a very long list. The language requirement for teaching Indian (Arabic, Chinese, etc) texts ought not be set at a higher level than the one for teaching Plato or Kant; there should be a level playing field. In other words neither what I sometimes fondly call “The Argument from the Non-Availability of Translations” nor “The Argument from the Need to Know Sanskrit” provides a compelling objection to the expansion of the curriculum. This said, Jim Maffie’s point about oral philosophical cultures is an important one. Michael Sandel has developed techniques of “public philosophy”, where members of the public engage each other in philosophical discussion; such techniques and many others are needed to bring oral philosophical cultures into view.

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  27. Elisa Freschi Avatar

    This is a serious problem. But I believe that team work could be the solution. We need more team work between philosophers and Sanskritists to produce accessible translations and studies. Within reading groups, I have seen that a few people knowing Sanskrit or Tibetan will be able to make the experience valuable for all (the others would add their philosophical insights). What is your experience with that?

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  28. Matthew Avatar

    Following up on something Owen said above: I wonder if things like Leiter’s own rankings have unintentionally contributed to this issue in big philosophy departments at research schools. If one can build on one’s existing strengths in say, philosophy of mind, by filling a line with an up-and-coming hotshot in the field, you can move up in the rankings by adding a 5th phil-mind person. If a department wanted to expand the the width of its offerings by including a qualified non-Western specialists, there is no net gain in terms of rankings. There is thus an incentive for departments to stay narrow.

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  29. Laurie Shrage Avatar
    Laurie Shrage

    Has anyone here read Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon, 1780-1830 by Peter K.J. Park? I just ordered a copy. The book seems to challenge the assumption that our field has always been Eurocentric. Here’s the description on Amazon:
    “In this provocative historiography, Peter K. J. Park provides a penetrating account of a crucial period in the development of philosophy as an academic discipline. During these decades, a number of European philosophers influenced by Immanuel Kant began to formulate the history of philosophy as a march of progress from the Greeks to Kant—a genealogy that supplanted existing accounts beginning in Egypt or Western Asia and at a time when European interest in Sanskrit and Persian literature was flourishing. Not without debate, these traditions were ultimately deemed outside the scope of philosophy and relegated to the study of religion. Park uncovers this debate and recounts the development of an exclusionary canon of philosophy in the decades of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. To what extent was this exclusion of Africa and Asia a result of the scientization of philosophy? To what extent was it a result of racism?”
    Morris Cohen, one of the first American Jews to get a Ph.D in Philosophy at Harvard described the discipline (as it was taught in the US) as a “branch of Christian Apologetics.” Sidney Hook recollects that William Hocking asserted “the Jewish mind could not properly interpret and teach the philosophy and history of Western Christian civilization” (Out of Step, 210). So I would add to P. Park’s questions whether the formation of the canon reflects ethno-religious chauvinism. Bruce Kucklick’s and David Hollinger’s work on the history of American philosophy both show how this was so.

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  30. Owen Flanagan Avatar
    Owen Flanagan

    Thanks to everyone for a fruitful discussion. Three points: First, what Jonardon just said about linguistic expertise is important. There are good, accessible translations of many classical Chinese and Sanskrit texts. I studied Latin and classical Greek, but my teaching of Seneca and Plato and Aristotle depends on great translators not on my own facility with the original languages. Second, John Maffie’s point about Amerindian (and we could add African philosophy) are important. Third, I think that there is no doubt that the PGR encourages conservatism.

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  31. p Avatar
    p

    I think the points about teaching are good. But I thought the question really was about the way philosophy is done and practiced rather than taught in undergraduate classes. True if one merely teaches Plato at an undergraduate level, one does not need to know Greek. But I assume a person of this sort is not qualified to engage in research (or teach a research grad seminar) on Plato or engage in scholarly debates. Partly what makes many of us good at teaching, say, Ancient Greek philosophy is that we had teachers who were actual scholars. If all we are concerned with is undergraduate teaching but there is no serious engagement with these traditions at a research level, then it seems there is something strange about it to me.

