By: Samir Chopra

A few months ago, I noticed an interesting and telling interaction between a group of academic philosophers. A Facebook friend posted a little note about how one of her students had written to her about having encountered a so-called "Gettier case" i.e., she had acquired a true belief for invalid reasons. In the email, the student described how he/she had been told the 'right time' by a broken clock. The brief discussion that broke out in response to my friend's note featured a comment from someone noting that the broken clock example is originally due to Bertrand Russell. A little later, a participant in the discussion offered the following comment:

Even though the clock case is due to Russell, it's worth noting that "Gettier" cases were present in Nyāya philosophy in India well before Russell, for instance in the work of Gaṅgeśa, circa 1325 CE. The example is of someone inferring that there is fire on a faraway mountain based on the presence of smoke (a standard case of inference in Indian philosophy), but the smoke is actually dust. As it turns out, though, there is a fire on the mountain. See the Tattva-cintā-maṇi or "Jewel of Reflection on the Truth of Epistemology." [links added]

In response to this, one gentleman wrote:

[T]here are countless cases that are standardly referred to as gettier kinds despite author, radical diversity, historical inaccuracy

I found this response peculiar, and yet, interestingly revealing.

Naming a particular fact-pattern, one used in a standard pedagogical example, as a "Gettier case" is not an innocent act. It is fraught with significance. It attaches the name of a person, an individual philosopher, to an entire range of philosophical cases used to illustrate epistemological principles. That person, that philosopher, does not come unattached; his name brings in its train an entire philosophical tradition and serves to stamp its institutions and its personnel with the imprimatur of philosophical innovator, as worthwhile contributors to a hallowed–and well-established and recognized–tradition. Because of this naming process, in part, an entire area of philosophical work is marked off and stamped with a certain kind of ownership.

Of even more interest to me is the response I made note of. A philosophical discussion is underway, proceeding along familiar, well-worn lines. Names of well-known philosophers from well-known traditions roll off everyone's lips. Then, an interjection is made: politely pointing out that the nomenclature in use has an etymology that is not always acknowledged. This reminder is provided, I repeat, politely. There is no snark, and pointers to references are provided for the interesting reader. It is the very model of a respectful academic contribution to a philosophical discussion; I dare say I'd call it a useful philosophical contribution for the interested scholar of philosophy.

The response to this contribution–the first one, before any welcoming acknowledgments can be made–is, roughly, to cease and desist. There's a conversation going on; it's following the usual well-worn path, and you'd like us to look elsewhere? The nerve. There is no acknowledgment of an alternative tradition.

This is what silencing looks like.

Addendum: In response to my post, Professor Alan Richardson of the University of British Columbia wrote to me saying:

I find it interesting that the stopped clock example, which Russell mentions in a sentence of his 1948 Human Knowledge (on p 154 of the 1948 Simon and Schuster edition) would have been known to Russell (indeed to have been derived by Russell, one imagines) from Lewis Carroll’s little 1898 essay “The Two Clocks.”

Here’s a version of the Carroll essay from the web. 

So, Russell’s example gets subsumed under “Gettier cases” and what I have to think is the inspiration for it (the Carroll essay) goes missing.  Yes, just another example of “the Matthew Effect” but given what your post was about, it seemed interesting enough.

Note: This post was originally published–under the same title–at samirchopra.com.

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9 responses to “An Act Of Philosophical Silencing”

  1. Sara L. Uckelman Avatar

    It’s presumably for reasons similar to those of the person who raised Gaṅgeśa that I find myself regularly railing against the use of “Ockhamism” to define a certain type of branching-time analysis of future contingents (since there’s in many cases little evidence that Ockham actually had any such view), and hesitate to call the distribution of conjunction and disjunction laws ‘de Morgan’s’.
    What is it that is always said about those who don’t know their history being doomed to repeat it?

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  2. Sylvia Avatar

    After reading this, I was interested to learn more about this “Jewel of Reflection on the Truth of Epistemology”. An English translation seems to be in the making. There doesn’t seem to be much online, but I did find this pdf.
    The Gettier- and Ockham-ification of ideas not pertaining to Gettier or Ockham may be seen as instances of Stigler’s law of eponymy, which says that “No scientific discovery is named after its original discoverer” (and which -of course- wasn’t named after its first proponent either). Apparently, it also holds for philosophy.
    I don’t think it is harmful per se to call the dust-or-smoke example a Gettier case. We tend to connect things we learn to things we already knew. Most Western philosophers in 2015 learn about Gettier’s paper before they learn about Indian philosophy; but presumably it is better to learn about it late rather than not at all?
    Or maybe it’s a slight improvement to call them “Gettier cases avant-la-lettre”? This at least makes clear their temporal priority.

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  3. Wesley Buckwalter Avatar

    Hi Samir,
    As you know, I was the gentleman that made that remark in a private facebook thread with a close friend. If I recall correctly, people in that thread were asking about whether certain kinds of thought experiments were typically referred to as “Gettier Cases”. I said that they were, despite how inaccurate or uninformative it might be to do so, in part because of the alternative traditions you cite. I’m sorry you interpreted my remark as silencing my friends on facebook. Personally I believe that philosophers should abandon the notion of “Gettier cases” and that the practice of labeling thought experiments in this way should be discouraged. If you are interested, I have recently argued for this in two articles here (http://philpapers.org/rec/BLOGCA) and here (http://philpapers.org/rec/TURKAL).
    All the best,
    Wesley

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  4. Patrick S. O'Donnell Avatar

    Sylvia, The text was translated by Stephen H. Phillips and N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya and published in 2004 by the American Institute of Buddhist Studies (note that it is not a Buddhist but Nyāya text) in conjunction with Columbia University’s Center for Buddhist Studies and Tibet House US. See: http://www.amazon.com/Epistemology-Perception-Gangesas-Tattvacintamani-Treasury/dp/0975373439

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  5. Sylvia Avatar

    Patrick, thanks for this reference!
    Searching for “Jewel of Reflection on the Truth” gives a lot more results than searching for “Jewel of Reflection on the Truth of Epistemology”.

