By: Samir Chopra

Rarely, if ever, does the term 'intellectual property' add clarity to any debate of substance–very often, this is because it includes the term 'property' and thus offers an invitation to some dubious theorizing. This post by Alex Rosenberg at Daily Nous is a good example of this claim:

Locke famously offered an account of the justification of private property, one that Nozick brought to our attention in Anarchy, State and Utopia. The account worked like this: morally permissible private property begins with original acquisition, and that happens when you mix your labor with nature, and leave as good and as much for others. Alas, this “Lockean” proviso is impossible to satisfy. Or at least it is in every original acquisition other than the case of intellectual property. Here one mixes one mental labor with nature—empirical facts about reality, including social reality. Since there are an infinite number of good ideas, the creator of intellectual property leaves as much and as good for others, and therefore has an unqualified right to what he has created.

Brian Leiter’s ownership of the PGR satisfies the most stringent test of private property I know. It’s his creation and he excluded no one else from mixing his or her labor with nature to produce a substitute for or for that matter a complement to his creation.

In light of this fact, the effort to separate him from his intellectual property owing to disapproval of his emails and posts seems rather preposterous.

It has often been proposed–most notably by Richard Stallmanfree software's most fiery proponent-that the term 'intellectual property' be junked in favor of more precise usage. That is, when you are tempted to use the term 'intellectual property' use 'copyright,' 'patents,' 'trademarks,' or 'trade secrets' instead. Doing this would enable immediate grappling with the precise nature of the issue at hand–in each named domain there are separable legal and policy issues at play.

For instance, the granting of copyright is not the recognition of an abstract property right. It is a utilitarian policy decision–to allow the collection of monopoly rent for a limited period of time–with a very specific objective in mind: the creation of more artistic works. If someone's copyright rights have allegedly been violated, we may begin by trying to identify the concrete expression that was supposedly copyrightable, the identification of the nature of the infringement–unauthorized reproduction or the production of derivative works–and so on. Incidentally, matters become a tad confusing because Rosenberg talks about 'mixing mental labor with nature.' Locke did not have 'nature' in mind, rather he had in mind fallow land. Which is precisely not the nature of artistic creation, where the creator does not interact with 'fallow land' but mixes his ideas with the ideas of others to create a new work.

In the case of the Philosophical Gourmet Report, it relies for its content on the availability of a great deal of openly available material; collation, processing, and analysis turns this into a new work–the PGR, the new concrete expression. There is indeed a copyright in the particular concrete expression of the PGR–the individual blog pages and the material in them–its author's commentaries, analysis, and summaries. The unauthorized copying of the content of these is indeed prohibited, as is the production of derivative works–for instance, an unauthorized abridgment of his explanation of the rankings. But the current proposals aimed at changing the 'management' of the PGR aim to do nothing this sort. Prof. Leiter's concrete expressions–the current content of the PGR–remain his; he could continue to produce them, retain his copyright, and proceed as before. And indeed, an entirely new set of rankings may be produced, using the same 'raw material' available to the current authors of the PGR, subjected to new analysis and commentary, and thus resulting in a new concrete expression, a new set of rankings. Also copyrightable.

Analytic philosophers–who are so proud of their claims to provide conceptual clarity–shouldn't continue to traffic in a term as obfuscatory as 'intellectual property.'

Note: This post was originally published–under the same title--at samirchopra.com.

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8 responses to “Once More: ‘Intellectual Property’ Breeds Confusion; Drop it”

  1. Alan White Avatar
    Alan White

    I have a bit of a self-interested question here that might translate to the Leiter situation.
    What about methodology or procedure as property? I teach–and have multiply published on–a single-topic approach to teaching intro to philosophy. The method I’ve described can be used with pretty wildly different content. Does that mean I cannot be entitled to ownership of that method even if others employ it with content that I have never considered? I’d think not. This is not about patents on means of specific construction or producing an item –it’s about general means of achieving specific goals (in my case, involving students in doing philosophy rather than learning philosophical content; with Leiter it is about methods that produce useful rankings). I’d be at least offended if one used my approach without citation or acknowledgement (and Martin Benjamin thus used my approach with full acknowledgement for many years in his graduate course on teaching). If Leiter developed his own methods of evaluation and ranking, then why is that not a matter of ownership?