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  32. Christian Coseru Avatar

    Matthew: Excellent point about the effects of the PGR. It has not only created a culture of narrowness in philosophy, but also one of uniformity, where only a few topics and areas are pursued because this is where all the action is, so to speak. Every now and again you get these queries (especially on Leiter’s blog) from grad students about, say, what are the hot topics in X, the implication being that getting on the conversation maximizes one’s chances of success (precisely the point Eugene Park made). Of course, at some level this is just the nature of the enterprise we are engaged in, but the rankings have had this (perhaps unintended) effect of narrowing the scope of our field.
    The pressure to hire with an eye to moving up in the rankings also gives large departments an advantage, because those are likely to have more folks working in each of the specialties (and can better replenish their ranks). Not every department can be NYU or Oxford, but insofar as most try, the push to strengthen the core will continue into the foreseeable future. If you are a moderate size department, what incentive is there really to diversify? So, I’m not terribly optimistic that non-Western philosophy will fare better so long as the PGR continues to hold sway. And why wouldn’t it hold sway, given the net benefits of moving up in the rankings? Chairs and deans love it, it affects salaries, and the ability to retain faculty is a big deal, given how expensive searches are.
    My proposal rests on a great deal of good will on the part of those in the race to the top 10 or even top 20 to diversify by allowing for work in non-Western philosophy to be counted, where appropriate, as part of the core. You are working on personal identity and are drawing from, say, Buddhist or Chinese materials on agency, among other sources? Then you, my friend, are doing metaphysics, not non-Western philosophy. Unless, of course, your approach is entirely historical, disregards the contemporary debates, and couldn’t care less for whether the arguments are good ones (by present standards). There is room also for non-Western philosophy as a primarily historical and exegetical enterprise, and its worth should be recognized for the same reason we recognize the value of (training in) classical or early modern Western philosophy. But that’s not what my proposal is about.

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  33. Eric Schwitzgebel Avatar

    Lots of good interesting points in this discussion! I find it non-obvious what the effects of the PGR are in this respect, however. One reason is this: It would be pretty easy for a university to have a specialty rating in Chinese philosophy. A single good specialist, even fairly junior, will do it! In the case of UCR, we’re ranked in the area simply by virtue of having one person who does a little of it plus one affiliated faculty member in Comparative Literature. So when UCR turns to the PGR to pitch itself to administrators, it can highlight its rating in Chinese philosophy alongside its other ratings. It’s much harder to achieve a specialty ranking in, say, philosophy of mind.
    This doesn’t hold for non-Western philosophy other than Chinese, but my impression is that if there were enough specialists in those areas at PGR-rated departments, the PGR would add new categories reflecting that.
    I don’t know what impact hiring a specialist in non-Western philosophy has on overall rankings, though. Maybe relatively little, if people who aren’t in the area don’t recognize the person’s name.

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  34. Sara L. Uckelman Avatar
    Sara L. Uckelman

    Most of my experience with Indian texts has come through reading groups and intensive workshops — I’ve been lucky enough that I haven’t had to tackle the texts on my own without recourse to linguistic specialists! Now that I am leaving them behind, though, I do worry about how I’ll continue (though I’m sure I’ll figure out a way).

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  35. Christian Coseru Avatar

    Eric: I agree. The effects of the PGR are not obvious. But to follow on your example, UCR is ranked for Chinese only because it made the cut. That is, only because you have strengths in some of the “main” areas. A place like Hawaii, where the focus is narrowly on the main Asian philosophical traditions, to my knowledge, has never been ranked, yet that is where most specialists are likely to come from. New Mexico has had for many years John Taber, one of the best specialists for Indian and Buddhist philosophy (joined by Richard Hayes for a while, now retired), but again it never made the cut. The same goes for U Conn, which had Joel Kupperman (now emeritus), with a strong interest in Buddhist philosophy. UConn is right there at the bottom on the PGR.
    Now, what is a student with an interest non-Western to do? Go to Hawaii, New Mexico or UConn (and a couple of other such places)? Pursue those interests at more prestigious places but in another discipline (area studies, religious studies, etc.)? Or try and get into one of the top ranked philosophy departments, given how much one’s job prospects depend on the latter, and keep her interest in non-Western as, at best, an AOC?
    I don’t have an answer to these questions, but it’s worth having a discussion about why prospective grad students with an interest in non-Western philosophy face such dilemmas.