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  6. Chris Avatar
    Chris

    I feel like Wesley’s comment should be incorporated into the post. I have looked at this twice and I must be honest I feel very differently about it having read it – to be honest, I feel misled.
    Chris

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  7. Jennifer Nagel Avatar

    Hi Samir,
    I agree that it’s really valuable to learn as much as we can from a great variety of philosophical traditions, and we’d all be better off if our philosophical educations were much more diverse. For what it’s worth, I’m a facebook friend of Wesley’s, and I never saw his comment as dismissive to the Classical Indian tradition. He says that many cases get labelled as “Gettier cases” even when this isn’t historically accurate, and this seems totally consistent with your suggestion that other and earlier philosophers should get the credit for devising epistemological cases with the structure we now associate with Gettier’s 1963 paper, better known to most of us in the Anglo-American tradition for contingent historical reasons.
    There’s actually an interesting debate about whether the cases you cite (and their earlier antecedents in Dharmottara, ca 770 CE) should or should not count as cases of the same type Gettier found (“Gettier cases in the contemporary sense”). Those who are interested could read Jonathan Stoltz’s paper Gettier and Factivity in Indo-Tibetan Epistemology — Stoltz argues that because Dharmottara’s tradition was working with a factive conception of justification, his cases were not intended to show justified true belief without knowledge: so, the desert traveller who hallucinates water in the valley ahead (where coincidentally there is a well hidden under the sand) has a belief that is at best pseudo-justified, rather than justified. Stoltz has a great analysis of the ancient texts, but I am inclined to resist his analysis of the nature of what it means for something to be a Gettier case in the contemporary sense: I think even those who have factive conceptions of justification can use cases of the desert traveller type to argue against those who have weaker conceptions of justification — Dharmottara clearly had Dharmakirti’s more internalist line on justification as a target. (As a contemporary parallel, Timothy Williamson can recognize “Gettier cases” as showing something interesting even if he thinks that any belief falling short of knowledge is not fully justified.) I think there are also interesting questions about what philosophers themselves are using these cases to demonstrate. If memory serves–the case is discussed in Georges Dreyfus’s Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations, which I don’t have in front of me now–Dharmottara uses the desert traveler case not against JTB but to criticize a rival theory of knowledge which analyses it as truth-hitting cognition that underpins successful action. Russell uses the stopped clock example not to show that JTB is wrong but to show that knowledge is not equivalent to true belief. Peter of Mantua’s fourteenth century mistaken identity case (discussed here) is used against an analysis that identifies knowledge as belief that is both true and confident.
    Gettier does a nice job of making a simple point about JTB theories in his short 1963 paper, which is much more readily available to us than the Dharmottara (the crucial first section of which still hasn’t been translated from the Tibetan, so far as I know). So that’s an OK reason to call them “Gettier cases” when we are talking about JTB theory, rather than calling them “Russell cases”. Whether we should really call them “Dharmottara cases” is a great question, and one that may take considerably more research into Dharmottara and Dharmakirti, and considerably more thought about the role that the dialectical intentions of a philosopher should play in the identification of a given type of thought experiment.
    Meanwhile, I’m not sure that using the label “Gettier case” for ancient cases has to be contributing to the Matthew effect for Gettier, giving to him more of what he already has. If I say to a contemporary Anglo-American audience, “Dharmottara here presents a nice example of a Gettier case” I’m signalling that the thing they might have thought was discovered in 1963 had been found a long time earlier (if anything this lessens Gettier’s singular stature). Meanwhile, let’s go back and look at the excellent, and amazing Classical Indian causal theory of knowledge. And also the ancient idea that justification is factive. I love this paper for example.

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  8. Patrick S. O'Donnell Avatar

    Jennifer, I do have Dreyfus’s book in front of me, and yes the case is discussed there (pp. 292-93), with Dreyfus referring to Dharmottara’s example as “quite similar to the cases used by Gettier in his attacks against the classical Western definition of knowledge as justified true belief.” He writes that the example can thus “be appropriately described as Gettier-like in that it takes a putative definition of knowledge and brings a counterexample in which the criteria implied by the definition are met but we know that there is no knowledge[,]” the conclusion for Dharmottara being that we “need both criteria (practical value and normative truth) to define validity (leaving aside for the time being the issue of novelty).” And the more general lesson being that “a causal account of knowledge can be made complete only by at least tacitly appealing to a normative element determined in intentional terms. This is what Dharmakīrti intends to capture in his account of valid cognition.” Should Dharmottara want to exclude Gettier-type cases, in other words, “he must hold that here truth does not just mean factuality, but something stronger, what we would call normative truth; that is, truth in accordance with the proper standards of evaluation.”

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  9. Samir Chopra Avatar

    Jennifer,
    Thanks for this very rich comment–especially with all the references you’ve provided. Much appreciated. There are issues here of attribution that I hope to address in another post very soon.
    best,
    Samir

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