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  2. Gordon Avatar
    Gordon

    Hear, hear. I almost posted a comment on the Daily Nous thread about this bit of really confused argument on Rosenberg’s part, particularly as it got debated in the comments. The main point I’d want to add is that it’s not at all silly to use Locke as a moral justification for granting intellectual property rights (by which I mean primarily patent and copyright). It’s a point debated in the IP literature, and any number of very good theorists – Robert Merges, Wendy Gordon, and Justin Hughes come to mind – think there’s something to it; other very good theorists (Seanna Shiffrin is the first name that pops into my head here) think Locke adds nothing of use to the discussion (full disclosure: I’ve got a paper out that argues that the Lockean argument can be extracted from his focus on land and work pretty well in an IP context, but that the provisos mean that the rights granted would be fairly weak).
    Rosenberg thought he was making a moral argument, as far as I can tell (so the move to Locke and away from utilitarianism was in principle appropriate), but it wasn’t well-made. The Nozick zipper argument isn’t taken that seriously any more in Locke scholarship, even among libertarian-leaning readers: Locke doesn’t say I have to leave the exact same thing (so if I take one acre of land, you are thereby also entitled to an acre), and folks like David Schmidtz argue that if property claims lead to greater overall wealth, the proviso is easily satisfied. Locke’s examples even support this reading, as he says repeatedly that cultivated land out-performs fallow land.
    The better moral argument for IP in the PGR would be Hegelian, and say that BL has some sort of personality interest in the PGR, because he’d invested so much of himself in it. Of course, that one cuts both ways, and you could argue that everybody who makes a significant life decision based on the PGR also has a personality interest in it (John Tehranian makes the theoretical argument here).
    As a matter of policy, if that was the argument? The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in 1991 that hard work didn’t get you copyright protection. Your expression had to be original (or whatever part you got copyright to had to be your original contribution; ideas can’t be copyrighted in any case). The Court said a decision to alphabetize names in a phone directory lacked any originality and so wasn’t copyrightable, when the names and phone numbers were themselves already out there. By analogy here, a numeric ranking of graduate programs by their reputation isn’t that original, either. So whatever comes out of that process as copyrightable would be fairly narrow: absolutely nothing would prevent others from using the same underlying data to say something else (SCOTUS is hostile these days to business-method patents, but that still might be a better route, fwiw).
    In short, no, I don’t think Rosenberg’s copyright claim made any sense at all. At least it wasn’t per se offensive, like the thinly-veiled comparison to Hitler and Stalin… I think there’s a lot of problems with the PGR, and with the boundary-work it performs, but it deserves a better discussion than that.

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  3. Graduate Student Avatar
    Graduate Student

    I think there’s much to like in this, but I want to balk at “the granting of copyright is not the recognition of an abstract property right. It is a utilitarian policy decision.” I think that’s true — but it is also misleading. It is true as a matter of legal history. But it is misleading if it is supposed to suggest that the only basis for recognizing copyright is utilitarian consequentialism. There is a further question about whether there is a moral right to copyright, and this sort of writing suggests that’s an easy, quick, “no”. But that is a substantive moral question, and one which probably should interact with our normative theorizing about the curvature of actual copyright law. (And the same goes for the other sorts of ‘intellectual property’.)

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  4. Graduate Student Avatar
    Graduate Student

    (Also I think the link to samirchopra.com is incorrect?)

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  5. p Avatar
    p

    Indeed, we should treat ideas expressed in articles – which presumably are just expressions of those ideas – in the same way. No problem if somebody takes my idea and publishes it and does not mention me, right? I mean – it’s in his words, not mine…

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  6. David Wallace Avatar
    David Wallace

    p: Distinguish, surely, principles of academic attribution from principles of copyright. If someone uses the ideas from my paper without attribution, that’s plagiarism, but it isn’t copyright violation. (If it was, I could sue anyone who used and developed my research, whether or not they attributed it!)

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  7. ajkreider Avatar
    ajkreider

    If I read p correctly, he isn’t making a point about legally enforceable rights, but moral rights. Viewing plagiarism as a kind of stealing (of others’ ideas) implies that someone owns something. And to own something is to have some kind of dominion over it, a right to say how it is used . . .
    I suppose this is Graduate Student’s point as well.

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  8. David Wallace Avatar
    David Wallace

    Akreider: but that’s exactly my point. Having an idea, in academic contexts, grants no control whatsoever on how it’s used. It only grants an entitlement to be acknowledged.

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