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  36. Eric Schwitzgebel Avatar

    Christian, have you seen this discussion?
    http://manyulim.wordpress.com/2008/10/08/apa-newsletter-on-the-state-of-the-field/
    And of course, the situation is even more severe in other areas of non-Western philosophy, as you know.
    Kwong-loi Shun is now back at Berkeley, which is terrific news for Chinese philosophy in the U.S., in my highly biased opinion.

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  37. Manyul Im Avatar

    The discussion that Eric refers to in comment 36 is now available with fixed link to the newsletter pdf here: http://warpweftandway.com/apa-newsletter-on-the-state-of-the-field/ . Another advantage of the updated link is that the comment field is still open. The old blog that bears my name has been left alive without open comment fields, as an archive.

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  38. Eric Schwitzgebel Avatar

    Thanks for the better link, Manyul!

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  39. Teresa Avatar
    Teresa

    I am not an academic philosopher – I became a scientist instead – but wanted to share the practitioner’s view of some of the translation challenges and timeboxing discussion, at least when it comes to Buddhist philosophy.
    I speak neither Tibetan, Japanese, nor Sanskrit, yet I can study Buddhist philosophy from primary sources – living Buddhist masters who speak English, write books on Buddhist philosophy in English, and teach in English. You can’t get more primary than that. You could actually go talk to these people. (There are many authorized teachers from multiple Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana lineages living and teaching in the US.) There are translation committees and individual translators who continually translate classic texts into Western languages, primarily English, such as the Nalanda Translation Committee, that are funded not by universities but by other practitioners, who want access to the material. As was already pointed out, Buddhist philosophy and psychology is not something from Shantideva’s or Nagarjuna’s time – it is a living, growing field, just not well visited by Western professional philosophers. But it’s there to reach out to touch – in English. In fact, Westerners as well as non-Westerners are writing on these topics, some associated with academia but most not. If I as a lay philosopher can find these sources, you can too.
    The choice whether to do so is just that – a choice.
    However, my somewhat cynical opinion of academia is that top academic departments in any field are primarily interested in self-preservation and replication, as others have also suggested. At the very top, the search for truth and understanding of our Universe becomes secondary to building a prestigious career. It is not only philosophy that is this way.
    While there is powerful inertia and attachment to ego and wanting career security at work, someone has to ask the supposedly important questions, perhaps especially in a field like philosophy. If top academic departments seem more like career mills than places of open and honest inquiry, should we really accept that as just that state of affairs? If inquiry is limited to a pre-defined set of areas, how effective can it ever be? Are you really seeking to understand if you limit where you will look for understanding before you even start? These kinds of discussions have to be held, whether we feel any particular one is “warranted” or not.

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  40. Paul R. Goldin Avatar
    Paul R. Goldin

    I’m always offended by discussions like this–unintentionally, perhaps, but still tellingly offended–because even those voices who argue against the parochialism of what’s taught as “philosophy” still seem to believe that only Philosophy departments teach philosophy. I’ve been teaching Chinese philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania for eighteen years now–but my department is East Asian Languages and Civilizations, not Philosophy. It would never have happened in my university’s Philosophy department. (They won’t even cross-list my courses!) There was one major position in Chinese philosophy in a philosophy department when I went on the job market in 1995: the University of Michigan. Suffice it to say that their current faculty list (http://www.lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/people/faculty) doesn’t include anyone with that specialization.
    Translation: you guys in Philosophy departments are systematically shooting yourselves in the foot. Whatever the reason for keeping out Chinese philosophy–ignorance, fear, chauvinism, misplaced devotion to protecting the supposed purity of the profession–the rest of the academy has moved on and isn’t looking back. Could you imagine an Art History department without non-Western art? A Religion department without non-Western religion? Even an English department without literature from beyond the U.K. and U.S.?
    I think the most plausible explanation of the willful ignorance, incidentally, is something I heard Frank Perkins say: “‘This isn’t philosophy’ is code for ‘I don’t have to read this.’” He’s dead right, and it’s a perfect modus operandi for reducing oneself to insignificance. My heart goes out to the few fine China specialists toiling in Philosophy departments today, but I have stopped worrying about whether your profession as a whole will ever change its attitude. We’re doing it ourselves instead.

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  41. Christian Coseru Avatar

    Yes, I remember that discussion (thanks indeed, Manyul!). Amy Olberding’s suggestion, in particular, was that having something like Chinese philosophy for an AOS might give some candidates, especially at mid range departments, some edge on the market. The assumption was that often folks who get their PhDs from such departments end up at more teaching-oriented places, where an AOC Chinese philosophy might be seen as a plus. I don’t know that there is any evidence for that, but looking at where PhDs from UH have ended up in the past decade or so might be the place to start. A related question is how many PhDs from places like Hong Kong and Singapore end up taking positions in the US or Canada (and, yes, great news about Berkeley, now that Kwong-loi is back—we got the department newsletter in the mail just a few days ago).
    What I am worried about, you’re right, it the near total lack of representation for Indian and Buddhist philosophy in a top department (except perhaps for Stephen Phillips at UT Austin, though currently only one student there lists Indian philosophy as an area of interest).
    Perhaps it’s time for another discussion of the state of the field for non-Western philosophy with regard to PhD programs in a more formal venue like the APA.

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  42. p Avatar
    p

    I think that it would be a mistake to think that professional academic philosophers have some sort of contempt of to non-western philosophy or misplaced devotion to their own western one. I think thinking this shows a rather fundamental misunderstanding of what western philosophy is and how it works. Most philosophy departments at which philosophy, as opposed to history of philosophy, is done, resemble – in their spirit and approach – science departments (in a similar way in which linguistics does). New philosophical arguments and theories are being developed and rejected as we speak. These concern anything from current physics and biology to problems concerning current legal issues. The philosophers who do this are not historians of philosophy – they all profit from having knowledge of history and they, of course, profit from being products of a certain history, but they themselves engage with the world and with each other rather than with that history (at least explicitly). When such a contemporary western philosopher looks at the history of his discipline, he can trace it back – in a more or less unbroken chain – to the Greeks (and probably to Plato). The Greeks invented philosophy (or so they thought) quite explicitly – it was their – so they claimed – cultural phenomenon that distinguished them from the Persians, Egyptians, or Babylonians. Not that these other cultures did not think about important and deep matters, but they did not do it in the way in which early Greeks started to do it (there is a lot of literature on this). At some point, of course, the Greeks themselves and later other philosophers too, became aware that a similar processes went on elsewhere (particularly in India – Plotinus is perhaps one of the first who became interested in this but he failed to make it to India). However, what they became aware of is that there is whole other tradition of thought in certain cultures (India, China) that is just like what the Greeks called ‘philosophia’ and so it too can be or should be considered philosophy.
    However, and here is the contemporary problem, although there is thus history of philosophy in India, China and the West, the question is whether there is a contemporary Indian, Chinese or Western philosophy or just philosophy. I take it that there is no distinctive contemporary Chinese physics, Indian linguistics, or British biology. Hence, although a contemporary western philosopher might find history of her subject interesting and stimulating (just like any other scientist), it is difficult to persuade her that studying Chinese or Indian philosophy is crucial since, after all, she might think studying history of her own western tradition is not that crucial either but it is at least something of which she is, in some sense, the product.
    I do not think that this means we should not have Chinese or Indian philosophy specialists – I think we should and I think these traditions should be studied with as much fervor and acumen as the western tradition. But I think it would be a mistake to treat them like something one can just pick up by reading a translation. That’s treating it like a Cephalus in the Republic treated Socrates – as something to be done as a hobby, once one has nothing more important to do. Even many writings of ancient Greek or Medieval philosophers are difficult to understand on one’s own, generations of editors, collators, and scholars took great pains over now centuries to even established the texts and the fact that one can read Plato now with much understanding in translation is the result of a very long tradition of translating into English (reading a first time translation in another language, quickly shows hoe difficult it is to translate something with understanding).
    In any case, my point is that many western philosophers have actually a lot of respect for Chinese and Indian philosophy, but that involves awareness of how much it would take to actually really engage with that history and a question as to why engaging in it – for a contemporary philosopher – should be important to begin with (just as it might not be with medieval or Greek philosophy) when one aims are, as a matter of principle, not historical.

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  43. Christian Coseru Avatar

    Paul Goldin’s point @40 about the parochialism of our disciplines brings up another issue: the inverse correlation between the fantastic work produced in non-Western philosophy in the past decade alone and the progressive decline in interest in non-Western philosophy in philosophy departments (with the few noted exceptions for Chinese). Leiter, in his response @6, notes the poor representation for Indian philosophy in Anglophone departments as a reason for why it was dropped. Why this poor representation?
    One explanation (at least in terms of where the lines go) might have to do with the notion that philosophy is now a highly specialized and technical discipline, conceived on the model of the sciences. As such, it is free to disregard disproven theories wherever they may have originated, in Europe’s own past or Asia’s. On this conception of philosophy, then, Indian or Chinese philosophy (which often only means philosophy up to the 16th c. as p said rightly notes @21) cannot satisfy more than an antiquarian interest and, as such, is best left to intellectual historians and historians of ideas.
    One may argue that this conception of philosophy is too narrow or even out of character with the role that philosophy has played even in the West up until recently. But, in my experience, discussions that call into question the rightness or wrongness of a dominant conception of philosophy are highly contentious (vide the continental/analytic divide that still plagues our field, though perhaps less so now than a decade earlier). A more profitable question is whether there is progress in philosophy. I’ve asked a somewhat related question with respect to Indian philosophy here:
    http://indianphilosophyblog.org/2014/07/23/whither-indian-philosophy/
    In my opinion, the shift of work in non-Western philosophy away from philosophy departments, in particular to Religious Studies programs, has further contributed to this perception that, say, Indian, Buddhist, or Confucian philosophy is not really philosophy but religion (or, at the very least, philosophy in the service of doctrinal assumptions). That is unfortunate, though many argue that philosophy’s shift toward the sciences (and away from historical and exegetical considerations) is what ensures its continued relevance.

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  44. Justin E. H. Smith Avatar

    Thanks for this very thoughtful post, Christian.
    I agree with Brian Leiter that representing ethnic or cultural constituencies among students is not a good reason for transforming the curriculum to better represent non-European traditions in philosophy. I also strongly agree with Jonardon that there are extremely good philosophical reasons for such a transformation, independent of identity politics, and if graduate students continue to articulate their own case for the transformation in terms of improved representation of constituencies, we shouldn’t assume that they are making the only, or the best, case that can be made. As Jonardon says, the burden of articulating the strong philosophical reasons for inclusion of non-European traditions cannot be placed on grad students.
    This point might be strengthened by the observation that when even prominent scholars articulate these reasons, as Jonardon has in a number of books, the lesson is lost on most of our colleagues. It’s no wonder, then, that a young scholar such as Eugene Park would prefer to push for the desideratum of greater inclusiveness in the hammer-and-nails language of representing student constituencies, of ‘getting the ethnic vote’, when book after book about the tremendous philosophical contributions of Nāgārjuna or Gaṅgeśa do not sway philosophers like Brian Leiter (and most others) from their tendency to see non-European philosophy as of mere secondary importance, as at most a legitimate side interest of philosophers.
    This tendency was expressed with surprising and disappointing clarity in Brian Leiter’s appeal to the ‘limited resources argument’, namely, the argument that the relative neglect of non-European traditions, periods, and authors in philosophy is justified by the fact that there are still many gaps in most departments’ curricula when it comes to covering even European traditions, periods, and authors. This argument more or less explicitly commits the person who makes it to a hierarchy of importance, on which philosophy is primarily a European endeavor with secondary or lesser echoes or approximations occurring elsewhere in the world. Try to imagine this sort of reasoning occurring in the hiring decisions of a history or anthropology department, or any other department that is at least in principle committed to the study of some aspect of human cultural and intellectual activity per se, in contrast with Slavic or South Asian or Latin American area studies departments, which explicitly commit themselves to concentrating on a circumscribed geographical range of human cultural and intellectual productions. At present, philosophy remains a sort of de facto area studies department, in which the area in question generally goes unspoken, and which only grudgingly and hesitantly opens up to other areas when pressured. Again, it does not open up on the basis of the overwhelming evidence of noteworthy philosophical activity that has gone in the extra-European world, and in the face of this inertia it is not at all surprising to see overtly political and constituency-based arguments replacing the (more interesting) philosophical ones.

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  45. jim maffie Avatar
    jim maffie

    Paul: Interesting. I teach Aztec philosophy in the Latin American Studies Program, Latin American philosophy for the Latin American Studies Program, and Indigenous Philosophies of the Americas in the American Studies Department. (I do, in all fairness, teach a world philosophies course for the philosophy department.) In my view, all the really interesting stuff is happening outside of mainstream philosophy departments which continue their own implicitly areas studies (West) focus. Yes, they are shooting themselves in the foot, making themselves increasingly more irrelevant. “Better dead than red” as the old Cold Wart saying used to go.

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  46. jim maffie Avatar

    Paul, I agree. I teach Aztec philosophy for the Latin American Studies Center, Latin American philosophies for the Latin American Studies Center, and indigenous philosophies of the Americas for the apartment of American studies. In all fairness, I do however teach a low level world philosophies course for the Phil department. I agree, philosophy departments are shooting themselves in the foot, but I guess they see matters in terms of purity vs. relevance. And as the old Cold war saying had it, “Better dead than red.”

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  47. jim maffie Avatar

    Meilin Chinn: I agree with the name change you propose. I once proposed to the editor of the Journal of the History of Philosophy that it rename the publication The Journal of the HIstory of Western Philosophy after he summarily rejected my submission on Aztec philosophy as unacceptable for not being proper philosophy. I received no response to my proposal. The name hasn’t changed. Those few of us who work on Aztec philosophy have had our work summarily dismissed on the grounds that it is anthropology, not philosophy.

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  48. Eric Schwitzgebel Avatar

    Jim, since your first and second comments closely resembled each other, I assumed that the second was the version you preferred. Let me know if you’d like to see both versions up.

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  49. r Avatar
    r

    I agree strongly with p @42 (or, perhaps, too strongly–I may be a step farther). In terms of my own work, I conceive of myself as working on issues that are not themselves historical or cultural, and again in terms of what is useful to my own projects I find the study of history of philosophy to be tedious and unrewarding–whether that history is Eastern, Western, Greek, Persian, or whatever. If I had to list out areas that I would benefit most from knowing more about, I would list about a thousand things before I’d list historical western philosophy–for instance, mathematics, logic, linguistics, psychology, vision science… etc. So, if the diversification interest here amounts to something like: we should start taking away some history jobs from people who study canonical western philosophers, and start giving them to people who study canonical non-western philosophers, then that sounds fine. Since I have no dog in that race, I won’t be sad if a Spinoza gal gets replaced with a Nagarjuna bro.
    What I find more difficult is the suggestion that, because it is not engaged with world traditions, philosophy cannot really be said to be about topics like ‘mind,’ or ‘language,’ at all; at best in it’s current state it’s about ‘parochial western conceptions of mind’ or whatever–and that, for a philosopher to be genuinely competent in some AOS they must have an understanding of how that AOS has been approached in various classical non-western traditions. First off, I just strongly doubt that this is so. For the same reasons that I have always gotten more out of reading a mix of contemporary work than I have gotten out of reading Hume and co., I suspect I’d also get more out of reading a mix of contemporary work than I would out of reading Nagarjuna. But even that this is so, it seems to me that trying to effect this change ‘by committee’ so to speak is the wrong way of going about it.
    It is incredibly common for philosophers to think that their favorite ideas are unjustly neglected, and then it is depressingly common for them to complain about the failing of the profession in not taking those ideas up. Look at Williamson giving a hectoring lecture about how we ‘Must Do Better’ by all becoming epistemological externalists, or Horwich giving interviews where he says that contemporary philosophers are just too vain to realize what Wittgenstein has clearly taught us, namely, that most of the questions contemporary philosophers want to talk about are bullshit. These sorts of exercises are stupid. The way to move the profession toward a good but under appreciated idea is not with a hectoring lecture, but by fashioning the actual dialectically appropriate tools which come to convince people: by patient explication of the idea, by constructing elegant theories employing the idea which solve traditional problems, and so on.
    It seems to me that partisans of the relevance of classical non-western traditions to contemporary issues in philosophy are just in the same boat as everyone else with an idea (the pragmatists, the wittgenstineans, the X-phi-ers, etc. etc.). If they want to get attention, then the way to do it is just by doing good philosophy until people take note.

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